THE MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES IN A SOCIALIST SETTING:
SLOVENE IN YUGOSLAVIA

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Introduction

In this paper I address a number of problems with respect to language maintenance in Slovenia: how to categorize its history; what relevance to attribute to its alternatives; and how to look at the prospects for its future.

First, I attempt a definition of the term language-maintenance itself. My definition is as follows: to maintain a language is to preserve and respect it, but also to give it a practical value, i.e., to maintain its ‘use value’ and keep it out of the sphere of ‘exchange values.’ To treat a language as an ‘exchange value’ means to treat it as a commodity; this is exactly what has happened to many languages, the vital property of ethnic groups and nations which have disappeared in history. These (historical) languages may still exist in one or another symbolic form, and may even be used on special occasions and by extravagant groups (as Latin or Greek, used by priests, doctors and philosophers), but they are not ‘maintained’ for all practical purposes, and they do not have the function of so-called national languages. To maintain a language should therefore mean to use it for everyday purposes, from kindergarten to national parliament, from poetry to theoretical physics. To put it radically: to maintain a language means not thinking about it as a particular phenomenon, and forgetting its particularity; it means presupposing its existence in such a way that its users can function, and use it, without reflection, in a natural and automatic way, the way of everyday ‘common-sense knowledge.’ To use these terms is to enter the discussion initiated by phenomenologists like Schutz (1964) and Berger and Luckmann (1966), who drew our attention to the fact that we have difficulties with our ‘common-sense knowledge’ when we cross a national border or cross into a ‘finite province of meaning;’ there, we are strangers, and our natural domestic language becomes a foreign language.

Without proper maintenance a natural, ‘domestic’ language may become foreign even at home: this phenomenon is often encountered among minorities and among emigrants. Or, in reverse: as soon as a language becomes ‘foreign’ (starts to seem odd, impractical, etc.), or when its use somehow stigmatizes the person who speaks it (cf. Priestly 1986), the problem of maintenance arises.

Here I try to examine the extent to which Slovene is confronted with a problem of this kind in contemporary Yugoslavia. First, some examples. Slovenes find themselves in an awkward situation when they begin a conversation with a fellow non-Slovene Yugoslav on Slovene territory, and are expected to accept the other person’s language as a natural means of communication, thereby granting it the status of ‘common-sense knowledge,’ whereas Slovene is experienced as foreign by the fellow-Yugoslav. Slovenes very often accept an imbalance of this kind, and are therefore regarded as bilingual by their fellow-citizens from other parts of the country, including those who have come to live in Slovenia. Insisting on linguistic balance and reciprocity is a new and still quite rare experience for Slovenes. It should be added that, as far as immigrants from Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia are concerned—not to speak of occasional visitors, federal officials or, e.g.,
army officers—they do not find it necessary (nor are they obliged, other than exceptionally) to be bilingual; and they only rarely, in fact, contemplate such a possibility.

Has Slovene been properly maintained in the past? On the one hand, it has never become an ‘exchange-value’, in the sense that Slovenes (in Slovenia, at least) would ‘trade’ it for some other ‘exchange-value’, e.g., for a better standard of living, or for the opportunity to participate in politics or religion . . . On the other hand, Slovenes did in the past opt for bilingualism; this was the case during their co-existence with the German population during the Austrian Empire: as far as conversations with authorities were concerned, Slovenes were at least partly bilingual. Bilingualism is an ‘improper’ form of language-maintenance, especially when practised over a long time period, and when the first language is not used for all purposes, but only for those with ‘lower’ prestige.

In contemporary Slovenia Slovene is legally to be used for all practical purposes, and it is protected, serviced, and developed by the relevant institutions—academies, universities, publishers, media, professional associations, and the like. The formal basis for this is comprised by the state constitutional amendments of 1967-68 and the 1974 Constitution itself. A very important document with respect to the protection of natural languages is the ‘Resolution on the Realization of Constitutional Principles of Equal Rights of Languages and Scripts of the Yugoslav Nations and Nationalities in Federal Regulations and in the Work of Federal Organs’ of 1969 (cf. Uradni list 1969). This resolution declares that linguistic rights are equal in the following fields: the federal legislative practices; the work of federal organizations; all proceedings before state organs and courts; international and interstate relations; and defense. These principles were summarized in the 1974 Constitution, according to which there is no official state language, while the languages of the nations have equal rights in official use. Five languages, including Slovene, are in ‘official use’. Slovene is a language in which all federal acts and regulations are accepted and published as ‘authentic texts.’ Actually, only in the federal assembly is this rule practised; there are several departments to verify texts and provide translations, and a staff of fifty to provide simultaneous translations of parliamentary discussions.

