

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS: A STUDY OF THE ATTEMPT
TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF SLAVERY IN THE
TERRITORIES BY THE APPLICATION OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY—1850-1860.

Introduction.

The period in which Stephen A. Douglas took the most active part in shaping Congressional legislation was a period of territorial expansion. During this time Texas was admitted to the Union, the Mexican cession acquired, and the northern boundary of the Oregon Territory determined. The sectional question of slavery was closely connected with each of these territorial additions, but it was in connection with the Mexican cession that it became most prominent. This paper will be confined to a discussion of Douglas' activity in dealing with the problems growing out of these annexations of territory, and the application of popular sovereignty in the organization of the Territory of Nebraska. The narrative will trace events to the election of 1860 with a view to showing the results of Douglas' policy.

The movement toward the West was not a new one. It began with the settlement of the colonists along the Atlantic seaboard; and the American interest in the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico, together with our diplomatic activities as a "world power," remind us that it still lives. In the middle of the eighteenth century began the movement of Western expansion into the upper waters of the tributaries of the Atlantic, and, in the revolutionary days, the Alleghany Mountains were crossed by the "men of the Western waters." Struggles with the Tidewater Aristocrats in attempts to wrest political control from them began even before the Alleghanies were crossed. Bacon's rebellion was at bottom a struggle between the frontier settlers and the large landholders of the older settled region, and the War of Regulation, in the Carolinas, and Shays' Rebellion, in Massachusetts, were fundamentally similar sectional struggles. Each successive wave of population moving westward brought its peculiar struggle with the older settled area, and resulted, generally, in a broader democracy.¹ In the period to which we invite

¹Turner, *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 78, p. 289; Vol. 91, p. 83.

attention the movement toward the west bears all the characteristics of these earlier westward movements, though in the later years of the movement it became entangled with the question of slavery.

Previous to 1830 this westward movement was almost entirely Anglo-American. Immigrants arriving in American ports down to this time were comparatively few.¹ In the two following decades the social and political ferment which had been acting in Europe for half a century, and which culminated in unsuccessful attempts at revolution, led to a very large emigration to the United States and reinforced the natural American tendency to move westward. Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island, and the Anti-Rent agitations and disturbances in New York from 1839 to 1847, were expressions in this country of similar democratic movements and serve to explain in part this new westward movement.²

With the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, the profitable production of the short-staple variety of cotton was made possible on the uplands of the South Atlantic States, and as cotton planting and slave holding advanced into the interior countries the free farmers were obliged to change to the plantation economy and buy slaves or move out, and numbers of them passed into Kentucky and Tennessee.³ Many of these were of the Scotch-Irish and German stocks that in the first half of the eighteenth century passed down from Pennsylvania into the uplands of the South. At a still later period this Southern stock, including that from Tennessee and Kentucky, made up a large share of the settlers in the States bordering on the Ohio.¹ Side by side with this movement was the onward march of the planters, who took possession of the Gulf plain into which cotton culture and slavery spread. By 1834 Alabama, which had practically no cotton crop in 1811, raised a larger crop than either South Carolina or Georgia.² In the decade between 1830 and 1840, the New England States showed small gains in population, as did Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. But Georgia advanced in population from 516,823 to 691,392, Alabama from 309,527 to 590,756, Mississippi from 136,621 to 375,651, and Louisiana from 215,739 to 352,411. The new Northwestern States increased their popu-

¹U. S. Industrial Commission Reports, XV., p. 267 (1901).

²Garrison, *Westward Extension*, Chap. I.

³Turner, *Rise of the New West*, Chap. IV.

¹Turner, *New West*, Chap. V.

²Turner, *New West*, Chap. VI., and table, p. 47.

lation by leaps and bounds; Indiana in the decade of the thirties, from 343,031 to 685,866; Illinois, from 157,445 to 476,183, and Ohio, from 937,903 to 1,519,467.³

Notwithstanding the fact that the Western movement of population was in general along the lines of longitude, the West, as a whole, had a strongly nationalistic tone down to about 1830. The new section lying in the Mississippi Valley, which was becoming a dominant force in the councils of the Nation, acted as a tie binding the older sections in a more compact Union.⁴ But soon after 1830 the northern and southern portions of the Mississippi Valley began to show signs of marked differences. From New York and New England, in the thirties, a tide of settlement, making its way along the Erie Canal and the Great Lakes, poured into the Northwestern States and made the region an extension of the Greater New England already to be seen in New York. In the Gulf Plains the plantation system was pushing out the small farmers, cotton was becoming the most important crop, and a Greater South was in process of formation. These differences gradually became accentuated until the States of the Mississippi Valley became divided into two great groups separated by fundamental economic considerations.

The North readily saw the advantage which the control of the Federal machinery gave in supporting its policy and promoting its interests, while the South in turn fell back on the defensive theory of States' rights. The main factor in the economic divergence of the two sections had come to be slavery, because cotton culture had come to be the dominant occupation of the South, and slavery was believed to be essential to the plantation system of economy.⁵ That the movement which resulted in adding Texas to the territory of the United States was due primarily to the Anglo-American demand for more land, rather than to a conspiracy in the interests of slavery, has been conclusively shown.⁶

Re-annexation of Texas and Re-occupation of Oregon.

The impulse to Southwestern expansion, though in the beginning not primarily connected with the question of slavery, was greatly weakened in the North by the "growing realization that territorial expansion and the extension of slavery were so inextricably involved with each other that every accession of territory

³Twelfth United States Census, 1900.

⁴Turner, *New West*, pp. 67-74.

⁵Garrison, *Westward Extension*, Chap. I.

