JAPANESE VIEWS OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE*

"East is East and West is West
Never the twain shall meet."

The terms East and West, showing opposite directions, convey on the surface divergent differences, but it is forgotten that the earth is round, and the so-called farthest East touches the farthest West.

According to many historians civilization originated in the garden of Tigris Euphrates, and from this region one moved to the Eastward and the other Westward. The Eastward movement produced Indo Chinese civilization, and finally came upon Japan where the march had been stopped by the third Shogun of Tokugawa who closed the country, 250 years ago. While the Eastern civilization thus stopping at an Island Empire in the Far East, the Westward movement which had developed into Grecian, Roman, German, French and English civilization running into the new continent and there was also thought at an end when it reached to the Pacific shore. But the Ocean, in spite of its vastness, did not form impassable barrier, but a bridge across which that Westward march of civilization was to continue. The time finally came, and through the American Commodore M. C. Perry the Eastern current of civilization was met with its Westward current, about half a century ago, when he knocked at the door of Japan in 1853.

There is no nation in the world that has had such experience and vicissitudes, as well as progress, as Japan for the last fifty years, neither are there any two nations on the face of the earth with such romantic relations and affections as those of Japan and the United States. The United States, on the shore of Uraga, where now an imperishable marble stands the statue of Commodore Perry, importuned Japan to yield and opened her door to trade and commerce. And today one might even wonder whether the United States of America would have come to existence had it not been for the existence of Japan,—the meaning is this: Unless Columbus had read in Marco Polo of the wealth of Japan he would not have started on his voyage of discovery. Moreover was it not Japan that supplied tea in the harbor of Boston which proved to be the signal of American Independence?

I think it is not useless to remind here a brief history how the American

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Commodore knocked the front and how the first minister, Mr. Townsend Harris, opened the door.

We know that the question of establishing commercial relations with Japan had occupied public attention in the United States for more than twenty years before Perry’s arrival.

Both in official and business circles the matter had been much discussed. A resolution in favor of a mission being sent to Japan had been proposed in the House of Representatives, and as early as the year 1832 the United States Government had sent to Commodore Roberts, then in command of the American squadron in Chinese waters, instructions regarding a mission to Japan, for the purpose of opening a trade, which were to be acted upon if he thought advisable. If he decided to undertake this mission, he was to charter a private vessel, and letters of credence in which the proper title of the Emperor was to be inserted, when ascertained, were furnished to him.

But by the harsh treatment received on various occasions by the crews of American whalers wrecked on the coasts of Yezo and neighboring islands and by the experience of the “Morrison” in 1837, Washington Government decided to take the new and vigorous policy. The “Morrison” was a British merchant vessel, and chartered by an American mercantile house at Macao for the purpose of restoring to their country seven shipwrecked Japanese. The “Morrison” was received with undisguised hostility. She was not allowed to communicate with the shore, and she was twice fired upon, first in Yedo Bay, where she arrived and afterwards at Kagoshima.

In 1845 the “Mercator,” an American whaler, rescued some Japanese sailors at sea and took them to the bay of Yedo. On anchoring she was surrounded by several hundred armed boats and deprived of her arms and ammunition. After a detention of three days orders for her release came from Yedo.

In the same year Commodore Biddle endeavored, under instructions from Washington, to open relations with Japan. He came with two men-of-war and anchored in Yedo Bay. And at the request of the Japanese he explained in writing the reason for her visit. But his mission was a failure. The Yedo Government, in a written reply, refused definitely to enter into trading relations, and with this answer Commodore Biddle withdrew.

Four years later the American man-of-war “Preble” was sent to Nagasaki to fetch away the shipwrecked crew of a whaler. She had some difficulty in accomplishing her object, which was only effected after a show of force.

In no way discouraged by the result of Commodore Biddle’s visit,
the United States Government persevered in their policy of opening Japan to foreign trade. In 1851 instructions with that object were sent to Commodore Aulick on the China station, together with a letter from President Fillmore addressed to the Emperor of Japan. For some reason which does not appear these instructions were not acted upon, but in the following year the matter was again taken up, fresh credentials were prepared and Commodore Perry received orders to proceed to Japan on a mission which assumed almost the dimensions of a naval expedition.

