TWO SOLITUDES REVISITED: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF COLLABORATION IN SLOVENIA DURING WORLD WAR II
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While planning to do research on Slovene collaboration in Ljubljana, relatives and acquaintances warned me that I was being lured into an academic dead-end. They maintained that the documents in the national archives had surely been doctored by their previous communist caretakers, that whatever was important and self-incriminating had undoubtedly been destroyed or hidden, and that I might not even be allowed to examine them in full. My actual experience in the archives in the spring and summer of 2002 was quite the opposite. I enjoyed access to the documents pertaining to the anti-Communist opposition during World War II and was graciously assisted by the archival staff. Yet twelve years after Slovenia’s independence from Yugoslavia, and twenty-three years after the death of Tito, many families that belonged to the anti-communist camp during the war remain convinced that a “victor’s history” continues deliberately to demonize them and exclude them from the narrative of the war years. A similar division between pro-communist and anti-communist sympathizers cleaved and to a certain extent continues to divide the historiographical interpretation of collaboration.

The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 culminated in the tripartite division of Slovenia. The largest section was occupied by Germany, which included the Slovene regions of Gorenjsko and Štajersko. Hungary occupied the smallest share, the easternmost extreme

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1 The best archival collection on Slovene collaboration and the anti-communist opposition are found in the branch of the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia housed in the Institute for Recent History in Ljubljana. Of particular interest are Arhiv Republike Slovenije (AS) 1873 Gorenjsko domobranstvo, AS 1878 Slovenski narodni varnostni zbor v operacijski coni Jadranisko primorje (SNVZ), AS 1877 Slovensko domobranstvo, AS 1895 Milizia Volontare Anti-Communista (MVAC), AS 1898 Slovenska ljudska stranka (SLS), AS 1876 P gelişka varnostni zbor (PVZ), AS 1891 Pokrajinska uprava (PU), AS 1912 Informativni urad (IU), AS 1902 Zbirka tiskov nasprotnikov NOB in tiskov politične sredine.
of Slovenia known as Prekmurje. Italy took the remaining Slovene territory in the southwest, which included the capital Ljubljana. It was in this Italian-occupied zone, the so-called Province of Ljubljana (Ljubljanska pokrajina) that the Slovene civil war that raged from 1942 to 1945 reached its most ferocious intensity, and where the prospects for collaboration were most favorable. Unlike the German- and to a lesser extent the Hungarian-occupied regions of Slovenia, Italy offered the Ljubljanska pokrajina a degree of cultural and administrative autonomy. Initially, most of the pre-war Slovene political and religious elite followed a policy of limited cooperation with the Italian authorities. This policy eschewed armed opposition in favor of developing an underground resistance, which would rise and assist a future allied invasion. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the Communist dominated Liberation Front (Osvobodilna fronta - OF) embarked on a policy of immediate armed resistance and sabotage directed against the occupiers. While launched in all occupied areas of Slovenia, the OF had its greatest successes in the Province of Ljubljana, and the thickly forested massif of Kočevski Rog would become one of its strongholds. OF activity resulted in reprisals by the occupier, such as the bloody Italian summer offensive of 1942. It was within this context of spiraling violence that the anti-Communist opposition developed. The anti-Communist camp, opposed to OF tactics and fearful of a Communist takeover at the end of the war, formed the Village Guards (vaške straže) with the consent and support of the Italians in the summer of 1942. The Village Guards were, as the name suggests, used to guard villages from OF incursions and requisitioning, as well as being utilized in limited local offensives against the Partisans.

Following the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, the Germans took over the Province of Ljubljana. Unlike their harsh occupation in Gorenjsko and Štajersko, the Germans, with the assistance of Slovene collaborators, set up their own enhanced version of the Village Guard, which became known as the Home Guardsmen (domobranci). In addition, the Germans allowed for the expansion of local self-administration, the so-called Provincial Administration (pokrajinska uprava) headed by Leon Rupnik. The domobranci were better armed and trained than their Village Guard predecessors, and given a wider mandate that included the use of mobile battalions which were to actively pursue Partisans. Much smaller and weaker domobranci units were also organized in 1944 in Gorenjsko and the Primorska region, the mostly
Slovene-inhabited Adriatic littoral, which had been under Italian rule since the end of the First World War.

World War II officially ended on 8 May 1945. Less than two weeks later, accounts between the two factions would be settled with the repatriation from Austrian Carinthia to Yugoslavia of the first of more than 10,000 domobranci who had until then been detained by the British on the fields of Vetrinje (Viktring). The massacre of the majority of these people, without any trial, drove the proverbial nail into the coffin of any rapprochement between the victors and the losers of the civil war that raged in Slovenia from 1942 to 1945.

The post-war wholesale massacre of the domobranci was carried out in a sheer frenzy of revenge. In part, the massacre also resulted from the profound insecurity the newly installed communist regime felt in those years. Many of the most prominent anti-Communist leaders in Slovenia fled the country in the closing months of the war. Persistent rumors circulated within Yugoslavia of a possible Allied-émigré invasion to topple the newly established communist government. With ongoing tension over Trieste and the Italian-Slovene border region, such rumors took on frightening proportions. These rumors were further fueled by the fact that only forty-two of the over 3,000 alleged war criminals that the Yugoslav government wanted extradited were handed over.2 The American and British governments refused to release the others, claiming the Yugoslavs were conducting a political witch-hunt rather than a search for justice. In this unstable international environment, the Yugoslav regime was carrying out its own brand of radical communist and Stalinist reforms, which created its own share of opposition and confusion.