⁶*Ibid.*, Chaps. II. and VI.; Garrison, *Texas* (Commonwealth Series).

would precipitate a slavery crisis."¹ Douglas stood squarely for "the re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas." He undertook to prove to the doughty champion of New England, John Quincy Adams, that the Rio Grande was the south-westerly boundary of Texas; he defended the war with Mexico, and endorsed Polk's statement that American blood had been shed on American soil.² When the Wilmot Proviso came up in connection with Texas, Douglas repeatedly voted against it, and moved as a substitute the extension of the compromise line of $36^{\circ} 30'$ and a provision for the return of fugitive slaves. If the slavery question must be settled then, he favored the compromise line of $36^{\circ} 30'$, but he preferred to leave the question until the States applied for admission, when they could settle the question for themselves by means of their respective constitutions. Thus early (March 3, 1847,) did he foreshadow the doctrine with which his name is so closely identified.³ He held that we needed Texas to protect our commerce on the Gulf and prevent England from getting a foothold there. We needed Oregon to protect our fisheries and our trade with China. He favored establishing a railroad to Oregon, and said he would later bring in a bill authorizing a survey of the route. He advocated the organization of the Territories of Nebraska and Oregon, without attempting to define the boundaries of Oregon, and as our settlements were agricultural, and the British settlers were fur traders, we would have driven them out without the use of force.⁴ He was pledged, he said, to move a declaration of war if England tried to take Oregon, Cuba or Texas, as he believed she intended, and, in conclusion, he gave vent to his "Young Americanism" by declaring that if war came, he would administer Hannibal's oath of eternal enmity and not stop till he had blotted out the national lines on the map and made the area of liberty as broad as the boundaries of the continent itself.⁵ On May 13, 1846, he declared, "I am as ready and willing to fight for $54^{\circ} 40'$ as for the Rio Del Norte."

In dealing with the question of slavery in Oregon, Douglas held that slavery should be prohibited, "inasmuch as the whole of the said territory lies north of $36^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude, known as the line of the Missouri Compromise." This line he accepted as

¹Bourne, *Am. Hist.*, Rev. V., p. 502.

²Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st ses., pp. 816-7.

³Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 2d ses., pp. 425, 440.

⁴Cutts. *A Brief Treatise upon Constitutional and Party Questions*, as received orally from the late Stephen A. Douglas, p. 64.

⁵Cong. Globe, 28th Cong., 2d ses., p. 226.

⁶Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st ses., p. 817.

the basis of all settlements of the slavery question, down to the compromise of 1850. He never favored the Wilmot Proviso and voted against it on all occasions, and he voted for the Missouri Compromise Line every time an opportunity offered itself, except when instructed otherwise by the Illinois Legislature.³

When the bill for the organization of the Territory of Oregon finally passed, August 13, 1848, it excluded slavery by the application of the "conditions, restrictions and prohibitions" of the Northwest ordinance to the Oregon Territory. The people of the Territory had already forbid slavery there, and all attempts to extend the compromise line (36° 30') having failed, Douglas voted for the bill as passed.⁴

The Compromise of 1850.

To the most pressing question of the day—that of slavery in the newly acquired Mexican territories—the election of 1848 gave no answer. The Democratic convention which nominated Lewis Cass declared the war with Mexico to be "a just and necessary war," and denied the power of Congress to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States, and condemned all efforts to have that body deal with the question of slavery at all. A minority of the platform committee, led by William L. Yancey, offered a resolution favoring "non-intervention with the rights of property of any portion of the people in this confederation, be it in the States or in the Territories, by any other than the parties interested in them," but it was voted down 36 to 216, all the favorable votes coming from the South. The general desire to suppress all agitation of the slavery question appeared in the prompt calls to order whenever attempts were made to discuss the Wilmot Proviso. The Whig convention nominated General Taylor without making any declaration of principles whatsoever.¹

When Congress assembled in December, 1848, President Polk strongly urged the necessity of providing territorial governments for New Mexico and California. He favored the extension of the Missouri Compromise Line to the Pacific, but Congress adjourned on the 4th of March, 1849, without having made any provision for the government of the new territory. In the meantime gold

³Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 2d ses., pp. 166, 187; *Ibid.*, 30th Cong., 1st ses., pp. 136, 1043, 1061, 1078; 32d Cong., 1st ses., p. 67 (Appendix).

⁴Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st ses., pp. 1061, 1078-1080; Hines, 425-31; Gray, 346, 359.

¹Garrison, *Westward Extension*, pp. 268-280; Stanwood, *Presidential Elections*, pp. 167-171.

had been discovered (Jan. 24, 1848,) in the foothills of the Sierras. Thousands swarmed to the New Eldorado overland, by way of the Isthmus of Panama and "around the Horn." By the close of 1849, it was estimated that 81,000 Argonauts had arrived in California in search of the golden fleece.¹ Before Congress met again, in December, 1849, a California convention had drawn up a constitution forever prohibiting slavery in the State, and it had been adopted by a vote of the people.²

Late in January, 1850, Henry Clay introduced his famous plan of compromise in a series of resolutions comprehending the questions in dispute. Bills covering most of these questions had already been introduced and referred.³ On March 25, Douglas, from the committee on territories, reported bills for the admission of the State of California and for establishing the territorial governments of Utah and New Mexico.⁴ On the 18th of April, it was voted to refer Clay's resolutions and the whole matter of compromise to a select committee of thirteen, of which Clay was the chairman.⁵ On the 8th of May, Clay reported a number of measures, which have since been known as the "Omnibus Bill."⁶ There was considerable difference of opinion as to whether it was possible to pass all the measures in a single bill. Those in favor of passing one bill at a time gave way to Clay, but it was soon seen that the "Omnibus Bill" could not be passed, and each bill was finally passed separately.⁷ Clay's bill, so far as the new Territory was concerned, consisted of two printed bills reported by Douglas from the Committee on Territories with a single modification. The original Douglas bill "provided that the power of the Territorial Legislature should extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the constitution, without excepting African slavery."⁸ Clay's bill provided that no law should be passed "in respect to African slavery," but this clause was later rejected, largely through the influence of Douglas.⁹ Previous to our acquisition of the Mexican territory slavery had been forbidden therein by the Mexican government, but when this terri-

¹Rhodes, I., pp. 110-113.

²Rhodes, I., pp. 115-16.

³Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 127-8.

⁴Sheahan, Douglas, p. 130; Cutts, p. 79.

⁵Rhodes, I., pp. 171-3.

⁶Rhodes, I., p. 172.

