

TIME MAP TAIWAN: PEDAGOGY AND THE POWER OF AN ELECTRONIC CULTURAL ATLAS IN THE CONTEXTUALIZATION OF HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of the historical influences that are the subject of the time-mapping visualization of Taiwan, primarily from the perspective of how those influences affected the island's aboriginal inhabitants. This narrative provides a basic background of Taiwan history to aid in an understanding of the mapping project itself, part of the Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative based at the University of California, Berkeley. It includes details related to the source of historical/geographical data and the digitization of that data for dynamic representation in order to better contextualize this representation. This project is primarily centred on the cultural resources and experience of Taiwan's aboriginal groups, which today face contentious issues including language extinction, self-identification, access to cultural resources, the teaching of history in public education, and adapting to a multicultural identity, all of which are components of cultural resource management (CRM), and all of which would be served well by the CRM technology and programs of which this project can be considered a pilot project.

INTRODUCTION

The island we call Taiwan has a cultural heritage going back thousands of years, and a history of about four hundred. During this time, the various cultural and political influences that have gone into molding the Taiwan that exists today have been many and varied, and have led to a complex and sometimes ambiguous impact on its development. The presentation of this history and how it is taught in the classroom, especially at the level of secondary education, has long been a contentious issue, most recently in mid-2015 during the so-called Textbook Controversy, which saw thousands of students march on, and briefly occupy, offices of the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of Education. Their demand: a reversal of the ministry's decision to revise history textbooks that would present a pro-China view of Taiwanese history more in line with the philosophy of the political party in power, the Kuomintang (KMT).

This controversy is hardly new: education, and even maps, have long been used as a tool by the ROC government to inculcate a national rhetoric and manufacture support for the KMT regime (Chang 2015:77). Textbooks were changed during the 2000–2008 administration led by the

pro-localization Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), this time to shift from a Sinocentric approach to the study of history, to one that was more Taiwan-centric. Case in point: the Han-centric view of history asserts that “Taiwan was administered by the Qing Dynasty,” the implication being that Taiwan is Chinese. Yet looking at the maps that were produced at the time, it is clear that the Qing court exerted effective control over less than half of the island, and that it was not until the Japanese colonial period that any single power controlled the entire island. While this may seem like splitting hairs, it has enormous implications for the very sensitive political and societal struggle over whether Taiwan is Taiwanese or Chinese. Maps, such as the time maps produced in the Electronic Atlas project described here, can present this information far more eloquently than other methods of instruction. The presentation in textbooks of historical events can vary widely depending on the preconceptions and agenda of the authors. In a 2011 study, researchers used a multiple perspective analysis to look at how the Wushe Incident (more detail below) was presented in 38 textbooks. The researchers concluded that descriptions of the incident failed to convey the true extent of the event’s causes and repercussions. Moreover, they found that the textbooks used a Han-centric viewpoint that could lead to a narrow understanding of the incident (Tseng and Chang 2011).

OVERVIEW OF THE TAIWAN MAPPING PROJECT

The perspective adopted by this map-driven framing of historical political developments is the perspective of the island’s aboriginal peo-

ples, as it is they who represent the common thread, having witnessed and been changed by all of the various waves of immigration, settlement, and colonization of Formosa since the beginning of recorded history on the island—indeed, pre-dating this point. For the mapping project to have value as a supplement to materials used in existing public education systems, both domestically and internationally, this perspective is a unifying lens through which to offer a more cohesive understanding of the forces of history, and that can serve as a counterbalance to the aforementioned Han-centric instructional aids.

The project described herein is an engaging and attractive geographical visualization of the transformation and growth of the various cultural and political influences over the island of Taiwan. First and foremost, it is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of this technology both for pedagogical application, as well as for eventual expansion into a more comprehensive electronic-atlas project that would serve as a dynamic, interactive and visual gateway to digitized media on the nation’s artistic, cultural, and historical treasures. This project is part of the Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative (ECAI), School of Information, Berkeley, University of California. It is a digital humanities project dedicated to adopting modern technological tools to aid in Cultural Resource Management (CRM).

The history of Taiwan reveals a complex and multifaceted series of influences that are still felt today and that compete for expression in the identity of Taiwan’s inhabitants. Thus, the teaching of Taiwan history would benefit from a visual representation through modern computer

technology and multimedia applications. Hence the Taiwan mapping project, the primary inspiration for which was an excellent example of employing TimeMap technology called TimeMap Korea: a joint production of the University of Sydney's Archaeological Computing Laboratory and the National Institute of Korean History in Seoul, South Korea. It presents an excellent and engaging visual depiction of the history of the Korean Peninsula suitable for use in the classroom. After some research, it was noted that no similar animation existed—free for use and available on the Internet—for teachers of Taiwan's history, and so it was decided to embark upon this project and rectify that omission.