In spite of the general rule and the arrangements just mentioned, delegates very often do not use their rights. It is known that Macedonian delegates practically never speak Macedonian in the federal parliament: and Slovene delegates have recently admitted that they prefer to speak Serbo-Croatian, since their speeches are not listened to, or not understood, if they speak in Slovene. This is even more true of discussions in parliamentary committees; and the federal bodies of the League of Communists, the Socialist Union, the trades unions, and the army, work exclusively in Serbo-Croatian. The same holds true for all the executive bodies, including the Executive Council (the Cabinet) and the State Presidency, even though these include membership from formally sovereign, equal, non-Serbian and non-Croatian nations. Even if the President of one of these bodies is Slovene, he will speak Serbo-Croatian on official occasions. This means that linguistic equality in Yugoslavia is quite limited. This assertion, and this feeling of linguistic (and national) inferiority, is dramatized by data from the latest report of a longitudinal research project (see Slovensko javno mnenje 1986). This report includes findings from identical questionnaires administered in previous years. One of the questions was: “Some people say that the immigration of workers from other republics represents a threat to Slovenes. Do you agree with this or not? And if you do, what is being threatened in Slovenia?” The answers were as follows: “Yes, the Slovene nationality is being threatened” — 11.3% (1980), 14.6% (1982), 12.7% (1983), 23.0% (1986); “Yes, the Slovene language is being threatened” — 15.8% (1980), 28.2% (1982), 24.6% (1983), 39.0% (1986).
Historical aspects of the problem

At the birth of the Slovene nation there is a conversion: I refer to the event that occurred in the mid-eighth century, when the Slovene prince Borut asked the Bavarians to help him in his war against the Avars, as recorded in one of the rare early historical records of the Slovenes, the *Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantorum* (cf. Kos 1936). The paradigmatic character of this event was confirmed more than 1000 years later when it became the central problem in Francagréve Prešeren's *Krst pri Savici* (cf. Cooper 1985). The story of the Conversion, and Prešeren's poem, relates the unwillingness of Slovene leaders to accept the Christian faith, and their insistence on 'original' (barbarian) ways of life. The Christians succeeded with a combination of force and bribery: according to the historical report, the converted prince presented local leaders with two alternatives: to become Christians and drink from golden glasses, or remain pagans and 'eat like pigs.'

This conversion, in spite of its dubious morality, brought the Slovenes the beginnings of their written culture, the *Freising Fragments* of about 1000 AD (see Tomšič 1956). The next great cultural thrust was also connected with a conversion, this time from Catholicism to Protestantism. Primož Trubar, the sixteenth-century reform-minded priest, by translating into 'modern Slovene' more than twenty religious and encyclopedic works, established Slovene as one of the cultural languages of Europe. Following Luther's example, Trubar introduced into Slovene culture the notion of the secondary importance of the political sphere, as compared to the primary importance of religion and culture. With him a subdued, quiet struggle between the political and the cultural spheres began in Slovenia; and this may be considered another 'historical advantage.' The next occurrence of a conversion came with Bonapartism, which gave Slovenes further linguistic, cultural and especially literary rights. The 'Kulturkampf' that was one of its products meant a conversion to Liberalism. Although this was a German concept (and a not very friendly one, in terms of contemporary German-Slovene political relations) it did help the Slovene liberal intelligentsia work out many useful, fruitful emancipatory political and cultural programs, and begin several important ventures—the Slovene 'Realist' novel among them.

The most recent conversion of the Slovenes was the conversion to atheism ('combative atheism' in early Stalinist jargon). The protagonists of this last conversion were the liberals, the social democrats and the communists; it can be fixed in time as a 20th-century phenomenon that reached its full power after 1945. 'Atheization' (and 'bolshevization' in the period after World War II) was a mixed blessing as far as the development of the Slovene nation was concerned. Was it an exceptionally radical conversion?