⁷Rhodes, I., pp. 181-5, for details of the votes.

For a map showing a test vote on the Compromise of 1850, see Garrison, *Westward Extension*, p. 238.

⁸Cutts, pp. 79-80.

⁹Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 132-37; *Cong. Globe*, 31st Cong., 1st ses., pp. 944, 1018, 1118, 1134, 1830.

tory came under our constitution two theories arose as to the status of slavery. Calhoun claimed Congress had no right or power to "deprive the citizens of any of the States of this Union from emigrating with their property into any of the territory of the United States."³ The other side claimed that all Mexican laws not in conflict with the constitution remained in force, and slavery could not therefore exist except by act of Congress. Douglas strongly maintained that the territory of the Mexican Cession was free territory. He said: "The country is now free by law and in fact * * * and must forever remain free. It will be free under any bill you may pass or without any bill at all." Appealing to the Southerners in their determination, he uttered this bit of philosophy: "It requires but little moral courage to act firmly and resolutely in support of previously expressed opinions * * * but when a man is called upon to review his former opinions, to confess and abandon his errors, to sacrifice his pride to his conscience, it requires the exercise of the highest qualities of our natures—the exertion of a moral courage which elevates a man almost above humanity itself."⁴

When Jefferson Davis sought to amend that part of the compromise bill which dealt with the territories by an amendment safeguarding "those right of property growing out of the institution of African slavery," Douglas replied that the amendment attempted to continue slavery on **the assumption that it is there already**. This assumption, he held, was contrary to the fact, and he was not willing to extend slavery to the territory by act of Congress. Davis charged him with being unwilling to protect property in California. "But, sir," Douglas answered, "I do not hold the doctrine that to exclude any species of property by law from any territory is a violation of any property right to property." Continuing, he cited the facts that banks, whiskey and gambling tables had been excluded rightfully from several States and Territories by statute, and to allow the people to forbid slavery involved the same principle of self-government.¹ To deny this right to legislate on the question of slavery, he argued, would be contrary to the arguments used by the Democrats in the campaign of 1848; it would be contrary to the Nicholson letter; besides, to take the question out of the hands of the people would not settle it. But suppose it could be settled by Congress, "is an institution to be fixed upon a people in opposition to their unani-

³Garrison's *Westward Extension*, pp. 294-7.

⁴Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st ses., p. 373 (Appendix).

¹Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st ses., pp. 1115-6.

mous opinion? Or are the people by our action here to be deprived of a law which they unanimously desire, and yet have no power to remedy the evil?"²

In a previous argument, he declared that the ordinance of 1787 did not actually prohibit slavery in the Northwest Territory. Slavery existed there till it was abolished by the people themselves. In Oregon, he said, slavery did not exist because it was prohibited by the "deliberate and exclusive act of the people," acting "in obedience to that great democratic principle that it is wiser and better to leave each community to determine and regulate its own local and domestic affairs in its own way."³

He met the sectional argument that the South was being deprived of its rights in the territory by declaring that the South as a geographical section had no rights. As a part of the Union it had a voice in the disposition of the territory for the common benefit of all, but no more than that. "It is no violation of Southern rights to prohibit slavery, nor of Northern rights to leave the people to decide for themselves."⁴ As the debate dragged on through June, he took occasion to again state his idea of the solution of the question of slavery. "I have always held that the people have a right to settle these questions as they choose, not only when they come into the Union as a State, but they should be permitted to do so as a Territory."⁵

Jefferson Davis inquired what number of people there must be in a territory before the right to govern themselves accrued. Douglas replied that he would make no attempt to state the exact number. If there is enough to make a government necessary at all, that government should have the same right to legislate upon slavery as upon any other subject, like the relations of master and servant, parent and child, and commercial laws effecting the rights of property and citizens.⁶

Criticising the opposition to the admission of California, and in direct answer to Soule, Douglas said: "You must, therefore, depart from the established usages, abandon the precedents, and overturn the authorities, before you can exclude California from the Union. What has she done to justify this treatment? Sir, I fear the world will come to the conclusion that her sin—her only crime—was that she chose, in the plenitude of her wisdom

²Ibid, p. 1114.

³Ibid, p. 371.

⁴Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st ses., p. 369.

⁵Ibid, p. 911, Appendix.

⁶Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st ses., p. 1115.

and power to exclude the institution of slavery from her borders."⁴

Douglas did not vote for the Fugitive Slave Act, though he was heartily in sympathy with it, as carrying out the plain mandate of the constitution. In explaining why he did not vote for the bill, he said: "Whatever political sins I may have at any time committed, I think I may safely assert that no Senator ever doubted my willingness to assume the full measure of responsibility resulting from my official position. The dodging of votes—the attempt to avoid responsibility—is no part of my system of political tactics."⁵ "The arguments against the Fugitive Slave law, when closely examined," he declared, "are arguments against the constitution of our country and not against the provision of the law which has been passed for the purpose of carrying the constitution into effect." He charged Sumner with taking an oath to support the constitution, while at the same time firmly resolving not to support part of it. What would these gentlemen care for the form of proceedings and provisions of the law, provided the fugitive was not returned to his master? The real objection is that the fugitive is sent back, not that the form of the law does not suit them."⁶ With practical unanimity the standard historians dealing with this period picture Douglas as a subservient tool of the slavocracy, a political trimmer in the service of the South. That he made mistakes he himself did not deny, but when he looked into the future he read the failure of Calhoun's proposition looking to the maintenance of an equilibrium between the sections, North and South, and declared any such proposition to be impossible. As Douglas figured out the question of expansion into the territories, four States would, in time, be made out of Oregon Territory, five out of the Mexican Cession, two out of Minnesota Territory, and six out of the Territory on the Missouri. Each of these, he predicted, would be a free State whether Congress prohibited slavery or not. Should Texas be cut into five states, he predicted three would be free, and if all Mexico were to be annexed twenty of the resulting states would be free, and but three slave.

These predictions, he held, might be unpalatable to the South, but he considered them undeniable. We all look forward, he adds, to the time when Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri and probably North Carolina and Tennessee will grad-

⁴Ibid, p. 852.