The first step in the project consisted of marshalling the required resources, primarily geographic data on the historical periods of cultural and political control in Taiwan. A variety of sources proved useful, not least of which was the generous assistance provided by Mr. Wei De-Wun of SMC Publishing in Taipei, Taiwan. The project's final product is a video (Karalekas 2018) that tracks change over time, represented in this paper through a succession of screen shots (Figures 1–7) from the video. For fuller information, please consult Karalekas (2018); for instance, this video has a scrolling legend showing the territorial boundaries of 18 Formosan aboriginal groups rather than the five in the Figure 1 screenshot.

ABORIGINAL AND EARLY NON-ABORIGINAL COLONIZATION OF TAIWAN

The island of Formosa was almost exclusively the domain of its aboriginal inhabitants before large-scale migration of Han Chinese from the mainland began in the 17th century. For the

purposes of the project, a decision was made to begin the animation in the year 1500: prior to any foreign powers or influence having any political or social control over the island of Formosa, in order to have a reasonable amount of time to present the traditional territories of the various aboriginal groups.

Of course, these delineations are not static, and have evolved over the past several thousand years. Archaeological research on Taiwan has documented the establishment of hundreds of settlements between 4000 BCE and 100 CE, including evidence for the expansion of colonization from the coast to the hinterland, and dramatic population growth over time (Bellwood 2017; Carson 2017; Hung 2017). Nevertheless, this research has not endeavored to link the archaeological remains to the aboriginal territorial demarcations that would be essential—even if approximate—in order to have a coherent perspective from which to tell the history of Taiwan. To that end, the closest illustration of this information was found in a map produced by Paul Li in 2001 giving historical linguistic boundaries. This map provides an excellent visualization of the various groups' territorial boundaries as well as the migrations experienced by many (see Figure 1).

Although not much is certain about the exact nature of the political and economic relationships on the island prior to the arrival of the first Westerners in or around 1590 (at which time the island inherited from Portuguese sailors the name it still carries today, Formosa), the first European visitors found the island populated by approximately 70,000 indigenous persons, about 1,000 Han Chinese settlers and farmers, and even a few Japanese traders and pirates. The

latter two groups were largely transient entrepreneurs, with a few traders in deer, salt and other items. The aboriginal economy appeared to be largely one of subsistence agriculture and hunting, especially deer.

Although the European presence on the island could more accurately be described as involving trading posts rather than colonial power, it had a tremendous impact on the political and social structure of the island's inhabitants. It was during this period that immigrants from the Chinese coast grew in number and displaced many of the west-coast groups from their traditional land. This pattern of migration also led to the current demographic situation wherein the aboriginal population makes up less than 2 percent of the island's total population. Given the importance of creating a nation-building ethic that forms a natural extension of historical forces, a brief examination of the history of the aboriginal relationship to government is in order.

The Dutch established their presence on the island by building a fort in what is now Tainan City. While the Dutch were developing parcels of land in the southern part of the island, Spanish forces were doing likewise in the north, the main purpose being to protect the Philippines from encroachment by the Japanese and Dutch, as well as to protect Chinese junks bound for Manila from enemy attack. By and large, Fort San Salvador in the Bay of Keelung, as well as Fort San Domingo in Danshui (Tamsui), failed in this mission, and Spanish officials began to see the colony as a waste of resources (Andrade 2008). The maps that offer a geographical representation of this influence can be misleading, as the Dutch and Spanish claims consisted primar-

ily of building and holding forts and making expeditions inland and around the coast, rather than actively governing large territories. Meanwhile a supra-tribal alliance of aboriginal groups including the Papora, Babuza, Pazeh, and Hoanya had formed the Kingdom of Middag (or Dadu, as it was known locally), governing almost 30 villages in the western central plains (see Figure 2).

The recorded history of Taiwan is generally believed to have begun during this period of European presence. Indeed, many cultural, economic and social changes were underway during this relatively brief but important period. Prior to the Europeans' arrival, Taiwan was widely considered *terra incognita* by Westerners and the Chinese alike, but it had a thriving political, social, and trading life among the various aboriginal groups that called the island home, and one that traditionally has, in much academic work on the greater-China "Sinic zone," received less than its fair share of attention thanks to a tendency to regard China as a result of the unitary cultural and historical development of the Han people (Di Cosmo and Wyatt 2005:3).

The Dutch and later the Spanish would establish colonies on the island, bringing with them Western ways and having an indelible impact on the history of the island, though it is important to point out that both powers established colonies in areas lacking in high-order aboriginal political units such as the aforementioned Kingdom of Middag (Andrade 2011:187) (see Figure 2). Not long after they had established a presence, the Europeans turned the island into something of an early trading hub, with goods from Asia transhipped to Europe (Brown 2004:37). In addition to setting up a taxation system, the

Dutch administration built schools that gave a Romanized writing system to the coastal Siraya language, with the Siraya Gospel of St. Matthew being published in 1661, followed a year later by the Siraya Catechism (Adelaar 2011:10). It was the practice of Dutch missionaries to provide religious instruction in native languages, thus creating the need for a writing system for the first time in Taiwan. The Sirayan, or Sinckan, writing system was also used in Western literary instruction, and became so popular that records indicate it was still in use as late as the early 19th century, over a century and a half after the Dutch expulsion from Taiwan.