The immediate post-war years also saw the trials of collaborators and traitors. The most important in Slovenia against alleged collaborators took place from 21 August to 30 August 1946. The court found Leon Rupnik, Milko Vizjak, Lovro Hacin, Miha Krek, and Bishop Gregorij

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2 Vera Kržišnik-Bukić, "Legal Trials in Yugoslavia, Particularly in Slovenia, in the Aftermath of the Second World War", in Razprave in gradivo (Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 1997) 121. The best archival source on the communist trials against their political opponents is AS 1851, which deals with the Kočevo trials that took place after the Italian capitulation in September 1943. AS 925 KUZOP (komisija za ugotavljanje zločinov okupatorjev in njihovih pomagcev) includes the minutes of the post-war trials of Rupnik, Rosener, Vizjak, Hacin, and Rožman.
Rožman guilty of treason and gave them sentences ranging from the death penalty to long years of forced labor.³

The Courts of National Honor (sodišče narodne časti - SNČ) judged more “plebian” collaborators during the first few months following the liberation. These “extraordinary” judicial proceedings often required obligatory public participation in “the uncovering of national traitors and criminals.”⁴ The SNČ handed out more “lenient” sentences. They imposed no death sentences, concentrating rather on corrective punishments such as the loss of national rights and honor, or forced labor to a maximum of ten years, as well as the total or partial confiscation of the property of the convicted. For example, despite one woman’s defense that “love is international,” she was sentenced by the SNČ to two years light forced labor for inviting Germans into her home.⁵ Following closely on the heels of these trials was the 1948 rift between Tito and Stalin. Opposition in these unstable post-war years was therefore seen not merely as a nuisance but more often as high treason.

It was within this atmosphere of general hysteria that the post-war communist or—as the author and Jozo Tomasevich term it—“regime school” interpretation of Slovene collaboration coalesced. The Communist Party of Slovenia was a tiny and illegal party before World War II. It had been catapulted to power in 1945 through its struggle against not only the occupiers, but also its domestic opponents—the pre-war political elite and the Roman Catholic Church. The NOB (Narodna osvobodilna borba - National Liberation War) became the “creation myth” of the Communist Party. Post-war historians went into minute detail in describing enemy offensives against Partisan units. The importance of the Soviet army, which had in fact played a significant role in the liberation of some regions of Yugoslavia, most notably eastern Serbia, was largely ignored, particularly after the 1948 break with Moscow. The significance of Anglo-American support for the Partisans during the war was equally downplayed. General histories entitled the experience of World War II under the catch-all title of the NOB. Ferdo Godina’s 1980 work on Hungarian-occupied Slovene Prekmurje, a

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³ AS 925/I-IV Komisija za ugotavljanje zločinov okupatorjev in njihov pomagacev (KUZOP).
⁵ For other examples of SNČ convictions, see Coh 74.
region of Slovenia that experienced only a brief, isolated, and tragically abortive attempt at resistance was, for example, entitled, *Prekmurje, 1941-1945: Prispevek k zgodovini NOB (Prekmurje, 1941-1945: A Contribution to the History of the National Liberation War).* Thus the NOB was used to legitimize the Communists’ right to rule.

Not surprisingly, the anti-Communist opposition figured little in this straightforward narrative of OF resistance to the occupier. Rational aims were not affixed to their actions or responses to the occupation. In the colossal 900-page 1979 *Zgodovina Slovencev (History of the Slovenes)*, 150 pages, or approximately twenty percent of the work, were dedicated to the four short years of the NOB and World War II. Less than ten pages were dedicated to the “other side”—the anti-revolutionary opposition. Metod Mikuz, the author of this section of the work, explained the discrepancy bluntly: “This chapter is not very extensive, as the role of traitors in the history of the Slovene and Yugoslav people was not that important.”

While the regime school view of collaboration was parroted by hundreds of historians and commentators, it is defined by certain shared elements. It operated on the premise that the OF was the only proper manifestation of the will of the Slovene people during the war. This was a continuation of the OF’s insistence from its very inception that no insurgent organization could operate outside the confines of the coalition. As such, the regime historians claimed that the OF enjoyed the support of the majority of Slovenes. Seen within this context, the regime school condemned the “shield” approach which avoided outright resistance on account of enemy reprisals and which was generally adopted by the leaders of the anti-revolutionary camp. “Our sacred

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7 Metod Mikuz in *Zgodovina Slovencev* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1979) 777–78.
national responsibility,” wrote the Slovene communist Boris Kidrič during the war, is rebellion. The regime historian Branko Božič added to Kidrič’s words, stating that “all those who did not want to fight soon found themselves on the side of the occupier and among the traitors of the Slovene nation.” Thus, the “shield” approach, which was adopted in large part to reduce unnecessary human and material losses, was described as cowardly, as the action of “faint-hearted people.” The “shield” proponents were driven only by base self-interest according to the regime school. Their aim was to maintain their reactionary control over the church and their pre-war political dominance. They became “mere onlookers of the struggle,” and “political gamblers.” Other derogatory epithets that originated during the war were maintained. The anti-revolutionary camp was demonized as “whites” or “white guards” (a term borrowed from the Russian Revolution), “reactionaries,” “švabobranci” (defenders of the Germans), or the always vague but frightening term “clerical fascists.” The meager rank and file support for the anti-revolutionary camp was dismissed as the choice of “unschooled people,” or as Edvard Kardelj characterized them, “misguided peasants.” Regime historians followed a predictable narrative. Little was written about the less-savory aspects of OF actions. The opposition of the Communist Party to the defense of Yugoslavia in the April 1941 invasion, a policy that was not abandoned until after the Axis attack on the Soviet Union in June of the same year, was passed over. It was assumed that the people of Slovenia courageously bore and almost welcomed enemy reprisals in their support of the OF. Victims of communist assassinations were unquestionably “collaborators.” While silence reigned on the question of the communist massacres of their opponents at the end of the war, regime historians emphasized the bloodlust and cruelty of the collaborators, as evident in the works of Francek Saje and Štefanija

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9 Božič 201.
10 Božič 200.
12 Colakovic 342–44.
13 Ivan Križnar 218.
15 Francek Saje’s work is a classic example of the regime school, Belogardizem (Ljubljana: Slovenski knjižni zavod, 1952).
Ravnikar-Podbevsek. Much was written on the white-guard torture chambers of Saint Urh, as well as the shadowy terrorist “Black Hand” organization that murdered Communists and their families. Moreover, regime historians refused to refer to the civil war as a civil war. Rather it was seen as the resistance of a tiny, unresponsive reactionary clique against the popular will, with the assistance of the occupier.