⁵Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 1st ses., p. 65.

⁶Ibid, p. 1120 (Appendix).

ually emancipate their slaves. He was opposed to Calhoun's proposition because it would revolutionize the fundamental principle of government, and would destroy popular equality. How much more completely could Calhoun have been answered? Some of the results came in a way never anticipated by Douglas, but, as early as 1850, he saw little comfort for the South in the westward movement of which he was the greatest exponent.¹

Jefferson Davis was opposed to all the measures embraced in the compromise except the Fugitive Slave Act. He declared he wanted none of the credit for having passed them, if there was any credit in so doing. "If any man has a right to be proud of the success of these measures, it is the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglas). They were brought before the Senate by the Committee on Territories and the Committee of Thirteen, which it is claimed has done so much for the honor of the Senate and the peace of the country, merely stuck together the work of other men, save and except the little bill to suppress the slave trade in the District of Columbia."²

The Compromise As a Finality.

The passage of the compromise of 1850 marks the end of the first stage in the slavery controversy in the United States. The majority in the Northern States, which at one time were willing to accept the line 36° 30' as the dividing line between free and slave States were no longer satisfied with that line, and demanded the application of the Wilmot Proviso to all the new territory.¹ The majority in the Southern States, on the other hand, while demanding equal rights to enter all the new territory with their slaves, were willing to accept an extension of the Missouri Compromise Line.

California's action in organizing as a State, with boundaries extending north and south of that line, and a constitution declaring against slavery, complicated the situation. A settlement was then worked out by allowing the people of the States and Territories to settle the question for themselves, and the alarming possibility of Southern secession was temporarily suspended. Every part of the public territory had received some sort of regulation regarding slavery except the Indian reservation. The final

¹Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st ses., p. 371.

²Ibid, p. 1830.

³Schurz, Clay, II., p. 322.

Bancroft, Seward, I., p. 225.

outcome in Utah and New Mexico was, of course, a question of the future, but the means of settlement had been provided.

Three possible sources of friction lay on the horizon: Southern attempts at tropical annexations, Northern opposition to the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, and the opening of the territory between the Missouri River and the Rocky Mountains. This latter, it is true, had been provided for by the Missouri compromise, but the South was able to keep it closed to settlers because it was occupied by Indians, and action of the Senate was required to remove the Indians and make settlement possible there. "It remained to be seen whether the country would acquiesce and let the old parties resume their customary electoral contests, and concern themselves with the problems of internal government with which their earlier days had been taken up—such as the currency, the tariff, the public lands."¹ In the North opposition to the compromise was concentrated against the Fugitive Slave Act, but Cass, Dickirson, Douglas, Choate and Webster labored hard for submission to the law, and gradually a reluctant acquiescence was obtained. "It is a disgraceful and dirty business," said the *Ohio State Journal*, "but it is sanctioned by the constitution." The Southern upholders of the compromise, Clay, Crittenden, Stephens, Cobb and Foote, had a more difficult task in persuading the Southern people that nothing had been lost in California and that the North would live up to the Fugitive Slave law.²

The Northern people were not yet enough concerned about slavery to risk driving the South into disunion, and the South, though distrusting the North so far as carrying out the Fugitive Slave law was concerned, was willing to watch and await the outcome. Accordingly, an artificial calm reigned.³ Both political parties in 1852 declared the compromise final in the settlement of the slavery question; and the election, which turned largely on the personality of the candidates, was uneventful.⁴ "Except incidentally, and in relation to foreign affairs, the word slavery was hardly spoken in the session of Congress between December, 1852, and March, 1853. * * * But the fires of abolition and of secession were apparently as ceaseless as Aetna's. The Northern radicals were not discouraged, although popular senti-

¹Smith, *Parties and Slavery*, Chap. I.

²Phillips, *Georgia and State Rights*, p. 163. (*American Hist. Assoc. Report*, 1901, Vol. II.)

³Smith, *Parties and Slavery*, Chap. II.

⁴Stanwood, *History of the Presidency*, pp. 249, 251.

ment was so hostile that they kept their assistance to fleeing slaves as secret as possible.¹⁵

Beneath the peaceful surface the irrespressible conflict was going on. "Was there not peace already here?" asked Seward, in discussing the Kansas-Nebraska bill. "Was there not harmony as perfect as is ever possible in the country, when this measure was moved in the Senate a month ago?"¹⁶ On the surface, yes; but beneath the surface was working the same mighty restlessness that gave birth to every westward movement. Following the famine in Ireland and the revolutions on the Continent, immigration to America was very large. From 1845 to 1850 the average annual influx was about 300,000 persons. Large numbers of Germans were pouring into the country north of the Ohio River and into the upper Mississippi Valley. During the decade 1850 to 1860, the figures of the previous decade were exceeded by over 800,000, reaching the highest mark in the history of the country before the decade 1880 to 1890. In the latter part of the period the flow was somewhat checked by the panic of 1857 and the Civil War. Relatively few of these foreigners pushed to the extreme frontier, but as they settled in the older regions of the West and bought land, they pushed westward large numbers of native Americans, who were ever ready to move on to the new frontier. Texas formed a southern outlet for these people, Oregon formed a northern, and California drew from both sections.

The Argonauts moving to California and returning across the plains came to know Nebraska Territory, and demanded that it be opened for settlement. In addition, the possession of California and Oregon on the Pacific Coast called for better means of communication, and railroads, telegraph lines and wagon roads were projected. So important had the railroad movement become that conventions were called in various parts of the country, and three separate localities went into the struggle in earnest to become the eastern terminus of the Pacific Railway.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.

Petitions were sent from the people of Iowa and Missouri, as early as 1851, praying for the organization of Nebraska Territory.¹⁷ Representative Henn, of Iowa, informed Congress that "in the summer of 1853, not less than 3,000 souls had assembled on

¹⁵Bancroft, Seward, I., p. 333.

¹⁶Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 155 (Appendix); Bancroft, Seward, I., p. 349.