Dutch colonizers were also the first to initiate a large-scale transmigration program of Han Chinese settlers to the island to work in agriculture. The aboriginal populations did not take well to farming in the Dutch model, thus creating the need to import workers (Ka 1995: 12), and about 25,000 Han Chinese had come to the island by the 1640s to cultivate rice and sugar, forming essentially a Chinese colony on Taiwan that, perhaps inevitably, began to brush up against aboriginal territories, the result being clashes between the two ethnic groups (Andrade 2005). In addition to these demographic and economic adjustments, the Dutch East India Company also imported new belief systems. Unlike agriculture, the aboriginal inhabitants appear to have taken to Christianity when the first missionaries, members of the Dutch Reformed Church, successfully spread their evangelical beliefs among the locals starting in the early 1620s—an endeavor that is described in fascinating detail by Scottish Presbyterian missionary William Campbell (1903) using translations of contemporary accounts. The Spaniards

in the island's north likewise brought with them Catholic missionaries, mostly Dominicans, who were quite successful in converting many of that region's aboriginal inhabitants to Catholicism (Rubinstein 1991:19).

CHINESE POLITICAL EXPANSION OVER TAIWAN

The European missions were not to last long, however. After expelling the Spanish in 1642 (Copper 1999:25), the Dutch themselves were driven off the island (Hsiao and Hsiao 2002:164) after making an enemy of Ming dynasty loyalist and pirate Zheng Chenggong. Zheng was a participant in the effort that became known as the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, which consisted of the economically powerful southern provinces of Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian, which were being run as fiefdoms by surrendered Ming dynasty generals. The Qing, it must be remembered, was not ethnically Han Chinese, but a Manchu dynasty—a moniker by which it was also widely known—and many saw rule by northern barbarians as an affront to the greatness of China. The generals, and Zheng, rose up under the banner of “opposing Qing and restoring Ming” (Liu and Shek 2004:347).

To finance his effort to re-instate the defeated Ming Dynasty, Zheng plied the trade routes to Japan and Southeast Asia, which until then had effectively been Dutch monopolies. When the Dutch retaliated, Zheng imposed a trade embargo on Taiwan, causing the island's economy to collapse, and opening the door for armed invasion (Andrade 2008). Zheng took the island by force in 1662, establishing the Kingdom of Tungning and effectively putting an end to the

European presence on Taiwan. Zheng, known in the West as Koxinga, instituted policies that had a great impact on the aboriginal inhabitants. He and his heirs brought over their armies, who when they weren't preparing for the restoration of the Ming dynasty spent their time working the land as farmers (see Figure 3). The number of Han Chinese on the island is estimated to have grown to over 100,000 during this period (Spence 1999:55). This activity pushed aboriginal populations into the island's interior, causing further difficulties and population pressure with the tribes already living in these areas. Koxinga's plan to overthrow the Qing dynasty never came to fruition, however, and in 1683, his grandson lost Taiwan to Qing forces. For almost the next two centuries, the transmigration of Han Chinese increased, with people fleeing poverty in China despite attempts to stem this flow.

The defeat of Koxinga's legacy of control over the island meant that, for the first time in history, Taiwan was nominally a part of China. In reality, the throne was unable to exert much control over this frontier territory, and indeed was not able to exercise effective sovereignty over half of the island. Chinese leaders admitted as much when it suited them to do so, such as in response to Japanese demands for restitution after the Mudan Incident. In 1871, 54 sailors from Ryukyu were massacred by members of the Paiwan aboriginal ethnic group after having been shipwrecked and wandering into Paiwan territory (Wang 1990:45). Japan demanded that the aboriginal leaders be punished, but were told by the Qing court that the incident had taken place in a part of Taiwan that was outside of its jurisdiction (Cauquelin 2004:14). This admis-

sion of lack of control gave Japan the pretext to launch the punitive Taiwan Expedition in 1874, the success of which in turn highlighted the Qing's lack of control over Taiwan, and finally helped spur the government to attempt to conquer the highland peoples beginning in the 1880s.

This incident highlights the two very different views of sovereignty between the Qing court and governments in Japan and the West. In the traditional Chinese view, it is not about the strict legality of territorial control, so much as a symbolic acceptance of China's centrality to the region (Callahan 2004:58). By the time of the Mudan Incident, this worldview was already becoming anachronistic, and dangerously so, as the incident reflects. Moreover, it led to a lack of policy consistency, and misunderstandings. On the one hand, while the government was divesting itself of responsibility for the actions of Taiwan's aboriginal groups, claiming they were not bound by Chinese law, it was, almost in the same breath, averring that their land was still part of Chinese territory, and warning its officials not to refer to aboriginal territory as being beyond Chinese imperial domain, mainly to serve as a disincentive to Western designs on possible treaty ports (Chang 2003:43).