The historians’ craft was only one part of a larger Yugoslav communist campaign to enshrine the “victor’s history” as the history of the war. Communist-era Slovenia was infected with a rather severe case of “monumentitis.” Elaborate monuments sprang up all over the country, commemorating known and unknown fallen Partisans and their daring exploits. As late as 1975, 150,000 people attended the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Ljubljana, where an enormous monument to Partisan leader France Rožman-Stane was unveiled. In the cinematic sphere, Na Svoji Zemlji (On Our Own Land) was released in 1948. It was a heroic portrayal of a Primorski Partisan band contending with sadistic Italian and German occupiers and their black-clad, sinister looking native collaborators. In total, 54,800 people saw it during the premier and it is widely considered the most watched Slovene film of all times. The education system also taught obedience and respect for the NOB, as seen by the Young Pioneers and morning greetings to Tito by school children. Such promotion of the “victor’s history” in the decades after the war stood in contrast to the officially forgotten execution sites in the Kočevaski forest, off limits to mourners.

The regime school was challenged by the Slovene diaspora, which made sure that the post-war massacres would not be forgotten and that an alternate understanding of collaboration existed to that put forth by the Party. The diaspora school or the “émigré school,” as the author refers to it, centered on the approximately 13,000 Slovenes that fled and/or emigrated immediately after the war. Argentina accepted the largest share, while another large group emigrated to Canada. The United States, Australia, and Britain also took a few hundred individuals. This emigration wave changed the face of the diaspora, as these newly

18 Slovenska kronika XX. Stoletja 170.
arrived immigrants were not economic refugees as in past Slovene emigrations but political refugees, united in their hatred of the communist system in Slovenia. The emigrants included collaborators, hardened opponents of the regime, members of the pre-war elite, some church officials, most notably Bishop Rožman, as well as a number of simple people, mostly from Dolenjska and Notranjska, who for whatever reason feared communist rule enough to flee their homeland.

The diaspora community was not united in its interpretation of the events in Slovenia during the war, or on the question of where their country’s future lay. Among the pre-1945 immigrants, there was small but significant support for the Communists and the NOB. The most prominent member of this group was the well-known American-Slovene author Louis Adamic, whose decisive support for the Partisans during the war divided the diaspora community along lines similar to that of Slovenia proper. Among both the pre- and post-1945 group there were those who refrained from overt political activity, concentrating primarily on establishing a new life. A few influential members of the so-called wartime “center” (sredina), among them Ljubo Sirc, were equally critical of the compromising stance the political right and center-right took towards the occupier, as they were of the Communist takeover. The term “center” therefore referred to their attempt at finding a middle ground to the political divide between the left, the OF, and the right, the committed anti-Communist camp. This was a view also held by some former Chetnik sympathizers, who had hoped for an effective anti-Communist and anti-occupier resistance force during the war. However, despite the political, religious, and social fragmentation which decisively hampered the anti-revolutionary camp during the war, most post-1945 émigrés shared a similar enough interpretation of collaboration in Slovenia during the war to form their own distinctive historical school.

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19 Two of Louis Adamic’s most pro-Partisan and pro-Communist works included respectively My Native Land (New York and London: Harper, 1943), and The Eagle and the Roots (Garden City: Doubleday, 1952).


21 See for example Ivan Korošec’s early works, which appeared in émigré publications as well as the recent Prva nacionalna ilegala, Štajerski bataljon (Ljubljana: Ilex-Impex, 1993).
The centers of émigré publishing mirrored the concentrations of the Slovene diaspora. Buenos Aires was particularly active, followed by Cleveland and Toronto. In Europe, the Catholic Družba svetega Mohorja, based in Klagenfurt, was also quite prolific in publishing émigré accounts. The publications of the émigré school were varied, ranging from periodicals such as the influential *Zbornik Svobodna Slovenija*, published in Buenos Aires, to memoirs, various polemical tracts commemorating the post-war massacres, and more impartial historical works.\(^\text{22}\)

Certain shared doctrines identified the émigré school. Most decisive, and perhaps not surprising, was their insistence that what the Communists termed collaboration was in fact *self-defense*. This formed the crux of the émigré school’s position. It maintained that the anti-revolutionary camp was always anti-occupier and pro-Allied in its sympathies. The anti-Communists were the victims, “caught between two-fires,” between the communists and the occupiers. The origin of the phrase is uncertain, but it was bandied about in numerous émigré accounts to describe the difficult predicament the anti-Communists found themselves in, forced to seek arms from the occupiers in order to defend against OF incursions. The “two-fires” theory described the OF’s policy of immediate armed action against the occupier regardless of enemy reprisals as irresponsible and reckless, and denounced their “opportunistic” attempt to seize power in the midst of a national catastrophe. Thus within such hostile conditions, the anti-revolutionary

camp was forced to defend itself with the assistance of the lesser evil, that is, the occupier.