¹⁷Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub., II., p. 95.

the frontier of Iowa, ready to make their future home upon the soil of Nebraska, and later information led him to believe that 10,000 people will cross the river and become permanent settlers in Nebraska before the summer solstice" if the Territory is opened.² Senator Atchison, who until March, 1853, had been opposed to the opening of Nebraska because of his opposition to the Missouri Compromise Provision governing that Territory, said in Congress: "We know that it must come, and that in a very few years. The pressure of population from the older States, and from Europe, has been such that they roll up against the frontier, and the most populous counties in the State of Missouri are upon the western boundary line of that State. * * * The tide of immigration rolls on until it is stopped by the intercourse law. Such has been the case in our State for the last ten years, and I know the tide of immigration has been rolling back upon the interior of the State; now, sir, I know very well that in a very few years, if it is not doing so now, the tide of population, in defence of this government, will pass the frontier and take possession of every habitable spot in Nebraska Territory. You cannot keep them out. There is a large portion of our population who are now ready and anxious to abandon their homes and go into this Territory. You cannot restrain them much longer."³ Ex-Senator Benton went so far as to advise 15,000 or 20,000 who had assembled on the western border of Missouri to invade the Territory and take possession; but the President dispatched the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Fort Leavenworth with orders to use the army if necessary to restrain them.⁴

The Missouri Democrats were at this time divided into two hostile factions, both in favor of opening Nebraska to settlement, but divided over the necessity of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The moderate faction was led by ex-Senator Benton, W. P. Hall, Frank B. Blair, Jr., and the St. Louis Republican, and favored the protection of the rights of slavery under existing laws, but was opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise restriction. The radical pro-slavery faction was led by W. C. Price, Senator Atchison and Sterling Price, and was in favor of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Its leaders were the leaders of border ruffianism. Atchison, on March 3, 1853, said he saw no hope of a repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and urged the opening of the Territory. If he thought there was any

²Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 885 (Appendix).

³Ibid., p. 1113.

⁴Cutts, pp. 90-91.

possibility of repealing the Missouri Compromise he declared he would insist upon it as a preliminary.¹ In December, 1852, Abelard Guthrie, the recently elected delegate to Congress, found both the Missouri Senators opposed to territorial organization unless the Missouri Compromise could be repealed.² On December 9, 1852, Mr. Guthrie wrote from Washington: "Mr. Hall's bill (not then introduced) says nothing about slavery, but leaves untouched the Missouri Compromise. The Territory, it is pretty confidentially believed, will be free."³ As early as the session of 1843-44 Douglas had introduced a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska. It was part of his plan in opening a highway to Oregon in order that we might acquire all of Oregon as far north as 54° 40'.⁴ During each subsequent session down to 1854, he renewed the introduction of his bill, and "no one had objected to it upon the ground that there was no necessity for the organization of the Territory."⁵ There was objection, however, to the creation of any more free States lest the balance in the Senate between the two sections be destroyed and the interests of the South endangered.

Nebraska was, in 1851, Indian territory from which white settlers were excluded under threat of heavy fines and imprisonment. William Walker, one of the Wyandotte chiefs, stated that the Indians, especially the Wyandottes, "warmly favored the occupation by white people of the vacant lands, and the ultimate organization of the Territory," and with this end in view, "a few daring and resolute spirits in the Wyandotte nation determined to make a demonstration in favor of its organization by concerting measures for holding an election for a delegate to Congress."⁶

On the 12th day of October, 1852, a meeting was held at the council house of the Wyandotte nation and Abelard Guthrie was unanimously chosen as Territorial delegate to Congress. The Territory of Nebraska had not been officially organized, and, of course, Guthrie could have no legal standing as a Territorial delegate, but he could urge the organization of the Territory upon Congress. About the same time a similar gathering at Fort Leavenworth nominated a Mr. Banow as Territorial delegate.

¹Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 2d ses., p. 1113.

²Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub. (2d Series), 177, 28-30, 76.

³Ibid, p. 78.

⁴Cutts, p. 64.

⁵Cutts, p. 87.

⁶Neb. Hist. Soc. Pub., III., 2d Series, pp. 58, 60; Walker's MS., edited by Connelly.

Mr. Banow may possibly have been the representative of the Price-Atchison faction, but I have found no positive evidence of this. An election was called and Guthrie was elected by a vote of 54 to 16.² The Journal of the House of Representatives for December 17, 1852, shows that Abelard Guthrie presented a petition for a seat in the House as a delegate from the Territory of Nebraska. The petition was referred to the Committee on Elections, but apparently no action was taken on it by the committee. The matter came up again two years later, when Guthrie presented another petition, asking for pay for his attendance at the earlier session.³

The next year a movement was on foot to erect a provisional Territorial government, and a convention was called for this purpose to meet August 9, 1853. Another meeting for an entirely different purpose had also been called. Those Missourians interested in the selection of the Kansas River Valley as the route for the proposed Pacific Railway had planned a meeting to be held in that part of Nebraska Territory west of Missouri on July 26, 1853.

The Benton faction in Missouri now planned to take the enemy unawares and select the provisional Territorial officers at this earlier meeting. Guthrie was renominated as delegate to Congress, and William Walker elected as provisional governor of the Territory.¹ Resolutions written in part by Dyer, Governor Walker, Guthrie and others, before the meeting, endorsed the great central railroad route as it had been outlined in Benton's bill; expressed their deep obligations to Benton and Hall, of Missouri; regretted the failure of Congress to pass the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and urged its passage at the next session of Congress.² Later, the Price-Atchison faction nominated Rev. Thomas Johnson in opposition to Guthrie, though no opposition was made to Walker (a Wyandotte chief) as provisional governor. Governor Walker issued a call for an election, which was held on the second Tuesday of October, and resulted in Rev. Thomas Johnson's election over Guthrie, though Guthrie carried the Wyandotte precinct. Senator Atchison and the Indian agent, and the Methodist Church following, worked hard for the Rev. Johnson. Governor Walker's proclamation calling for an election in October was printed in the Missouri papers and a copy fell into the hands

²Ibid, III., 2d Series, 26-28.