The objects of his mission were explained by the State department to be threefold; to make an arrangement for the more humane treatment of American sailors who might be shipwrecked on the coasts of Japan; to obtain the opening of one or more harbors as ports of call for American vessels and the establishment of a coal depot; and to secure permission for trade at such ports as might be opened.

No secrecy surrounded the intentions of the United States. They were known in Europe as well as in America. Macfarlane, writing in London in 1852, says with some exaggeration, “The attention of the whole civilized world is now fixed on the American expedition.”

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry, with four men-of-war anchored in Uraga harbor. His instructions were to obtain the facilities desired by persuasion, if possible, but if necessary by force, and there is evidence to show that he was ready, if authorized, to take such strong measures as the occupation of territory to effect his object.

Perry was asked by the Japanese at Urago to go to Nagasaki, this being, he was told, its only place where foreign ships were allowed to come. He refused, and asked for an interview on shore, at which he could deliver the letter he had brought. After a few days’ negotiation the Japanese gave way. The interview on shore was granted and Perry delivered the President’s letter and his own credentials as envoy. In the formal receipt given to him it was admitted that the letter had only been accepted under compulsion. On July 17, three days after the interview, Perry sailed for the Loochoos, where he had called on his way to Japan.

In December of the same year Perry received a letter from the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, written at the request of the Japanese Government, telling him of the Shogun’s death having occurred soon after the receipt of the President’s letter, and asking him to postpone his return to Japan, as everything there was in confusion. Perry, in his reply, thanked the Governor General for the news, but announced no change in his plan.

On February 12, 1854, he arrived in Japan again, this time with six ships, and on the following day sailed up the bay of Yedo and anchored at a spot twelve miles above Uraga. He was urged by the
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Japanese to go to Uraga, or Kamakura and hold a conference there. This, however, he declined to do, and on the 25th he moved further up the bay, anchoring off Kanagawa. The Japanese then proposed that the conference should take place at Yokohama, a village quite close to Kanagawa. To this Perry agreed, and about a month later his negotiations were brought to a successful issue by the signature of the Treaty of the 31st of March, which opened the Ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels, the former at once, the latter at the end of a year. The treaty was ratified by the President of the United States July, 1854, and ratifications exchanged at Shimoda, February 21st, 1855. The Treaty consisted of 12 articles, including the following:

"The United States of America and the Empire of Japan, desiring to establish firm, lasting and sincere friendship between the two nations, have resolved to fix in a manner clear and positive by means of a treaty or general convention of peace and amity, the rules which shall in future be mutually observed in the intercourse of their respective countries; for which most desirable object the President of the United States has conferred full powers on his commissioner, Matthew Calbraith Perry, special ambassador of the United States to Japan, and the August Sovereign of Japan has given similar full powers to his Commissioners, Hayashi Daigaku-no-Kami, Ido, Prince of Tsussima, Izawa, Prince of Mimasaka, and Udono, member of the Board of Revenue. And the said Commissioners, after having exchanged their said full powers and duly considered the premises, have agreed to the following Articles:"

And Article I says:

"I. There shall be a perfect permanent and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity between the United States of America on the one part and the Empire of Japan on the other part and between their people respectively without exception of persons or places."

The signature of Perry's treaty was shortly followed by its conclusion of arrangements with other powers, with the British, the Russians, and the Dutch.

First in order comes the British convention. This was negotiated at Nagasaki, in October of the same year, 1854, by Admiral Stirling, who came with a squadron of four vessels. This treaty was signed October 14th and ratified January 23rd, 1855.

Four months later the Russian Admiral, Poutiatine, concluded a treaty at Shimoda, and with the Dutch on November 9, 1855.