The uncomfortable sting of accepting arms and fighting alongside the occupiers against one's own people was removed by highlighting the "double-game" played by the anti-revolutionary camp and the "foreign" character of the Slovene communists. It is true that even while cooperating with the Italian and German occupiers, the anti-revolutionary camp remained largely sympathetic to the Western Allies and the London government-in-exile. The pre-war political elite, namely the Slovene People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka - SLS), recorded the atrocities of the occupiers and sent them to the representatives of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, at the same time that they were compiling lists of OF sympathizers. The émigré school also emphasized that the Axis never completely trusted the anti-communist militias as proof of their loyalty to the Allied cause. The Italians, for example, offered the Village Guards only outdated weapons and prohibited their scattered units from unifying into larger joint actions. The Germans arrested leading domobranci whose loyalties were questionable, such as Colonel Ernest Peterlin, and sent them to concentration camps. Always sharing a prominent place in the works of the émigré school was the 3 May 1945 declaration at Tabor, where leaders of the anti-revolutionary faction proclaimed an independent National State of Slovenia as part of a democratic and federal Yugoslavia on the side of the Western Allies. With this proclamation, the domobranci became the Slovene National Army. Their new "liberationist" role was to take possession of the frontiers. However, this much-vaunted step was taken five days before Germany's surrender, when the German army was obviously in the process of evacuating Slovenia.

The émigré school also emphasized the "foreign" character of the OF and the Communist Party. The Communists worked for the interest of international communism, not that of the Slovene nation. They stood for "godlessness" in a devoutly Catholic country. Being a communist in the émigré literature was tantamount to a moral flaw. The ranks of the Party were full of "lazy workers, alcoholics, squanderers,

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Lists of occupier-perpetrated atrocities and "situation reports" sent to Krek in London, as well as lists of OF sympathizers, can be found in AS 1898, Slovenska ljudska stranka fascicles 122, 123.
prostitutes and known thieves, who went with the communists, so that they could take over the belongings of honest people."²⁴

The émigré school emphasized that the anti-revolutionary paramilitary forces such as the vaške straže and the domobranci were purely anti-Communist. While military actions against the communists are often recalled in their works, rarely was the assistance of the occupier noted. Within the context of the Cold War, the émigré school was also able to popularize what had in fact been a “dirty war” and transform it into a heroic war against communism, in solidarity with the contemporary struggles on the Korean peninsula, in Vietnam, and in Prague in 1968.

The émigrés further attacked sacred doctrines of Partisan resistance. “Liberated territory,” much vaunted by the Partisans, was simply territory which the occupiers left unoccupied because of a lack of manpower and strategic value. The émigré school highlighted the defeatism practiced by the communists during the April 1941 invasion and their inactivity until the attack on their mentors, the Soviets, in June 1941. The popularity of the Partisans was groundless. Whatever small support existed arose only from their unscrupulous use of coercion against their own people and the lies of a socialist paradise on earth. The torture and execution of Partisans and their sympathizers, which regime historians claimed had occurred at the white guard base of Saint Urv, was dismissed in émigré works as a fabrication. “Collaboration” was nothing more than a convenient term used by the Communists to defame the good names of their honest, devoutly Catholic, and nationally conscious victims. Indeed the émigré school accused the Partisans of collaboration with the Italians, pointing to the heavy weaponry acquired from the capitulated Italians that was so effectively used against the vaške straže and Chetnik forces in September 1943.²⁵

Most uncomfortable for the Slovene Communist authorities was the fact that the émigré school would not allow the post-war massacres to be swept under the rug. An overwhelming aura of martyrdom surrounded

²⁴ Matija Škerbec 11.
²⁵ This accusation of Communist collaboration with the Italians to acquire weaponry was initially made in Mirko Javornik Črne bukve: O delu komunistične osvobodilne fronte proti slovenskemu narodu (Ljubljana, 1944) but also in later émigré accounts such as that of Škerbec and in Debeljak 28, 42.
the massacres, elevated further by the British treachery in delivering these "pro-Allied, anticommmunist warriors" into the hands of the communists. Pointing to the British support of Greek anti-Communists, the émigré school highlighted the double standard practiced against Slovene anti-Communists. Perhaps most significantly, the horror of the crimes fostered a psychological backlash among the émigré school to any suggestion of collaboration on the part of the domobranci, or their vaške straže predecessors, and vindicated their battle against what they perceived as an unquestionably evil regime.

While a combination of ideological solidarity and government coercion ensured that the regime historians projected a more unified interpretation of the war years than the more politically and ideologically segmented émigré camp, cracks soon appeared within the communist camp. Milovan Djilas became by far the best-known dissident with his famous work The New Class. His 1977 memoir of the war, Wartime, offered a picture of an occupied Yugoslavia gripped by ethnic and civil strife. His work highlighted the fact that both sides committed atrocities, and referred to the massacres of the Communists' opponents after the war as "sheer frenzy."26 The lesser known Slovene equivalent of Milovan Djilas was Edvard Kocbek, the celebrated man of letters who, during the war, was the chief representative of the Christian Socialist faction within the OF. In 1952, his critical work Strah in Pogum (Fear and Bravery), a reaction to the Communist repression of the Catholic Church earned him a ten-year ban from publishing. His memoirs from the war, Tovarišja (Comradeship, 1967), described a Slovenia wracked by civil war. The work challenged the communist claim of popular support for the OF. Referring to the anti-Communist peasantry as "a political paradox," he wrote, "We are liberating a people almost against their will and we are expressing our progressive concepts in the name of that people, whom we are presently opposed to."27