For the better part of two centuries, the Qing court considered Taiwan somewhat of an economic burden that was tolerated in order to keep it from falling into the hands of pirates and, later, the Japanese, who had set their sights on acquiring the island. Prior to 1887, the Chinese officials stationed on Taiwan were corrupt and lazy, and their edicts were cruelly enforced, prompting social instability (Copper 1999:27). During this time, there were many clashes be-

tween the indigenous population and Han Chinese settlers, as well as popular attempts at insurrection against the corrupt mainland officials. There were so many of the latter that a popular saying at the time declared that “every three years there is an uprising, every five years a rebellion” (Roy 2002:21). Fearing the expense of dealing with these conflicts, and to make sure migrants would return to their ancestral graves, the Qing court attempted to ship as many Han Chinese inhabitants as it could back to the mainland, and instituted a prohibition on travel to the island by anyone but male workers (Davison and Reed 1998). This ban was repeatedly repealed and re-instituted until it was finally abandoned in 1788, but despite efforts to stem migration, the Han Chinese population increased at approximately 2 percent per annum during the first hundred years of Qing rule—an increase that reflects a high degree of cross-strait immigration and a failure of the Qing’s quarantine policies (Shepherd 1993:162). Illegal immigration and natural population growth meant that the Han Chinese inhabitants required more land, and new settlements reached northward and eastward (See Figure 4).

In response to this pressure, the island’s aborigines were forced to lease land to the Han Chinese, or become assimilated into the growing Han population. The only other option was to move further into the island’s mountainous interior, much of which was already home to aboriginal ethnic groups with their own languages and customs. Intermarriages were increasingly common during this era, given the absence of Han Chinese women on the island due to the immigration ban (Hsiao *et al.* 2002:169). Eventually a tenant farming system

developed on the island. Powerful Han landlords used tenancy contracts extensively, however enforcement was spotty as the government had a minimal ability to maintain order, let alone enforce tort.

Still, Qing leaders were eager to turn aboriginal farmers into tax-paying subjects. Han Chinese and so-called “cooked,” or civilized, aborigines were forbidden from venturing into the wilderness and sparking a conflict with the “raw,” or uncivilized, aborigines. Efforts were made to teach the cooked aborigines the superiority of the Han Chinese culture, primarily determining such superiority in terms of morality, such as the Confucian civic culture (Shepherd 1993:372). To prevent intermingling with the raw aborigines and stem further illegal land claims, a border of trenches and earth mounds was built.

When the aforementioned Mudan Incident of 1871 occurred, it was widely interpreted as a case of Japan testing the waters prior to possible colonization. At this point, Japan was in the throes of the rapid—indeed, liminal—period of modernization that accompanied the Meiji Restoration, and it was keen to follow the Western example and become a colonial power in its own right (Wilson 1983:408). Taiwan’s geostrategic position would have facilitated Japanese access to points farther southward and westward. In view of this obvious interest on the part of the Japanese, China began to re-evaluate Taiwan’s importance to the country’s maritime defence. It also began to re-evaluate the policy of cordoning off the raw aborigines in favour of assimilating them, through the “opening the mountains and pacifying the aborigines” policies of the late nineteenth century, essentially as

a means of finally extending Qing control over the interior of the island (Shepherd 1993:360). This period coincided with greater interest in Taiwan on the part of European merchants (Alsford 2015a), following the opening of the ports in 1860, and the arrival of the Presbyterians in 1865 (Alsford 2013).

This added interest in Taiwan from Europe and Japan is what ultimately led to the island's administration being raised from a single prefecture to two prefectures in 1875 (Gordon 2009). A similar test of the Qing government's dedication to Taiwan took place a decade later, this time with a French blockade of Keelung Harbor (Li 1956:120), after which the island was finally declared a province in 1887 and attempts were made to modernize (Brown 2004:52), including carrying out a land survey, and launching infrastructure projects like the island's first railroad: 60 kilometres of track connecting Keelung with Hsinchu, completed in 1893. It was this era of late-Qing investment in the island that historians argue marks the beginning of Taiwan's entry into the modern age (Alsford 2015b:69–70).

It should be noted that, despite 200 years of nominal Qing sovereignty over the island and its late designation as a full province, by the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, less than 45 percent of Taiwan was under effective Chinese administration. The remainder, though remote, mountainous and underpopulated, remained under the control of the aboriginal people who lived there (Huang 2001:224).