All these conversions, as I have tried to show, have encouraged Slovenes to abandon their earlier religious beliefs and to adjust to the dominant ideology of the rulers at the time: Christianity, Protestantism, Enlightened Absolutism, Liberalism and so on. These processes influenced Slovene popular beliefs in the religious and political spheres, but they did not touch language, i.e., the Slovenes' linguistic rights. On the contrary, Slovenes developed their culture, primarily their literature; they surrendered their political and religious rights, but kept their cultural rights. The conversion to atheism in a way repeated the old pattern; but it both gave something more and took away something more than had the previous conversions. The political rights of the Slovene nation expanded, but their cultural rights became structurally problematic, particularly in view of the prevailing, dogmatic interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society; in itself, this theory (whatever its interpretations) implies a low level of interest in the problem of nationality. The old model had promoted a disjunction of the political and the cultural spheres; the new one introduced their interconnectedness, even their indistinctness.
The ‘internationalist’ and ‘class’ emphases of this new conception nevertheless harbored several ‘common-sense’, democratic, even populist elements which, in the case of postwar Yugoslavia, prevented it from establishing an entirely unitary or centralist state. Greater discussion of the constitutional and political oscillations between 1943 and 1974 would clarify the benefits and the flaws; but it is a fact that the postwar Republic of Slovenia represents the most developed form of the Slovene nation to date, the form nearest the ideal (in the sense of an ideal sovereign state on Slovene ethnic territory). This means that none of the crucial conversions experienced by the Slovenes restrained them; on the contrary, they provided them with opportunities to survive and progress. Living with conversions does however mean developing a particular mentality, a ‘national spirit’ that can be described provisionally as a spirit of adaptation, of compromise and sublimation, but also a spirit of rationality and open-mindedness. In their politics Slovenes have often adopted policies of gradual steps, uneasy partnerships, and elasticity, which sometimes—in more radical and moralistic statements—brought upon them fierce condemnation (thus, by writers such as Fran Levstik, Ivan Cankar, Edvard Kocbek, and Edvard Kardelj). The same mentality has of course resulted in feelings of resignation, reflected in emigrations and in an extremely high suicide rate.

One of the points in the program of the Slovene Liberation Front of 1941 implied the transformation of the Slovene national character, and promoted the concept of so-called ‘active Slovene-ness’. And, indeed, something of this sort did happen: Slovenes began an armed struggle for liberation. It may be argued that this change of attitude was somehow connected with the latest conversion (cf. above), which—to put it very radically—re-converted Slovenes to their ‘original’ position as an independent Slavic people, associated with some other Slavic tribes, the situation in the seventh-century commonwealth of Samo.

For most of their history Slovenes have fought for the preservation of their language and culture, and were (as indicated above) willing to pay a high price for them. Most of the time their opponents were Germans; more recently, Italians and ‘fellow Yugoslavs’. Even the term “Serbo-Croatian-Slovene language” was at one time used. After World War II the situation changed, and it can hardly be argued that there was a systematic opposition to Slovene in Yugoslavia. It is however true that conflicts and dissensions regarding the competence of Slovene (as also the competence of other languages) remain one of the features of Yugoslav cultural life; today, Italian and German opposition to Slovene are felt only among Slovenes living in Austria and Italy.

The theory of equal linguistic rights

Let me begin with a view which appears to be widespread among Slovene specialists in ethnic research and among influential cultural politicians, as expressed by Silvo Devetak (1986:1): “Equality of language rights is one of the most essential factors of national equality in any multi-national society. True equal rights can only be achieved when people master two or more languages.”

This is a description of an ideal and, let me add, a utopian situation. Conditions in Yugoslavia would certainly be ideal if members of all the Yugoslav nations could speak the languages of all the others. Slovenes do actually try to achieve this ideal: in addition to courses in Serbo-Croatian at universities, on the radio and in adult education, the language is a compulsory subject in Slovene elementary schools. But this application of the rule is more or less one-sided: while some adhere to it, others—other nations—do not; as a rule, it is thus rather problematic.
In practice, if Slovenes respect this principle and others do not, this means that some Yugoslav languages have the status of first-class languages while others have second-class status. To put it bluntly: in Yugoslavia, Slovene is a second-class language.

Why do Serbs and Croats not want to learn Slovene? For various reasons they are aware that a knowledge of Slovene is not a strict necessity: because they belong to the two largest Yugoslav nations; because, in their dealings with Slovenes, they became used to this idea both before and after World War II; and so on. From experience, they know that Slovenes are willing to talk with them in Serbo-Croatian on most occasions, and they find this communication satisfactory. They may sometimes like to speak Slovene (a few exceptional instances of this behavior have been noted), but this attitude is based more or less on morality and guilt feelings. Normally, humans are not ready to succumb to ethical and similarly refined feelings, but prefer to act in accord with their interests, needs, and duties. I imagine that a Croat or a Serb, if confronted with the idea of learning Slovene, will ask himself a very logical question: why learn Slovene, if I can invest my time and energy into learning a more important language, or into some profitable activity that my well-being, success in life, and socioeconomic orientations depend on? Only rarely are people willing to sacrifice the great amount of time and effort that are required to learn as complicated a language as Slovene.