However, it was a series of interviews with Kocbek published posthumously in 1975 in Trieste that truly frightened the Slovene Communist Party. In Edvard Kocbek: Pričevalec našega časa (Edward Kocbek: Witness of Our Time), Kocbek spoke candidly of the civil war and the bullying sectarianism of the Communists in the later years of the war

that destroyed many of the OF’s self-proclaimed ideals. More importantly, he spoke openly of the “horrific punishment of the enemy”\textsuperscript{28} after the war, and the clumsy attempts to conceal it. While not defending collaboration, Kocbek believed it was necessary to go public with what happened after the war, to admit “our guilt” and “our crimes”; otherwise “Slovenes will never step into the clean and clear atmosphere of the future.”\textsuperscript{29} Thus, in the midst of the thirtieth-anniversary celebration of the liberation, Kocbek’s work initiated a limited public discourse among Slovenes on the nature of the war in Slovenia, and the events that followed it. The Communist Party, for its part, banned Kocbek’s work and launched a campaign of defamation against it.\textsuperscript{30}

Kocbek’s reevaluation was a prelude to the changes that were to occur in the 1980s. Tito’s death in 1980, increasing economic difficulties, heightening ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, and a growing cultural liberalization, which the authorities half-heartedly attempted to suppress, all contributed in part to a reevaluation within Slovenia proper of the regime view of collaboration and the war years. Collaborators and collaboration became a topic of interest in itself rather than simple ideological caricatures for a new, younger generation of historians, many with no first-hand experience of the war. In 1980, Dušan Željeznov revisited the trial of the mayor and later head of the administration of Ljubljana province and Inspector General of the domobranci, Leon Rupnik.\textsuperscript{31} While Željeznov in no way challenged the verdict that Rupnik was a collaborator and responsible for the death of many Slovenes, by quoting extensively from Rupnik’s written deposition, he portrayed a far more complex man. For example, Rupnik believed that the war would last longer than it did, thus reinforcing his belief that any premature resistance would lead to the obliteration of the Slovene nation. In another section of Željeznov’s work, Rupnik claimed to have successfully resisted German plans to establish a Slovene SS division.

\textsuperscript{28} It should be mentioned that two years prior to \textit{Edvard Kocbek: Prečevalec našega časa}, dr. Dušan Biber addressed the post-war massacres in the Zagreb series \textit{Vjesniku u srijedu}, but with far less public and political reaction than that of Kocbek’s controversial opinions. Boris Pahor and Alojz Rebula, \textit{Edvard Kocbek: Pričevalec našega časa}, Series Kosovela knjižnica 6 (Trst: Zaliv, 1975) 150.

\textsuperscript{29} Pahor and Rebula 150.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Slovenska kronika XX stoletja, 1941-1995} 347.

\textsuperscript{31} Dušan Željeznov, \textit{Rupnikov proces} (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1980).
The present leading authority on the *domobranci*, Boris Mlakar, also began writing in the 1980s. His excellent 1982 work on the *domobranci* in the Primorska region was still a fairly safe choice for the Communist period as the Slovenes of Primorska were generally receptive to the Partisans’ call for resistance largely because of their inter-war experience under Italian fascist control. Mlakar showed, however, that pockets of support for the *domobranci* did exist, and that the reasons were usually local, moving away from the regime belief of some type of inherent class-based disposition to side with the OF. “Liberated territory,” for Mlakar, was tolerated by the Germans because of a lack of manpower. Mlakar noted that the Partisans themselves would hold the families of SNVZ men collectively responsible for their membership in the organization. He also maintained that at the end of the war, the Communists shot some *domobranci* “without due process.”

Following in the footsteps of Kocbek, a few, but very important, pieces on the postwar fate of the *domobranci* also appeared in the early 1980s. Of these, the bravest and hence most controversial was Spomenka Hribar’s *Krivda in greh* (*Guilt and Sin*), which appeared in 1984. She insisted, despite her leftist political sympathies, that the *domobranci* also died for their homeland. As part of her call for national reconciliation, she demanded a monument to the *domobranci* in the center of Ljubljana dedicated to this “tragedy of a small nation.”

While in Slovenia proper the 1980s revealed important challenges to the regime’s official version of the war, few non-Slovene works published in the West up to this time dealt specifically with the events of World War II in Slovenia and the issue of collaboration. The greatest stir, particularly in the diaspora, was undoubtedly created by Nikolai Tolstoy’s 1986 work *The Minister and the Massacres*. While

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32 Boris Mlakar, *Domobranstvo na Primorskem* (Ljubljana: Borec, 1982).
33 The *Slovenski narodni varnostni zbor* (SNVZ), the Slovene National Security Committee, was the anti-communist force operating in Primorska region. For tactical and political reasons, the Germans insisted that the SNVZ was organized and commanded from Trieste, and that it operated independently of the much larger *domobranci* units in the Province of Ljubljana.
34 Mlakar 222.
evidently sharing the sympathies of the émigré school (and its sources), Tolstoy attempted to reveal who among the British authorities was responsible for the repatriation of the domobranci. It quickly became the "bible" of the émigré school, particularly as up until that point few Western scholars took an in-depth interest in the events in Slovenia during the war. Phyllis Auty and Stephen Clissold tended to be sympathetic to the Partisan cause, and delved little into the motives and nature of collaboration.37 Interested primarily in events in the Yugoslav areas to the south of Slovenia, neither of their earlier works mentioned the post-war massacres of the anti-Communists. Fred Singleton's early works also tended to be rather vague and superficial in their treatment of the Slovene wartime experience, though his 1985 work was more in-depth and specifically addressed the massacres.38 Stevan Pavlowitch's 1971 work was far more critical of the Communists, and captured more of the nuances of collaboration in Slovenia, attempting to distinguish between collaborators and political anti-Communists.39 He also put forward the "two-fire theory" in explaining why some of the Slovene population was forced to protect itself with arms acquired from the occupiers. Nora Beloff's 1985 work, Tito's Flawed Legacy, was a curiously tardy but much needed re-appraisal of some of the long accepted Titoist wartime "legends."40 In this respect, her sympathies obviously lay with Mihailovic's response to the war. While concentrating largely on the peoples to the south of Slovenia, she, like Pavlowitch, maintained that self-defense against the OF forced some Slovenes into the arms of the occupier. She also criticized the Communists' unjustifiably broad usage of the term collaboration, which was used against all of their opponents.