The first American consul-general to Japan was Mr. Townsend Harris, and he arrived in Japan in August, 1856. He at once opened long negotiations with the Japanese ministers and finally the American Convention was concluded at Shimoda, June 7th, 1857. And in the fol-
lowing year the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, between the United States and Japan, was settled in February. But the new Treaty was decided to refer it before signature to Kioto for the approval of the Throne. And the minister who had taken the most prominent part in the negotiations, Hotta Bitchiuno Kami, was sent to Kioto to obtain the Imperial consent, but the court had signified its desapproval of the negotiations, and he returned, having failed in his mission. The anti-foreign feeling was too strong.

The signature of the treaty was accordingly postponed till September, and the American negotiator returned to Shimado to await the result of further overtures to Kioto. Very soon after his return, however, an American man-of-war arrived with the news that the war in China had terminated and that the English and French ambassadors to China were on their way to Japan to negotiate treaties. He at once proceeded in this vessel to Kanagawa, and urged from there by letter the necessity for the immediate signature of the treaty. His representations, assisted by the presence of Iikamono Kami at the head of affairs, had the desired effect, and without waiting any longer for consent from Kioto the treaty was signed at Kanagawa on board the American man-of-war on July 29.

The ice having been broken, other treaties followed in rapid succession, all on the same general lines, thus proving the correctness of the opinion given by Harris that what was satisfactory to the United States would be acceptable to other powers. The Dutch signed theirs on the 18th of August, the Russians on the 19th, the British on the 26th and the French on the 7th of October.

Now the door was open, and the Western seeds sown in, and of the character of Commodore Perry and Mr. Harris, all the Japanese admired and respected Americans. They invited American teachers, experts, missionaries and merchants to westernize her institutions, hitherto feudalistic, and pursued the course as best they could according to the wise guidance of these Americans.

We surely thank the American fleet which brought such a kind hearted awakening and a message of friendly counsel, instead of conquer, or colonize. The happy consonance between the knocking at the door from without and response from within has created a new era in Japan, and she has ever since been faithful to her new destiny. The new destiny, that her course should lie midway between East and West, and that to build a stone firmly in the bridge which binds together these two great civilizations.

We can easily find that Japan and the United States, though differing in many ways, have one thing in common so far as diplomacy is concerned. That is, both nations have rapidly jumped into prominence.
as world powers, and therefore are more or less misunderstood, disliked, criticized, and even feared and hated in some quarters. Late Prince Katsura once said, “The only fault we Japanese are conscious of is, we have made too rapid progress!”

It was this widespread fear that the United States would become too prominent and powerful that explains much of the attitude of European Statesmen towards the United States during the era of Independence and just after. At first no government would receive American diplomatic agents, nor recognize the United States in any way. American agents were treated with contempt and not even permitted to enter the capitals of Europe in many cases. Only France, being the enemy of England, allowed American diplomats to live in Paris and gave most valuable assistance and sympathy, though not officially. When the war of Independence was successfully ended, DeAranda, the Spanish ambassador, wrote to the King of Spain: “This Republic is born a pigmy, but a day will come when it will be a giant. In a few years we shall watch with grief the vast power of this giant.”

France, England and Spain had vast possessions in the Western Hemisphere and those of Spain were under extreme forms of despotism that were radically opposed to the liberties of the new Republic. And when these Spanish colonies in South America revolted from the despotism of Spain and established republican forms of government European monarchies had extreme anxiety with all this political liberty and therefore the three great powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia, formed in 1815 what they called the “Holy Alliance,” the evident purpose of which was to check the growth of republican governments and possibly to establish again Spanish despotism in South America. It was indeed this secret threat from Europe that called out some of the best diplomacy in the United States.

The Republic felt that if Europe was permitted to build up monarchies in South America these would be a standing peril to the Republic, and so the determination was taken never to permit European interference in any of the governments of the entire Western Hemisphere. The cry of “America for Americans” was then heard for the first time. Thus the famous policy called the “Monroe Doctrine” was given to the world in 1823. Its main principals may be briefly cited in the words of President Jefferson: “Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to interfere with political affairs in the Western Hemisphere.”

While recognizing the right of England in Canada and the existing monarchies of Mexico and Brazil, this Monroe Doctrine has not only prevented any colonization of the Western Hemisphere by European govern-
ments and the establishing of any monarchy, but it has controlled the destiny of all the great islands near America.