Why is it necessary for Slovenes to learn Serbo-Croatian? My first hypothesis is that life in Yugoslavia simply and practically demands a knowledge of Serbo-Croatian, although no law prescribes it. Of course, the command of this language demonstrated by most Slovenes is deficient; and to pretend that it is adequate (as many Slovenes—primarily politicians—do) is an insult to the language of the Serbs and the Croats. Slovenes often speak a kind of broken Yugoslav language, a variety that can please only the most ardent Yugoslav ‘Centralists’ and assimilationists. If I say that Slovenes must speak Serbo-Croatian, I do not refer only to those who hold federal offices and who recognize it as the official language; those people believe, indeed, that they are setting a good example to all Slovenes. Perhaps, however, Slovenes should ask themselves the logical question (the same one mentioned above): why learn Serbo-Croatian, when we could be learning English, German or Russian instead?

The logical answer is blocked by the fear characteristic of Slovenes throughout the millennium. In recent times too, Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins have been the kings, the presidents, the secretaries-general, the military commanders and the ambassadors of Slovenes. When faced with authority, most Slovenes face a Serbo-Croatian-speaking authority. The linguistic question—today, especially in the army—becomes a question of patriotism, and can in extreme cases be interpreted as a question of civil (dis)obedience, even of high treason. The Slovene who speaks Serbo-Croatian (more precisely, ‘broken Yugoslav’) does so from fear for his own Slovene language. If it is Yugoslav authority which guarantees Slovene linguistic rights, Slovenes are to pay the highest respect to it; and this respect can be demonstrated by adaptation to the language of the authority. To be able to speak Slovene at home, Slovenes have to be able to speak Serbo-Croatian with the State. Otherwise, the State will not understand them, and may consider them bad citizens.

How is it possible to communicate with the State, if one is overcome by fear? Every Slovene has had experiences of this kind. In front of the military commander, the governor, the strict teacher, . . . one can only stammer in embarrassment. And that is the Yugoslav language spoken by Slovenes on most occasions: stammer! They speak fluently only at home, when they become ‘the first in the last village’, within the family and the local institutions. Perhaps the Slovene national character is to be summarized as authoritarian in
internal communication' (as tyrannical fathers, husbands, bosses, teachers, etc.) and as subservient in 'external communication.'

The theory that advocates equality through bilingualism is problematic and contradictory. When I say this, I also emphasize that Yugoslavia is not a country of equal nations and languages. One can also argue that—considering the actual circumstances and political reality—Yugoslavia can not become such a country. The theory of linguistic equality can also be interpreted as a form of arrogance, since it is a Slovene model imposed on other Yugoslav nations. It is true that Slovenes would feel better if the other nations of Yugoslavia were to accept this model; but they would feel even better if Slovene language, culture, industry and so on were to be recognized outside Yugoslavia: by the whole cultural world, or at least by the nations of Central Europe. Slovenes would feel equal if they enjoyed the treatment that the English enjoy from the French, the treatment the Germans enjoy from the Italians, etc.; if we take this into account, we soon realize that the 'theory of linguistic equality' is in fact a substitute, based on the view: if we can not achieve equality in Europe, let us have equality at least in Yugoslavia.

The 'normal' sovereign European nations regulate their linguistic relations in two ways: 1) symbolically and 2) functionally.

The symbolic way is apparent at various political meetings and 'summits'. It is known, for instance, that the President of Italy speaks good Spanish, and that the King of Spain understands Italian; they converse in both languages. Such statesmen speak several languages; or else, on special occasions, they learn a few phrases of the language of the nation concerned. So J.F. Kennedy said, "Ich bin ein Berliner;" Queen Elizabeth gave half her speech in French, half in English, at the opening of the Canadian parliament; the Pope preaches in Italian, French, English, Spanish, Polish, etc., depending on the country he gives his sermon in. Even more important is the behavior of key politicians in multilingual countries, e.g., Canada, Belgium, Switzerland: according to the linguistic context, they use different languages to show respect towards the electorate and towards the various national groups. In Yugoslavia, not even this (symbolic) level of linguistic relations has yet been reached.