³Ibid, III., 2d Series, 70, 71.

¹Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub. (2d Series), III., pp. 30-37.

²Ibid, pp. 30-37, 45-6, 88. Resolutions in Kansas Hist. Collections, VI., 107.

of H. D. Johnson, a member of the Iowa Legislature, who immediately sent word to Council Bluffs, Iowa. After consultation, the Iowans concluded to have a hand in the election for Territorial delegate, and arranged to have a ferry boat carry them over to the Nebraska shore near Sarpy's trading house, where, on the day specified in the governor's proclamation, they cast 358 votes for H. D. Johnson as delegate to Congress.

The returns for this election were turned in to the provisional government along with those for Rev. Thomas Johnson and Abelard Guthrie, but the returning board threw them out because H. D. Johnson and many who voted for him were residents of Iowa.³

Meetings ratifying the election of H. D. Johnson were held in several Iowa towns, and H. D. Johnson went to Washington (January, 1854,) where he found Rev. Thomas Johnson knocking for admission to the House of Representatives. Neither was admitted as delegate, and Nebraska, therefore, had two unofficial representatives in the gallery of the House.¹

The objection to organizing Nebraska as a Territory came naturally from the South. Nebraska was north of the compromise line of 36° 30', and in the struggle following the Missouri Compromise the South consistently tried to prevent the admission of free States unless she had ready a slave State to keep the balance in the Senate. No man understood this opposition better than Douglas. When he made an attempt to protect the emigrants passing through Nebraska to California and Oregon, the Senators from Georgia and South Carolina were foremost in opposition. Their objections, said he, "show us that we are to expect no protection at all; they evince direct, open hostility to that section of the country."¹ On another occasion the Senators from Texas were objecting, and Douglas said: "All other descriptions of bills—private bills and public bills—have been taken up by unanimous consent and by courtesy; but the moment a territorial bill is indicated, objection is made. Not only to considering it on that day, but on any future day. It seemed as if there were a design that this bill should never be considered—should never be entertained."² Pike and Guthrie found the center of opposition to the organization of Nebraska in the same section.³

³Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub., II., pp. 85-6, and III., p. 37 (2d Series).

¹Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub., II., p. 88.

²Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 1st ses., p. 1762.

³Ibid, p. 1684.

³Pike, *First Blows*, p. 183. Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub., III., p. 82 (2d Series).

Reference has already been made to the attempts Douglas made in every Congress of which he was a member to organize Nebraska Territory.⁴ In the session which ended in March, 1853, a bill for this purpose had passed the House, but Douglas was not able to have it considered in the Senate. That there was a strong demand for the opening of Nebraska Territory has been shown, and it is probable that in time Douglas would have won over a majority of the Senate, but a mere majority would not improve the situation, because Nebraska "had forever been excluded from settlement by treaties with the Indians, which could not be changed or repealed except by a two-thirds vote of the senate."¹

Senator Bell saw this objection and alluded to it on the last night of the debate, March 4, 1854, but Douglas had committed the South to the measure before this feature was mentioned.¹ When Congress met again in December, 1853, the bill which had passed the house during the previous session was introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Territories, of which Douglas was chairman. On the fourth day of January following, the committee returned a substitute for the bill and accompanied it with a report in which Douglas argued for the application of the principles established by the compromise measure of 1850.² The important changes made in the original bill were incorporated in the fourteenth section, which provided "that the constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within said Territory as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union * * * which being inconsistent with the principles of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories * * * is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the constitution of the United States."³

The report affirmed that these principles "were intended to have a far more comprehensive and enduring effect than the mere

⁴Nicolay and Hay, I., p. 337. Harper's Magazine, Dec., 1853, p. 121.

¹Cutts, pp. 92-3.

²Cutts, pp. 92-3.

³Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., pp. 115, 307 (Appendix).

⁴Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 307 (Appendix).

adjustment of difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition of Mexican territory. They were designed to establish certain great principles, which would not only furnish adequate remedies for existing evils, but, in all time to come, avoid the perils of similar agitation by withdrawing the question of slavery from the halls of Congress and the political arena, committing it to the arbitration of those who were immediately interested in, and alone responsible for, its consequences. * * * A question has arisen in regard to the right to hold slaves in the Territory of Nebraska, when the Indian laws shall be withdrawn and the country thrown open to emigration and settlement. * * * It is a disputed point whether slavery is prohibited in the Nebraska country by **valid** enactment. * * * In the opinion of those eminent statesmen who hold that Congress is invested with no rightful authority to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri is null and void."

It will be remembered that this eighth section of the Missouri Compromise provided that slavery should be prohibited in all of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36° 30', except Missouri. The report continued: "The prevailing sentiment in large portions of the Union sustains the doctrine that the constitution of the United States secures to every citizen an inalienable right to move into any of the Territories with his property of whatever kind and description, and to hold and enjoy the same under the sanction of law. * * * The compromise measures of 1850 affirm and rest upon the following propositions: First, that all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and the new States to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, by their appropriate representatives, to be chosen by them for that purpose. Second, that "all questions involving title to slaves," and "questions of personal freedom," are to be referred to the adjudication of the local tribunals, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Third, that the provision of the constitution of the United States, in respect to fugitives from service, is to be carried into faithful execution in all the original Territories the same as in the States. Still the committee did not recommend the repeal of the famous eighth section of the Missouri act, but, apparently, it indirectly authorized the inhabitants to disregard it.¹ That Douglas was alone responsible for the Kansas-Ne-

¹Senate Reports 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 15; Flint, Douglas, p. 63.

braska act is beyond question. It is likewise perfectly clear that it was prepared without consulting any section or faction. Douglas denied that the South had dictated it, and the facts in the case support him. There is no evidence to show that Atchison, or Stephens, or Toombs were instrumental in influencing him.²

His motives in introducing the bill have met with almost universal impeachment. Pike described him as "the agitator general of the slavery question, as the chief of dough-faces, as the bully of slavery," and Benton spoke of him as a poor white man who had married a woman with "niggers."³ The Independent Democrats accused him of making the dearest interests of the people "the mere hazards in the presidential game."⁴ A host of writers then and since have felt sure his motive was one solely of ambition. It is to be regretted that his private correspondence has not come down to us. But this has not hindered historians from reaching conclusions. Mr. Rhodes, for instance, so far abandons his usual careful accuracy as to declare that "in this case no confidential letters or conversations need be unearthed to arrive at a satisfactory explanation."⁵ This attitude of mind has become so widespread, even among trained historians, that it is almost impossible to present even the facts in the case.