THE JAPANESE INTERVENTION

The island's status as a province of China lasted less than ten years, until 1895 when it was

ceded in perpetuity to Japan as a spoil of war (see Figure 5). In many ways, the First Sino-Japanese War was a quest for ideological dominance in East Asia (Huffman 1997:202). Japan's victory in this conflict surprised many observers and vindicated that country's colonial ambitions. The interest Japan had in acquiring Taiwan was for its strategic and economic significance, and this became a reality with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The new colonial rulers quickly set about exploiting their newly acquired territory for the benefit of the Japanese empire (Tsai 2009:113). Japanese was imposed as the official language in Taiwan, and the colonial government embarked on a remarkably efficient modernization and industrialization campaign, building a self-sufficient economy on the island, constructing railroads and expanding Taiwan's larger cities, all paid for with the institution of a land tax system (Ka 1995:58). It was during this time, in 1897 to be exact, that the first structured ethnographic studies of the island's aboriginal populations were launched, conducted by Japanese anthropologist Tori'i Ryuzo (Blundell 2009:4).

Ryuzo's friend and fellow anthropologist Ino Kanori argued that such studies would yield information that would make the aborigines easier to control, and so the pair set out to conduct what would become the first formal investigation into the racial status of the island's aborigines (Barclay 2001:117). The colonial government led by Governor General Kodama Gentaro was supportive of this research, which yielded the classification for the first time of nine of the island's distinct aboriginal ethnic groups: Amis, Atayal, Bunun, Paiwan, Saisiyat, Tsou, Puyuma (now Pinuyumayan), Yami and the Rukai peo-

ple (Huang 2001: 247).

It should be noted that these names were conferred upon them by Japanese ethnographers and in many cases are not accurate representations of how the peoples refer to themselves. The Yami people, for example, now often go by Tao, which in their language means “people,” just as the meaning of Atayal is “brave man” or “genuine person” in that language. The Amis people, furthermore, actually call themselves Pangcah, meaning “human” or “people of our kind.” “Amis” really means “north.” The Pingpu group actually represents several groups of plains aborigines that, over the decades since pioneer settlements began growing on Taiwan’s West Coast, have been largely assimilated into Han Chinese culture, losing many of their languages and traditions. This complicated heritage, not unlike that of Canada’s Métis, leads to some differing opinions on self-identification; while some claim at least a partial aborigine identity, others identify as Chinese for fear of being called “savages” (Brown 2004:128). This phenomenon whereby self-identification varies widely across and within communities has received significant research, but the reasons for it remain debated. What is certain, however, is that such shifting sense of selfhood among Pingpu and other communities speaks to a wider fluctuation in the evolution of society insofar as how its minorities, especially aboriginal populations, are viewed by the majority. As pointed out by Hsieh (2006:109), “we are the most researched people in the world, especially by non-indigenous researchers” is a refrain that ethnographic researchers are all too likely to encounter during such studies. Support in the Japanese colonial government for ethnological research

was so great, for example, that Orchid Island, home of the Yami people, was sealed off until the 1930s and restricted for the exclusive use of anthropologists and other scientists. The first Japanese census of Taiwan conducted in 1905 recorded 784 aboriginal villages, 46,432 Pingpu aborigines, and 36,363 mountain-dwelling aborigines (Shepherd 1993:161).

Part of Japan’s plan to make Taiwan its colonial model whose example could be followed by subsequent acquisitions involved efforts to exert total control over the entire island and all of its inhabitants. To that end, in 1906 Governor-General Sakuma Samata launched a five-year aboriginal pacification plan. The following year, the Beishi aborigines and those of the Hsinchu area become pacified, and the brutal techniques used to subdue further groups included such shows of force as bombardment by warships. In 1910 the Regulations for the Supervision of the Aborigines was promulgated, and that year, the government began to actively assimilate the island’s aboriginal peoples. Vast expanses of the mountains remained unconquered, however, and so Samata promulgated a second “Five-Year plan to pacify the savages” (Simon 2015:85).

In 1914, after 90 days of battle in which several villages were razed and countless warriors killed, the Truku were the last of Taiwan’s aboriginal peoples to submit to Japanese control. This is not to say that uprisings came to an end: indeed, just a year later, the Tapani Incident would have an enormous effect on the Japanese approach to administering the colonial holding. The rebel leader, Yu Qingfang, raised an army of Han Chinese and aboriginal fighters by using a syncretization of folk religion, millenarianism, vegetarianism, and banner worship to convince

his followers that they were immune to modern weaponry as they stormed Japanese police stations in the mountainous southern areas. The uprising lasted two months before it was put down. After the Tapani Incident, the Japanese administrators realized that if they were going to rule over the island effectively, they had better develop a deeper understanding of the local people's customs and belief systems (Katz 2005:110).