Another manifestation of this kind of symbolic regulation of linguistic relations are bilingual inscriptions—on public buildings, on highways and local roads where place-names are displayed, on money, on coats-of-arms, in international documents, and in political life.

Here we pass to the functional level, i.e., to the level of useful and necessary communication, where the services of translators and linguists are required. For interlinguistic relations sovereign nations employ various scientific, cultural and protocol-related institutions which render the appropriate services to make these relations maximally smooth. Today, many of these functions are performed with the help of computers. For the maintenance of these lines of communication, some unified forms are presupposed. Because of the concentration of high technology in the U.S.A., the conventional language of these communications is English.

In Yugoslavia (again, 'thanks to Slovenes') there is some confusion with respect to symbolic and functional linguistic relations. Some of the difficulties, especially on the symbolic level, are quite unnecessary; they may have their roots in tradition, fear, and lack of pride. From time to time the dominant ideology launches campaigns for the introduction of Serbo-Croatian as the lingua franca, under the pretext that it is necessary for functional purposes, to make communication (in transportation, in science, in defense, etc.) easier.
Some problems in contemporary Slovene linguistic relations.

I conclude with a discussion of some contemporary language problems in Slovenia.

1. During the 1970s, as a result of an extensive economic policy, Slovenia began to show the properties of a country with a 'nationally heterogeneous population,' a term long used in other Yugoslav republics. These properties serve to fortify the idea of belonging to Yugoslavia and hence to strengthen the foundations of a new Yugoslav nation.

An excessive inflow of workers from the other republics has influenced the cultural and linguistic image of Slovene industrial centers. In response to this phenomenon the Slovene Writers’ Association, the Academy of Sciences and the University made several initiatives towards the greater care for, preservation of and improvement of Slovene linguistic practice. One of the most prominent institutions resulting from these initiatives was the *Jezikovno razsodišče*. To date the ‘language court’ has processed hundreds of cases of disregard for the constitutional principles regulating the use of Slovene in the public domain: negligent or non-Slovene publications and speeches, examples of sloppy reporting, political and business documents, translations and so on. One memorable and one of the most provocative actions was its critique of linguistic practices in the military installations in Slovenia, viz., inscriptions in Serbo-Croatian at the entrances to military establishments. The activity of this court has provoked, and still provokes, impatient reactions in other Yugoslav republics. One stereotypical reaction has been an accusation of nationalism. Slovene nationalism is of course on the rise, but it is still true that, in a group discussion taking place in Slovenia—even if the majority of participants are Slovenes—speakers of Slovene will still accommodate their speech to Serbo-Croatian interlocutors. This is even more true when conversations are between two people. The excuse for the privileged use of Serbo-Croatian is the ‘incomprehensibility’ of Slovene—even when the Serbo-Croatian speaker has lived many years in Slovenia.

2. In spite of the generally high density of Slovene language-use in the media, some TV broadcasts from Ljubljana (and some transmitted from other networks) remain untranslated. Serbo-Croatian is quite frequently used in communications with other parts of Yugoslavia. Also, in some schools, and also at the University, some students still use Serbo-Croatian textbooks, because Slovene ones are scarce or non-existent. Often this kind of language use seems simple and non-problematic; and some of its advocates deride the differences between Serbo-Croatian and Slovene, arguing that they are related and similar languages. This, of course, begs the question of degrees of similarity between languages, and how it can be measured.

3. A special problem is the translation of Serbian and Croatian works into Slovene, and of Slovene works into Serbo-Croatian. In some places, the *principle of reciprocity* is pleaded for. This principle can however be disputed: reciprocity is not sufficient for the adequate representation of Slovene titles in the Serbo-Croatian areas, since the Slovene market accepts Serbo-Croatian titles untranslated. The Slovene market thus acts purely as a supplement for Serbo-Croatian books: no additional investment is required.

4. Except in the official, political sphere, translation from Slovene is left to individual enthusiasts and to occasional experiments, the results of which are not always beyond reproach. Good translations from Slovene are rare, and remain limited to the field of literature. On the other hand, some ‘Slovene’ texts produced for the Slovene market by non-Slovene authors are often of rather poor quality.