"There is not a particle of evidence to show that Douglas did not himself believe that the application of the principle of popular sovereignty to the Territory was for the best interests of the country. It was entirely possible to believe that the experiment would succeed as it had apparently succeeded in 1850."⁶ The application of popular sovereignty to California, Utah and New Mexico had taken the slavery question out of Congress and placed it where it could be settled at least to the satisfaction of the people of the Territories; and certainly Congress had no better solution to offer. There was an urgent demand that the Territory be opened, as urgent demand as had been made and heeded for any earlier or later Territory. It is easy to condemn a policy suggested, very much easier than to suggest a better one. To leave the Territory till the South was ready to organize it; till a third of the Senate would not have been willing to oppose all attempts to remove the Indians, was certainly not the

²Rhodes, I., pp. 431-2.

³Pike, *First Blows*, pp. 217, 221.

⁴Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 281; *Am. Hist. Leaflet No. 17.*

⁵Rhodes, I., p. 429.

⁶Hodder, *Chataouquan*, Vol. 29, p. 435.

part of a statesman. Had Douglas known the ultimate outcome, his plans would certainly have been different. But he had good reason to believe that popular sovereignty would have been no less successful in Nebraska than it had been in California. His "career was controlled by faith in the right of the people to govern themselves and by devotion to the interests of the West. * * * His ability has never been questioned. His honesty and patriotism have never been disproved."¹ Even in the Republican State convention of Illinois he found a defender. L. H. Hurlburt, a delegate from Boone County, said: "The Senator (Douglas) was aware of the strong current of emigration setting westward from the free States, and did, he (the speaker) could believe, rely upon the force and known disposition of this current to create free States, if let alone, even under the outrage perpetrated in this Nebraska bill."²

There was need for the opening of Nebraska, and he undertook the task, while at the same time attempting to control the dominating pro-slavery elements in the party without destroying the party or the Union.³ Prof. Macy says he probably "had no more intention of actually enlarging the area of slavery than had Webster in laboring to remove the legal restriction from the Territory of Utah. Northern free labor was moving westward, as he knew, by leaps and bounds. It was not at all likely that slavery would ever gain any foothold in the region between the Rocky Mountains and the States of Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri. Douglas, no doubt, sought to further his presidential prospects without making any actual change in the practical situation respecting slavery extension."⁴ His prediction, in 1850, that Nebraska would be a free Territory has already been noted; and there does not appear to be a single sentence of his to show that he had changed his opinion. While discussing the Kansas-Nebraska bill, he called attention to the fact that slavery then existed in Nebraska, and added: "I suppose it will continue for a little while during their Territorial condition, whether a prohibition is imposed or not. But when the settlers rush in—when labor becomes plenty— * * * it is worse than folly to think of its being a slave-holding country. I do not believe there is a man in Congress who thinks it could be permanently a slave-holding country. I have no idea that it could."

¹Hodder, *Chatauquan*, Vol. 29, p. 436.

²Report of Convention in Chicago Press, June 18, 1858.

³Morton, *History of Nebraska*, I., p. 154.

⁴Macy, *Political Parties in the United States*, pp. 188-9.

⁵Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 279.

Senator Dodge thought a few slave holders would enter the Territory with their slaves under arrangements to serve a few years, after which they would become free, as had been the case in Illinois earlier.² Representative Henn predicted that the settlers would be ten to one in favor of freedom. "All Nebraska," said he, "if not all Kansas, must be settled by an emigration from the non-slave-holding States."³ May it not be possible that Douglas cajoled the South with the empty notion that the South stood some chance of gaining a slave State in competition with the freemen of the North?⁴ Senator Bell, of Tennessee, in arguing against the bill, said he had been assured that slavery would go into Kansas, and that idea had been spread throughout the South. He did not believe, however, that slavery could ever be established in Kansas, and he challenged any Southern man to show him how the South was to gain anything by the bill. He thought Douglas showed great skill in getting Chase and Sumner to attack the South and unite the South for the bill, adding: "I never saw a higher degree of parliamentary tact displayed than by the Senator from Illinois on that occasion."⁵

On the 16th of January, 1854, Mr. Dixon, of Kentucky, gave notice that when the bill was taken up he would offer an amendment to the effect "that the citizens of the several States or Territories shall be at liberty to take and hold their slaves within any of the Territories of the United States, or of the States to be formed therefrom."⁶ Mr. Douglas looked upon this amendment as a deliberate attempt to legislate slavery into the territory, though in the discussion which followed Mr. Dixon denied this intention and accepted Douglas' modification of the bill as satisfactory.

On January 23 Douglas offered a substitute bill, which differed from the original in two particulars: It declared that the slavery restriction of the Missouri compromise "was superseded by the principles of the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, and is hereby declared inoperative;" (note) and it divided the Territory into two parts, Kansas and

Note.—Moses, Illinois, II., p. 588, gives a letter from G. M. McConnell, in which he says he remembers hearing Douglas say that he was overruled by the Committee on Territories, and either had to accept the amendment or give up the leadership.

²Ibid, p. 381 (Appendix).

³Ibid, p. 888.

⁴Macy, Political Parties in the U. S., p. 190.

⁵Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., pp. 939-40 (Appendix).

⁶Wells, Lincoln and Seward, p. 68; Dixon, True Hist. of Missouri Comp., p. 440.