The task of assimilating the island's inhabitants and giving them a Japanese identity was accomplished in part by building schools and providing a Japanese education, even in the most remote mountain villages. By 1940, the vast majority of aboriginal children were enrolled in schools, learning about Japanese language and customs in addition to mathematics and the trades. Meanwhile, as Japanese identities took root, many traditional practices were dying out, including tattooing and headhunting (Huang 2001:224). More to the point: these practices were being actively suppressed, or outright forbidden, by the colonial government, to the degree that some members of the Atayal group were even forced to have their facial tattoos removed in a process that was painful and often disfiguring. The Office of the Governor-General executed its political orders through an administrative system administered by Japanese bureaucrats, with Taiwanese employed only at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Through an extensive and penetrating network of police stations and schools, police officers and teachers were the front-line workers and, to subjects in remote mountain villages, the face of the colonial government. It is perhaps not surprising that intermarriage of Japanese and aborigines was

not uncommon, as this contributed to the assimilation effort. Indeed, in certain cases aboriginal leaders arranged for their daughters to marry Japanese police officers, in order to cement a form of political alliance with the governing authority (Barclay 2005).

Despite these efforts at assimilation, the project was a difficult one. At least 100 incidents of armed revolt against the Japanese occupiers took place during the first two decades of the occupation. The last, and biggest, was the Wushe Uprising of 1930, in which the Atayal people of Taichung attacked and killed 135 Japanese, as well as injuring 215 at the Wushe Primary School (Qiao 2001:9). Subsequent attacks on police stations and other offices were launched, to seize weapons and ammunition in preparation for further resistance. The rebels held Wushe for three days. The reaction of the Japanese colonial government was swift and deadly: 1,163 policemen, 800 soldiers, and 1,381 mercenaries used their greater numbers, superior firepower and tear gas to overwhelm the rebels, even enlisting the aid of rival Atayal sub-groups. Eventually the counterinsurgency operation escalated to the use of poison gas dropped in canisters from airplanes. The uprising lasted 50 days and ended in the deaths of more than 900 Atayal and the surrender of about 500, at a cost of 49 Japanese soldiers and 22 aboriginal mercenaries (Qiao 2001:10). Revenge killings followed when rival Atayal who had fought for the Japanese murdered an estimated 200, despite the fact that they were supposed to have been in the protective custody of the Japanese. The uprising was a surprise to officials as the natives in the area were thought to have been successful examples of the govern-

ment's assimilationist policy at work. As a result, the Japanese government's conception of itself and of its relationship with those it ruled over was shaken to its core, and led to a more hard-edged policy of acculturation—by means of “imperialization”—as a means of consolidating colonial power (Ching 2001:136).

Whereas mountain-dwelling groups were largely ignored by previous governments, the Japanese attempts at social engineering had an enormous impact on local life. Previously, improving one's status used to rely on demonstrating proficiency in activities such as headhunting, but by the 1940s it had become a matter of education, and people who worked within the Japanese-imposed social structure were often elevated to the level of village chiefs, further consolidating the Japanese agenda. This went hand-in-hand with a Japanese policy, continued later by the KMT, designed to further remove aborigines from their traditional lifestyles and domesticate them by supplanting their custom of swidden horticulture and inculcating a more sedentary, farming-based lifestyle on reservation land.

Despite the brutal pacification campaigns of just a generation earlier, many aborigines volunteered to fight for the Japanese army in the Second World War (Huang 2001: 224). Even today, many older aboriginal people in remote villages speak Japanese rather than Mandarin, in addition to their tribal tongue.

RULE UNDER THE KUOMINTANG (KMT)

The island was bombarded heavily by American air power during World War II, at the conclusion of which it fell into the hands of the Chinese Nationalists (see Figure 6) in accordance with

the promises made in the 1943 Cairo Declaration (Brown 2004:9). The Chinese Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Mao Zedong's Communists was still going on, however, and by 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist, or Kuomintang, government had been forced to retreat to Taiwan, making it, the Pescadores, and a few surrounding islands the only remaining territory controlled by the Republic of China. Many of the Japanese methods of administration over indigenous peoples continued unchanged by the KMT. To the island's aborigines, the successive periods of colonization that began with the Dutch and Spanish and was followed up by the Zheng clan, the Qing dynasty and then the Japanese, carried on, this time with the Chinese Nationalists at the helm.

Chiang, an ardent anti-communist, feared that the relatively inaccessible mountain regions might become a haven for communist sympathizers, and so considerable attention was paid to the area. As the KMT gradually consolidated its control over the island, it began to impose its will more directly in the remote areas, and mountainous land in the central part of the island was taken over by the government, which banned non-state ownership. The new government, adept at the use of propaganda, recast historical events such as the Wushe Incident as examples of brave anti-Japanese—and therefore, by extension, pro-Chinese—insurgencies and declared the aboriginal inhabitants to be “mountain compatriots”. KMT re-education centres replaced the Japanese schools that were built in the mountain villages, and a series of studies was taught that focused on the language, history and culture of China. Whereas the Japanese had

forced aborigines to adopt Japanese names, they were, in the 1950s and 1960s, forced to take Mandarin names.