Former agents of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William Jones, F.W.D. Deakin, and Fitzroy Maclean all wrote works on their wartime experiences, which with the exception of Jones, concentrated almost solely on the central

Yugoslav theater of Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia. Jones was particularly smitten by the communists. This was evident in his very brief, uninformed and unsympathetic accounts of collaboration that often parroted Partisan propaganda.

The early 1990s witnessed the bloody dismemberment of the Yugoslav federation. As communist Yugoslavia disintegrated, so too did the "creation-myth" fashioned from its World War II experiences. Revisionism of the events of World War II was now used unscrupulously to feed the ethnic hatred of the new war, particularly between the Serbs and the Croats. While the reinterpretation of the occupation in Slovenia did not fortunately foster interethnic struggles, it did lead to a sobering and at times painful confrontation with the enduring legacy of the civil strife of those years.

A true threshold in the public re-evaluation of Slovenia’s wartime experience was reached with the first post-war multi-party elections in April 1990, in which the opposition coalition DEMOS won the majority. Another important event was the July 1990 declaration of the intention of Slovenia to seek formal independence at the end of a one-year period. The periodical Mladina (Youth), best known for the 1988 arrest of a group of its journalists, including the present politician Janez Janša, on charges of giving out military secrets, opposed the regime already before the elections. After the elections, it also carried stories on the Kočevje massacres, as well as interviews with survivors. Émigré works and articles, such as the 1946 letter written by Bishop Rožman to the pope, burst into the public discourse. Rožman’s letter gave a point-by-point refutation of the charges leveled against him at his trial in absentia. The article appeared in the 1990 edition of Nova Revija (The New Review), an opposition journal that had been causing the Communist authorities grief since it first appeared in 1982. Its chief editor was the historian Niko Grafenauer. Also in 1990, the Črna Bukva (Black Book) was reissued in Maribor. The Črna Bukva was a viciously anti-Communist work issued in 1944 by the anti-revolutionary camp,

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highlighting the atrocities of the Partisans, including the murder and torture of civilians, the torching of homes, and the destruction of Slovenia's cultural heritage. As a sign of how quickly the times had changed, the editors not only reproduced the theories of "self-defense" and "two-fires," but also wrote that the Communists took advantage of Slovenia's occupation to launch their revolution. They denounced the Communist charge of collaboration against their wartime opponents, as "the most shameful cynicism of the people who for so many years themselves collaborated with Stalin, one of the greatest monsters of world history." A month before Slovenia's proclamation of independence in June 1991, a conference dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of OF resistance held at the University of Ljubljana, captured the divergent perspectives that were appearing. It was attended by a number of historians still loyal to the regime school, a participant from the theology faculty who defended Bishop Rožman, and Boris Mlakar, who presented his even-handed analysis of the wartime anti-Communist opposition.

On a more popular level, the Kočevje massacre site became the focal point for a more honest and inclusive interpretation of all experiences of the war. Sadly, it also became the center of a rightist-émigré campaign to deny the legitimate patriotism that many Partisans fought and died for, as well as to denounce any inherent value in Slovenia's forty-year experiment with socialism. The first mass to commemorate the victims of Kočevje was held at one of the execution sites on 8 July 1990. As a sign of public reconciliation, the mass was presided over by Archbishop Alojzij Šuštar, and was attended by the former communist leader and later president of Slovenia, Milan Kučan. On a grass roots level, unofficial monuments began to go up even before Slovenia's formal independence. Of particular significance is that on many of these plaques one finds only a commemoration to the "victims of communist aggression." In Potoke, a roadside chapel was erected in


44 Zajdela and Leljak 1.

45 A summary of the contributions to the conference can be found in F. Gerdo, B. Grafenauer, and J. Pleterski, eds., Slovenski upor 1941: Osobodilna Fronta, Slovenskega naroda pred pol stoljetja (Ljubljana: Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1991).
1990 commemorating the post-war execution of nine boys from the tiny
village of only five houses. Public commemorations such as that in
Potoke would multiply in the post-independence era, changing the
“monument landscape” which had until then been devoted wholly to the
Partisan cause. However, it should be emphasized that the process was
very much a regional one, largely overlapping with the wartime anti-
Communist strongholds of Dolenjska and Notranjska regions.

Thus the reassessment of collaboration within a changing
understanding of World War II did not begin after the establishment of
an independent Slovenia, as some Slovene nationalists might contend.
This reappraisal had begun much earlier, within Tito’s Yugoslavia, in the
isolated words of “tolerated dissidents” such as Kocbek, and among
historians and thinkers in the 1980s who were not satisfied with the post-
war regime view. It would also be simplistic to state, again as some
nationalists might, that it was only the struggle for independence that led
to the breakdown of the “creation-myth” understanding of resistance and
collaboration. This process was in fact related to a broader search for
democracy in Slovenia and Yugoslavia as a whole, as well as in the
apparent need for reform in order to ensure the future survival of the
federal state. Within this context, no small role was played by the more
liberal version of Yugoslav communism as compared to its eastern
counterparts, particularly after the death of Tito.