5. Slovene is vulnerable to Serbisms and Croatisms. Here two phenomena are to be distinguished: forced additions to the language and spontaneous borrowings into the language.
The Slovene spoken by political professionals is often quite primitive. In ‘real masculine company’ the use of military language and Serbian swear words is rather popular. — The acceptance into Slovene of Serbisms and Croatisms because of the lack of appropriate Slovene expressions is however another matter. This is not really negligence but the filling of gaps, and I would consider it a normal linguistic development — a development, in a period of wide exposure to the media, that is similar to what is being experienced by the Germans, the French, the Russians and virtually all modern nations that are trying to preserve linguistic independence and an adequacy of expression for modern phenomena.

6. It would be relatively easy to demonstrate the influence of the Socialist ‘order’ on Slovene by comparing materials published within Slovenia with those published outside the republic. Although publications in Trst/Trieste and Celovec/Klagenfurt differ the least from the ‘central Slovene’ ones, and while those produced overseas — Slovene emigrant publications including those by opponents to Socialism — are certainly more useful for comparison, we could find significant differences even in those originating close to the ‘center.’ The basic impression is one of linguistic purism and archaism, reminiscent of linguistic norms from pre-war or even earlier times. The language of ‘foreign’ Slovene writers is attenuated, it has become metaphorically poorer, more conventional — as if a slow process of forgetting were taking place — and schematic. Surely, Slovene has developed best in the centers which, after World War II, found themselves within the Socialist state framework. This could lead directly to the conclusion that Socialism has accelerated the modernization of Slovene; but, as a matter of fact, Socialism is relatively innocent with respect to modernization of this kind (which involves linguistic agility and innovativeness); rather, the growth and progress of the language depend on the concentration of speakers and on the various national institutions that are now concentrated in the republic. Socialism has, however, certainly influenced individual aspects of this development.

7. After the war, (Soviet) Socialism enforced a system of word production that resembled George Orwell’s ‘newspeak.’ Some of the original contributions, such as naproza (nabavno-prodajna zadruga, ‘purchase-sales cooperative’), DID (dom igre in dela, ‘home of play and work’), stencas (stenski časopis, ‘wall newspaper’), left Slovene with the same speed with which they had conquered it. Foreign words like proletkult, agitprop, and komsomol have remained more or less technical terms. Of course, some Socialist-realist abbreviations have remained, but they have been joined by new ‘self-management’ abbreviations, e.g., TOZD, SIS, PIS, SLO, STO (samoupravljanje s temelji marksizma, ‘self-management with the bases of Marxism’), SVIO (skupna vzgojno-izobraževalna osnova, ‘common education-training basis’), and so on. These acronyms, with their contents, have remained controversial components of Slovene, and they are more or less linked to the ruling ideology and to the ‘revolutionizing’ of Slovene society. Their intrusive and obligatory character has made these innovations sterile and inappropriate for vigorous, creative speech or writing. The linguistic revolution has other concomitant effects too. I hope it is no exaggeration to say that a great deal of Marxist discourse (the ‘practical’ part more than the ‘theoretical’ part) has acquired the character of non-authentic speech, or jargon. Of course, it would be wrong to blame the Socialist system alone for such linguistic deformations. They occur (although in a different way) in Capitalist systems too, especially in the world of the military.

8. The ideological profit of these linguistic innovations — for the revolutionary movement or for the party authorities — is the impression of novelty and progress. These innovations may sometimes have a (visual or aural) impression of mystery and solemnity; they are difficult to grasp, even to pronounce; and they lead to the formation of special
groups of people having the professional command of such formulae, codes, and terms. These people are the insiders, and they can interpret the innovations to the uninitiated. We can speak of a special class, a logocracy, which has taken up a strategic place in Slovene politics, education and journalism in the post-war period.

9. Many phenomena relating to modern political Slovene and its logocracy are connected with Serbo-Croatian. Individual abbreviations and acronyms which have originated in the Serbo-Croatian language (the Yugoslav bureaucratic language) have become, as it were, untranslatable. Everybody says AVNOJ (anti-fascističko veče narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, 'the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia') instead of ASNOJ; SIP (sekretarijat inostranih poslova, i.e., the Yugoslav Foreign Office) instead of SZZ; UDBA (uprava državne bezbednosti, i.e., the Yugoslav secret police) instead of UDV; and so on. Many federal organizations are known by their Serbo-Croatian ‘names’, and are often referred to by these ‘names’ (mostly, acronyms) in the Slovene press. The paradox is that these names are not felt as ‘non-Slovene’, even though their Slovene versions do formally exist.

The above list of problems is by no means exhaustive; I have tried to examine typical cases only. I should add that the examination of Slovene sociolinguistic problems is not complete, either. In this paper, I have barely touched on this fascinating subject.

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