A series of policies were implemented to “modernize” the “backward” lifestyles of indigenous people, or to “make the mountains like the plains” (clearly a reference to the plains aborigines, or Pingpu, who had been completely assimilated by this point). These included teaching Mandarin as the official language, and efforts were made to instill Han Chinese culture and traditions in the lives of the island’s aboriginal inhabitants with the aim of eventually eliminating any remnants of their own cultures and replacing it with the Han Chinese culture. This policy to “plainize” the mountain people lasted until the 1980s and resulted in the eradication of languages and customs and the creation of an even stronger stigmatization attached to aboriginal identity than what had existed under previous regimes.

There were regulations instituted during this period to govern the private sale of agricultural goods grown on state-owned land, but in actuality land and produce was being sold illegally as enterprises from other parts of the island wanted access to the fertile mountain areas. Because the land cultivated by aborigines was state-owned, they did not have title to it, and were therefore unable to borrow money on it, effectively keeping them out of the economic system. By the mid-1960s, the KMT acknowledged the failure of its policy and began opening the land in these areas to private companies and individuals. During this period and well into the 1980s, the government also tried to fight encroachment by dividing and registering parcels of land and turning over control of it to aboriginal families. The

small size of these land parcels, the absence of farmers’ cooperatives, and the fact that aboriginal groups lacked a long history of concepts such as land ownership led to a situation where they were often cheated out of their reservation land, and the total land area they actually controlled gradually diminished. It was the market-led agricultural production that decimated the subsistence economies in aboriginal villages and had a negative impact on the social and political fabric of society.

The KMT government instituted policies that suppressed any attempts to create a movement for aboriginal nation building, and created in aboriginal communities a deeply held fear of even discussing such issues (Taipei Times 2001). It did this the way it consolidated its control over the island’s entire population during the martial law era. This was known as the White Terror period, when activists, intellectuals and anyone who could be considered a threat to the KMT regime ran the risk of being summarily arrested and accused of sedition (Kang 1979:17). An estimated 140,000 Taiwanese were arrested, killed, or “disappeared” for real or perceived opposition to the KMT, and a mood of anxiety suffused society, as anyone could be picked up by the authorities at any time and accused of being a communist spy. Taiwan’s population was essentially held in check by the pervasive sense of fear that this created. Aboriginal leaders were no exception, such as Uyongu Yatauyungana, who was executed by the KMT regime in 1954. Yatauyungana was a Tsou warrior who had participated in the infamous uprising on 28th February 1947 that had led to the imposition of martial law and the subsequent White Terror. As the White Terror swept

though the island eliminating potentially oppositional elites, a leadership vacuum was created that the government's centralized rule filled with a dependent aboriginal elite (Munsterhjelm 2014:22). The KMT chose certain trusted aborigines to serve the state, such as by administering indigenous areas. This increased the personal power enjoyed by these individuals, and ensured loyalty to the government. Another tactic was for the KMT to create political factions within otherwise unified ethnic groups by luring community leaders into joining the party, and then campaigning for party candidates.

During this period, very few aborigines were afforded the luxury of concerning themselves with issues of human rights or autonomy, because economic restraints imposed by the KMT administration ensured that most indigenous people did not agitate on post-materialist issues: most were far more concerned with feeding their families than with high-minded notions of nation-building. This situation taught aboriginal leaders that it was far more effective to lobby the government for small concessions, often monetary, than to concern themselves with nation building. For decades, Taiwanese aborigines who wanted to succeed in society had to hide their heredity. It was not until the mid-1990s that the government began to take steps to pull back from assimilationist policies and begin to expand aboriginal rights and raise awareness of the island's aboriginal peoples (see Figure 7). Much of this effort was part of a wider drive to move the island's political center away from the Sino-centrism exhibited by the Chiang regime and toward a more localized identity for Taiwan. At the same time, aboriginal groups began to assert their identity in more

overt and visible ways: a "new aboriginal subjectivity" that began in the early 1990s, wherein the display of aboriginal culture and identity served as a means of subverting the Han-centric moral and cultural order imposed on their people for generations and freeing themselves from this psychological domination (Rudolph 2008:75).

Formed in the mid-1980s, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines was the first activist group in the country specifically concerned with issues of indigenous rights. It lobbied for land rights, territorial autonomy, and economic integrity. Churches, too, provided logistical and financial support to the movement, and by the 1990s, these efforts began to bear fruit. The Constitution was amended in 1994 to include, among other changes, a new designation for aboriginal peoples from "mountain compatriots" (sometimes translated as "mountain siblings") to "original inhabitants" to better reflect their position as the first peoples to inhabit the island (Hsieh 1994:404). From the late 1980s to the early 1990s a number of land recovery movements were initiated, mostly by aboriginal elites based in the metropolitan centres, to retrieve lands that were designated by executive decree governing reservation land but had been appropriated through eminent domain to create national parks, or purchased under-the-table by Han Chinese businessmen and conglomerates. The executive order pertaining to this land tenure system stipulated that only aboriginals were allowed to hold title to certain land parcels in the mountain areas, and these movements lobbied for the return of these lands to their original indigenous owners (Chen 2002:6).