The post-independence era witnessed a further explosion of
literature, both popular and academic, on the topic of the Slovene anti-
Communist opposition during World War II. While the trend was, as
already noted, evident in the 1980s, Slovenia’s formal independence
from Yugoslavia and its liberal-democratic character fostered an
environment where opinions on collaboration that had previously been
considered taboo under the communists could be freely expressed. Alojzij
Žibert’s memoir, for example, chronicled the shameful physical violence
and discrimination practiced against the “forgotten” Slovenes who had
been forcibly conscripted into the German army.46 Younger historians
such as Bojan Godeša and Boris Mlakar, as well as older historians such
as Tone Ferenc, have written extensively on the anti-Communist

46 Alojzij Žibert, Pod Marijim varstvom: Spomini Slovenca – Nemškega vojaka
na drugo svetovno vojno v letih 1941-1945 (Kranj: Gorenški Glas, 1995).
opposition during the war.\textsuperscript{47} France Dolinar weighed in with a balanced assessment of Bishop Rožman’s wartime record.\textsuperscript{48} Other historians have reopened the related topic of the quasi-legal trials against so-called collaborators in the immediate post-war years.\textsuperscript{49} Their work has revealed some of the political, ideological and social complexities and heterogeneity of the group that for decades had been lumped together by the Communists under the catch-all term of collaborators. The vital and interrelated questions of motives and the degrees of collaboration began to be addressed. At the same time, collaboration was embedded within the context of the brutal experience of occupation and resistance, to a greater degree than ever before. Even historians who remained largely sympathetic to the Partisans, such as Ferdo Gestrin, nevertheless offered a less black and white portrayal of collaboration and resistance.\textsuperscript{50} Rather a “gray” view had begun to dominate, which acknowledged that the Partisans also alienated people through their behavior—in the case of Gestrin’s work, by their requisitioning campaigns.

Alongside historical works, there was also an explosion of popular literature and memoirs on the topic of collaboration. Among the memoirs, Stanko Kociper’s biography was a welcomed, albeit controversial contribution. As Leon Rupnik’s private secretary and son-


\textsuperscript{50} Ferdo Gestrin analyzes the chaotic civil strife of a small, occupied region on the outskirts of Ljubljana in \textit{Svet pod Krimom} (Ljubljana: Znanstveno raziskovalni center SAZU, 1993).
in-law, and as one of the chief propagandists of the domobranci, Kociper defended Rupnik’s record. He also refused to admit that the anti-revolutionary camp had collaborated. Collaboration, according to Kociper, assumed “voluntarism.” In other words, a collaborator had voluntarily to consent, without coercion, to collaborate. This was denied to the anti-revolutionary camp because of OF and Communist atrocities, and they were as a result forced to seek the assistance of the occupiers in order to defend themselves.\(^{51}\) Slovenia’s largest daily, Delo, carried a series of articles on the domobranci in late 1997 and early 1998. The Catholic press for its part continues to defend the wartime record of the church and the rehabilitation of Bishop Rožman.\(^{52}\)

Among this newly available literature, there was also a marked increase in apologist and polemical works that wished to portray the collaborator as a type of freedom fighter and precursor to the recent struggle against Communism. The Slovenska Zaveza Party and their quarterly journal Zaveza are just one example of a revisionist campaign which tends to view the OF and its Communist successor as a purely genocidal regime.\(^{53}\) Other historians and writers such as Draga Ahačič and Gregor Tomc warned specifically against this rehabilitation of the émigré-domobranci view of the war, and its equation of the anti-revolutionary camp as the wartime defender of democracy.\(^{54}\) While there

\(^{51}\) Stanko Kociper, *Kar sem živel* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1996) 44. Other examples of memoirs include the pro-Partisan work by Rudolf Hribernik, *Spomini: Klic svobode* (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, 1995). Emil Weiss-Belac, *Ne hodi naprej* (Ljubljana: Slovenska Matica, 1997), chronicles the tragic case of Weiss-Belac who was imprisoned after the war as a collaborator. He was pro-Partisan, and his only crime was to emerge from the Gestapo prison system alive. See also the English language memoir of Metod Milač, *Resistance, Imprisonment and Forced Labor: A Slovene Student in World War II* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002).

\(^{52}\) See for example the newspaper Družina.


\(^{54}\) See Draga Ahačič, *Osvobodilna ali državljanska vojna?* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba, 1992), and Gregor Tomc, “Potret domobranca ali kako si pridobim prijatelje” in *Mati-Domovina-Bog* (Ljubljana: Muzej novejše zgodovine, 1999) 85, 86.
has certainly been a visible increase in the works dedicated to collaboration and public proponents of émigré school doctrines, it would take quite a stretch of the imagination to state that such views have come to dominate the popular historical memory of collaboration and the war. This supposedly new-found interest in collaboration and adherence to émigré school doctrines seems much more dramatic than it objectively is precisely because such views were banned under communism. More importantly, however, is the fact that the present and at times bitter re-evaluation of collaboration and World War II is hardly different from the equally acrimonious national self-appraisal that occurred in France in the 1970s and 1980s following the appearance of the 1971 film Le Chagrin et la Pitié (The Sorrow and the Pity). Indeed a perusal of scholarly literature reveals that such re-evaluations have occurred in many former occupied European states and more recently in Asia.\(^5\) This process is related, as it is in the Slovene case, to the passing of regimes that based part of their legitimacy on their wartime record of resistance, as well as to a generational conflict between those born before and those born after the war. A significant but by no means unique characteristic of the Slovene case, is that this reinterpretation was delayed because of a regime that more or less froze such public debate for four decades. Despite the persistence of the regime view among still influential NOB veteran

groups, the hope is that this debate on collaboration and the role of the anti-revolutionary opposition will lead to a more inclusive view of the various experiences of World War II—one, hopefully, that still condemns war crimes for what they were.