Nebraska. The people of each Territory were to determine the question of freedom or slavery to suit themselves. Dixon expressed his satisfaction with this amendment as covering what he attempted by his proposed amendment.¹ The next day Douglas consented, at the suggestion of Chase, Sumner, and others, to postpone the consideration of the bill till the 30th of the month, and on the same day the appeal of the Independent Democrats appeared in the papers.² This led to a savage debate between Douglas and Chase, and a storm of indignation throughout the North.³ In the arguments which Chase made against the bill he "reached in many respects the highest point in his senatorial career."⁴ It is sufficient to say that he completely demolished Douglas' argument that the principles of the compromise of 1850 were believed by anyone to supersede those of the compromise of 1820. That the basis of the compromise of 1850 was different from that of 1820 was true, but that the later principles set aside or in any sense abrogated the settlement of 1820 was "untrue in fact and without foundation in history."⁵ On the 7th of February Douglas offered an amendment, which was carried, by which the Missouri Compromise was declared "inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories as recognized by the legislation of 1850."⁶

His division of Nebraska into two territories has given rise to the belief that one was intended to be free and the other slave. Mr. Rhodes writes: "It follows plainly enough, therefore, that the division of the territory was in the interest of slavery; and if Douglas had not been brought to the point of actually conceding that Kansas should be a slave State, he at least knew that there was a well-devised scheme in progress to make it one."⁷ Mr. Rhodes admits he cannot trace the ways leading up to this division. Mr. Douglas clearly stated the reason for the division, but Mr. Rhodes, having first impeached Douglas' motives, will not accept his statement of the reason.⁸ The real reason for the

¹Rhodes, I., pp. 433-9; Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., pp. 175, 239, 240; *Flint*, Douglas, 171.

²Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 281; Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 197-201; Rhodes, I., pp. 463-71.

³Bancroft, Seward, I., p. 357.

⁴Smith, *Parties and Slavery*, p. 100.

⁵Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 275; p. 139 (Appendix); Rhodes, I., pp. 441-451.

⁶Sheahan, Douglas, p. 201.

⁷Rhodes, I., pp. 440-1.

⁸*Ibid.*, I., p. 439; Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 221.

division of Nebraska was not connected in any way with slavery, but with the Pacific railroad. H. D. Johnson, who will be remembered as the Nebraska delegate to Congress elected by the Iowans, writes: "Before starting for Washington * * * a number of our citizens agreed upon a plan which I formed, which was the organization of two Territories. * * *" The Missouri people wished to have the Pacific railroad located in the Kansas river valley, and the Iowans were equally anxious that the Platte valley should be selected. Douglas being interested in Chicago, could readily see the advantage to his home city and was brought to favor the northern route. If a division of Nebraska could be made to further that end, Douglas could and did make it. Continuing further, Mr. Johnson writes: "Dodge * * * introduced me to Judge Douglas, to whom I unfolded my plan and asked him to adopt it, which, after mature consideration, he decided to do."¹ Senator Dodge said: "Originally I favored the organization of one Territory: but representations from our constituents, and a more critical examination of the subject—having an eye to the system of internal improvements which must be adopted by the people of Nebraska and Kansas to develop their resources—satisfied my colleague * * * and myself that the great interests of the whole country, and especially of our State, demand that we should support the proposition for the establishment of two Territories; otherwise the seat of government and leading thoroughfares must have fallen south of Iowa."² Representative Henn of Iowa expressed the same views in the House, and all these views corroborated exactly the reasons Douglas gave for dividing the Territory. From Iowa, then, came the call to divide Nebraska, and not from the "slavocracy."³

Most of the argument against the Kansas-Nebraska bill was directed against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Douglas complained that the opponents of the bill did not meet the question of popular sovereignty as a good or bad policy aside from its connection with the Missouri Compromise. He denied that the Missouri Compromise was a compact; he denied that it was more than legislation brought forward to settle the then existing controversy over slavery and contended its settlement was only temporary. By the conditions existing, Nebraska could

¹Nebraska Hist. Soc. Pub., II., p. 88.

²Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 382 (Appendix).

³Meigs, Benton, pp. 419-21; Davis, *The Union Pacific Railway*, Chap. III.; Sheahan, *Fergus Hist. Pub.*, II., p. 205; *Chicago Democratic Press*, June 25, 30, July 4, 7, 10, 11, 1853; J. Loughborough, *The Pacific Telegraph and Railway: Proceedings of the Railway Convention at Lacon, Ill (Cinn. 1853)*.

not be opened to settlement, and a new solution was demanded. He cited the votes on the Missouri act to show that the North had been opposed to it, and its representatives had voted against it in the Senate "in the proportion of more than four to one."¹ Touching upon the breach of plighted faith by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, of which the Northerners complained, Bancroft says: "Judging by their words merely, this was not altogether sincere, for there was not one of them that would not have been glad to blot out that compromise for anything more favorable to freedom; nor was there, probably, one of them that had not favored, or promised to favor, the repeal of some part of the Compromise of 1850. Had they been as absolutely candid as Dixon they would have said, 'we know neither parties nor compromises, except when they will aid us as anti-slavery men.'"²

But the repeal of the Missouri Compromise provision does not seem to account for the great storm which arose against the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Thousands of people were led to believe that the Territory was destined to be slave territory, and that they would be shut out from the free lands. Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota had recently been filling up with thrifty Northerners, Germans, and Scandinavians, and they looked upon the Kansas-Nebraska bill as an attempt to shut them out from the free lands of these two territories, "otherwise the comparatively few reformers * * * could not have set half the nation in a blaze in a few weeks."³

In 1860 the census tables showed that the free Northwestern States had contributed very heavily to the population of Kansas. Of the total population, 11,617 were natives of Ohio; 11,356 of Missouri; 9,945 of Indiana; 9,367 of Illinois. The other States contributed in smaller proportions, and 10,997 were born on Kansas soil between 1854 and 1860.⁴

(To be continued.)

EDWARD McMAHON.

¹Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st ses., p. 337 (Appendix).

²Bancroft, Seward, I., p. 353.

³Ibid, I., p. 357.

⁴Seventh U. S. Census, 1860, pp. 165-6.

For maps showing vote on Kansas-Nebraska Bill, see Smith, Parties and Slavery, p. 106.