Meanwhile, in the education system, men-

tions of aborigines in texts and curricula were more frequent and less derisive after martial law was repealed, and government funds were being made available for the establishment of museums and cultural activities to stimulate interest in the island's indigenous heritage (Hughes 1997:99). The overall localization movement was spearheaded by then-President Lee Teng-hui, who was arguably attempting to move the nation's politics into a realm where independence—as opposed to the previous KMT dream of retaking the mainland—was the endgame. In a famous example of embracing aboriginal heritage, Lee himself underwent a blood test that indicated he had aboriginal genes, in addition to his Hakka and Fukienese heritage.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Even this summary overview of Taiwan's history paints a complex web of interactions among regional and global powers and a variety of influences that is far from linear. Nevertheless, the complexity and vitality of Taiwan's history are such that the subject lends itself well to visual depiction, especially for the purposes of pedagogical application. The current project is a small step in a wider endeavor that would aid not only in demystifying and visually representing the island's diverse cultural resources, but also serving as an invaluable tool in their proper management. Far from being inaccessible, an unvarnished presentation of Taiwanese history is something that ought to be made more available not only to those students around the world who are interested in Taiwan, but to those students in Taiwan who themselves are too often given an ideologically skewed version of their own history. This project, in its own small way,

aims to help correct that condition.

While this bird's-eye view of Taiwan history, designed to provide context to the Taiwan Mapping Project, only scratches the surface, there is a wealth of sources available to students and teachers interested in a more in-depth examination of this fascinating topic, and they are encouraged to delve deeper into the various periods that interest them the most. Indispensable Chinese-language sources include Wu Mi-cha's (吳密察) *The General History of Taiwan: Stories of the Heroic Pioneers* (Wu 2005), *Four Hundred Years of Transformation in Taiwan* edited by Xu Xueji (許雪姬) (Xu 2005), and Lin Yu-ju's (林玉茹) *The Trading Activities and Networking of the Local Merchants in Hsinchu During the Qing Dynasty* (Lin 2000). Also included should be Su Beng's (史明) seminal 1962 work *Taiwan's 400-Year History* (Shih 1980), a comprehensive volume that was once banned in Taiwan by the KMT regime. For a deeper understanding of the Dutch and Spanish colonial eras in Taiwan, students would be well advised to reference the works of Ts'ao Yung-ho (曹永和), who used his exceptional language abilities to provide Chinese translations of European sources; particularly his work on early Taiwan history (Ts'ao 2000), and for those with a particular interest in cartography, his *Taiwan on Ancient European Maps* (Ts'ao 1979). In English, an excellent source remains William Campbell's (1903) *Formosa under the Dutch: described from contemporary records, with explanatory notes and a bibliography of the island*.

The very teaching of history itself can be a controversial issue, and it is often difficult for people of differing viewpoints to even agree on

the facts. One great tool in this struggle for accuracy has always been the map—a map does not lie: it presents knowledge that is known at the point at which it is made, save those maps produced for purely propagandistic purposes or those, like the ones produced in China in the immediate post-war years, which lack cartographic standards (Chang 2015:67). Maps have also been widely employed as a technology of the power of the state, to lay claim to hinterland areas and, more subtly, to highlight differences between colonizer and colonized. This latter technique was widely employed by the Qing dynasty, which adopted modern, Western cartographic techniques such as ethnographic illustrations on map margins to highlight exotic differences between the Han majority and the con-

quered peoples of the border areas, which helped in effecting their colonization (Hostetler 2000:623).

Although maps are not immune to being used for political purposes, there is no better way for quickly understanding modern Taiwan and where it fits in the larger Asian context. What influences from different times have remained? How do we access those resources and provide public access to them? How can they be incorporated into the public education curriculum? These and other questions are difficult to explore, but this exploration is made easier thanks to the computer-aided Cultural Resource Management technology that provides a dynamic visualization of time and place.




Figure 1. Taiwan Time Map including aboriginal Formosan linguistic boundaries.



Figure 2. Taiwan Time Map including Dutch, Spanish and Middag territories.



Figure 3. Taiwan Time Map including the territory of the Kingdom of Tungning and the Middag Kingdom to its north.




Figure 4. Taiwan Time Map including extent of effective control by the Qing Dynasty over Taiwan circa 1847.



Figure 5. Taiwan Time Map including Qing Chinese territories ceded to Japan in 1895.




Figure 6. Taiwan Time Map including early Kuomintang rule.




Figure 7. Taiwan Time Map including later Kuomintang rule.

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