For instance, when it was rumored that Spain was about to sell Cuba to France, the United States Government informed Spain that she was at liberty to retain and govern Cuba, but not to sell or transfer it to any other power, which act would be regarded as unfriendly to the United States. The statement from the Secretary of State, said "We can never consent that Cuba shall become a colony of any other European power. In the possession of a strong naval power it might prove ruinous both to our domestic and foreign commerce, and even endanger the Union of the States. The highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety." The protest against the Maximilian Empire in Mexico in 1866 and the declaration of war upon Spain in 1898 were quite the same reason.

These circumstances we can see in Japan's situation. Korea is the "Cuba of the Far East" and Russia's occupation of that peninsula would be a peril to Japan's national existence, just as Cuba to the United States. So Japan fought against Russia for "to provide for its own safety." Let me here refer to a rumor, in a few years ago, that Russia was about to sell the northern half of Sakhalien to the United States. In case it were true Japan would be justified in saying that the sale of North Karafuto to any western power would be regarded as "dangerous to the peace and safety of Japan." China is the "Mexico of Asia," and its unsettled situation and the establishment by any other strong power of any footstand is also "dangerous to the peace and safety of Japan."

So the Okuma cabinet recently proposed to the Chinese government that to agree no island, port or harbor along the coast shall be ceded or leased to any third power. But this does not mean any territorial ambition. Its only object is to effectively protect the territorial integrity of China and to make the Far East a well united whole, where East and West meet in peace and good understanding, so that the purpose of its political, economic, financial and social interest, in fact, its civilization in general, may be best served and adjusted.

Count Okuma, premier, declared in regard to the Manchurian question, "If China is powerful enough and there is not a least fear of Manchuria being occupied by any one of the foreign powers, there is no necessity for Japan being obliged to occupy Manchuria. The motives of Japan for the occupation of Manchuria is not aggression of Chinese territory, but simply for the fear that it may fall into the hands of any other foreign country, in which case a great pressure would be applied on Japan. Thus I am inclined to an opinion that until the time arrives when China would
be powerful enough to uphold Manchuria by herself, it is better for Japan to occupy Manchuria."

We know that the territorial preservation of China, commands international respect as the result of a solemn pledge entered into by the leading powers of the world. But how well and faithfully this pledge may be observed and how far this may be facilitated, the duty of showing falls principally on Japan, because of her geographical and political position. In short, Japan stands a trustee to the powers for the peace and well being of the Far East, and she must be invested with the status and power commensurate with this important office. That Japan is not spurred by her own ambitions to assume this role will be most clearly seen if any one will imagine what would happen on her effacement from the Far Eastern stage. It will thus be seen that Japan's ideals and necessity dovetail exactly with the peace in the East Asia and Far Eastern interest of the other powers.

Now the great East and the great West are coming together and the two nations that confront each other across the Pacific are Japan and the United States. These are the two nations that must bear the burden of solving the greatest diplomatic questions the world has even seen.

Therefore there is imperative need that we fully understand each other in the very largest and deepest and completest way. We must emphasize each other's best point in order to strengthen mutual trust and to conquer mutual suspicions. We must prove in the concrete that there is no impossible gulf between the East and West, by basing our friendship not so much on treaties as on a larger and broader mutual knowledge that no temporary misunderstanding can weaken and destroy. And the mightiest of the oceans, instead of becoming like unto the old Mediterranean, where the East and the West—Carthage and Rome—met in the one hundred years' war for decisive battle of race supremacy, Japan and the United States have made it the Man's theater of supreme achievement, of peace and prosperity of mankind.

In conclusion Japan cannot get along without the sympathy and friendship of the United States, nor can the United States get along without the friendship of Japan. Each has profound need of the other, and while the "Monroe Doctrine" is the basis of Century peace of the Western Hemisphere, the "Asia for the Asiatics" is the key of peace in the Far East. And we have no doubt that the fact is perfectly well understood in America.

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