Recent years have also witnessed the appearance of some solid English-language Western studies in the general field of collaboration, a few of which concentrate in part on Slovenia. The best among these is Jozo Tomasevich's work that gives the most in-depth English-language analysis to date of collaboration in Slovenia. Some interesting articles relating to collaboration have also appeared in the journal Slovene Studies. Former OSS agent Franklin Lindsay's 1993 memoir of the war in Slovenia gives a Western perspective on the chaotic conditions and the plight of civilians in occupied Slovenia. Both Lindsay's and Kirk Ford Jr.'s 1992 works reevaluate some of the myths of Partisan resistance, capturing the misgivings of some OSS and SOE agents supporting the Partisans in what was clearly becoming a civil war to decide the fate of post-war Yugoslavia.

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56 Some examples of the persistence of the regime school view in the post-independence era include, Slovenska Narodna Pomoč v okupirani Ljubljani med 1941-1945 (Ljubljana: Mestni odbor medvojnega aktiva OF, 1995); Silvo Grgič, Zločinov okupatorjevih sodelavcev: monografija v treh knjigah (Ljubljana: Partisan Book Club, 1997); and Ivan Jan, Škof Rožman in kontinuiteta: Zahteva po škofovi rehabilitaciji (Ljubljana: Samozaložba, 1998).


59 Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993).

60 Kirk Ford Jr., OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945 (College Station: Texas A&M UP, 1992). See also the earlier study by Thomas Barker which does not confine itself only to Austrian Carinthia, Social Revolutionaries and Secret Agents: The Carinthian Slovene Partisans and Britain's Special Operations Executive (New York: Columbia UP, 1990). The OSS archives are housed at the National Archives in Washington D.C., while those of the SOE are in the Public Records Office in London. Both contain relevant documents on the anti-revolutionary faction and the domobranci in Slovenia, as well as offering an important “outside” perspective on the events in occupied Slovenia.
The experience of occupation had a profound impact on the Slovenes, as it did on other occupied nations of Europe. It is foolhardy to imagine that a historian can ever completely and succinctly summarize the myriad personal experiences of those years. However, it can be safely said that the wartime polarization of Slovenes, which emerged from conflicting interpretations of the “proper” response to the occupation and the resulting struggle for postwar political power, left lasting and traumatic scars on the nation. This division continued after the war, with two fundamentally opposing views of collaboration, the regime school in Yugoslavia proper, and the émigré school made up of political exiles in the diaspora. The death of Tito, and the ensuing tensions in the 1980s between the forces of democratization and the status quo, and between federalists and separatists created a political and cultural environment in which the regime’s view of the occupation could be challenged. Moreover, the process of polarization in occupied Slovenia was never complete. There had always been Slovenes who belonged to neither faction, or had become alienated from both the Communist and anti-Communist camps. Their contribution and those of a less ideologically burdened generation that did not share the same traumatic personal memories of the war as their parents have been constructing a more critically sympathetic understanding of collaboration. The Slovene experience, while delayed by Yugoslavia’s post-war political history, must be seen within the context of a larger European, or even global reevaluation of collaboration during World War II, that has occurred during the past thirty years. This approach has attempted to ascertain the motives behind collaboration, and the degrees of collaboration in a much more sympathetic and less judgmental manner, in which the passage of time has undoubtedly played a large role. As a corollary, this exercise has also reevaluated much of the once accepted dogma of the victor’s history, and the moral limitations of resistance.

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PONOVA OŽIVITEV DVEH SAMOT

Članek je zgodovinska študija o kolaboraciji (sodelovanju z okupatorjem) v Sloveniji med drugo svetovno vojno. Članek se osredotoča na raziskavo dveh interpretacij, ki sta najbolj prevladovali v zgodovinskih razpravah po vojni. Med komunisti je prevladovalo mišljenje o kolaboraciji kot o »šoli režima«. Tako mnenje so imeli skoraj vsi, ki so kot kolaboracionisti nasprotovali komunistično vodenemu odpornemu gibanju med vojno. Drugo mišljenje, »šola emigracije«, je bilo prevladujoče pri tisočih po vojni razseženih antikomunistih. Ti so obtožbe o kolaboraciji zavračali, svoja dejanja pa razlagali kot žrtvovanje v samoobrambi. Bili so »prisiljeni« sprejeti pomoč okupatorja, da bi se branili pred napadi komunistov. To mišljenje se je v njihovih mislih potrdilo s povojnimi pokoli antikomunističnih čet. Članek skuša pretehtati tekmovalne trditve obeh interpretacij in preiskati splošno brezbružnost zgodovinarjev z Zahoda do vojnih dogodkov v Sloveniji. POMEMBNI IZZIVI ZA OBE INTERPRETACIJI SOVPADAJO Z VELEKIMI POLIČNIMI SPREMENAMI V SLOVENIJI V OSEMDESETIH IN ZGODNIH DEVETDESETIH LETIH 20. STOLETA, PREVSEM S KONCUM KOMUNIZMA IN NOODVISNOSTJO SLOVENIJE. MNOGO MANJ OBREMENJENA S KOMUNISTIČNIM IDEOLOŠKIM VPLIVOM SE JE NOVA GENERACIJA POZNAVALCEV RAZŠIRILA NA OSNOVI UTIRANJA POTI NEKAJ ODPADNIKOV. NJIHOVE INTERPRETACIJE SO DALE VELIK POUĐAREK RAZLIKOVANJU RAZLIČNIH VRST KOLABORACIJE IN POBUDAM ZANJO. ČEPRAV IMATA VIDIKA REŽIMA IN EMIGRACIJE ŠE VEDNO OSIŠLENIKE, PRIHODNOST OBLJUBLJA MANJ IDEOLOŠKO ZAZNAVANO IN BOLJ OBŠIRNO INTERPRETACIJO VOJNE KOLABORACIJE V SLOVENIJI.