

**STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS: A STUDY OF THE ATTEMPT TO  
SETTLE THE QUESTION OF SLAVERY IN THE TERRI-  
TORIES BY THE APPLICATION OF POPULAR  
SOVEREIGNTY—1850-1860.**

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[Continued from Last Quarterly.]

**Popular Sovereignty in Kansas.**

The introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska bill produced an unprecedented storm.<sup>1</sup> The newspapers followed the lead of the Independent Democrats in exciting and guiding public opinion. The Northern Whig journals unanimously opposed the act and the Democratic press was divided. Those papers loyal to the administration favored the bill, the more independent condemning it. Douglas was burned in effigy from Boston to Ohio. Speakers in public meetings, and legislatures, condemned the bill and passed resolutions against it, but Douglas remained firm and the South rapidly rallied to the support of the bill.<sup>2</sup> This support on the part of the papers and people of the South was largely because the bill was so vigorously denounced by Northern sections which were looked upon as abolitionist centers. Still, there were many in the South who were not moved to approval of the bill by Northern opposition.<sup>3</sup>

In the North, steps were immediately taken to form a new party embracing all those opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. In the Northwestern States and in Maine this new party took the name Republican, but in most of the Eastern States the opposition was drawn into the Whig and Know-Nothing parties, or into a more or less complete fusion of Whigs, Free Soilers and Democrats. The election returns showed that the Republicans or anti-Nebraska party carried all the Northwestern States except Illinois. In the East it was impossible to figure out exactly how things stood owing to the many varieties of fusion, and the sudden rise of the Know-Nothing party. Douglas claimed that the whole anti-Nebraska campaign had miscarried, though the administration had lost control of nine States and sixty-two seats in the House of Representa-

<sup>1</sup>Seward, "Life of Seward," II., p. 222.

<sup>2</sup>Rhodes, I., p. 463.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., I., pp. 468-70.

tives. Speaking of the voters in the Northern States, Professor Smith says: "Except in the Northwest, their action was so far from being what anyone would have predicted that it seems scarcely credible. The diversion of the fierce anti-Southern anger of the Eastern States into the construction of a party whose professed principles were absolutely unrelated to the measures which caused the upheaval seemed utterly inexplicable on rational grounds. The outcome remained to be seen."<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile a tremendous rush to Kansas had begun. The tide that Atchison and Henn had described as having moved westward to the borders of Missouri and Iowa poured forth into Kansas. The whole Northwest was astir. Large numbers of Germans went west from Missouri. The editor of the *St. Louis News* counted eleven wagons bound westward in a single day, and the *Cincinnati Commercial* noted the passage of seven hundred Germans.<sup>2</sup> More than a month before the bill was signed Eli Thayer had obtained a charter for the Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Society, which was later reincorporated as the New England Emigrant Aid Society, the object being to settle Kansas with free State settlers.<sup>3</sup> In August, the town of Lawrence was established by the Emigrant Aid Society, which before winter set in had sent out five hundred settlers.

This organized emigration with a political purpose was an unexpected factor in the situation. Missouri and the South resented it, and when an election was called for November 29 to elect a territorial delegate to Congress the storm broke. Organized bands from Missouri crossed the line into Kansas on or before election day and cast their votes. A Congressional Investigating Committee found that 2,258 votes were cast for Whitfield, and that 1,729 votes were illegal. Supposing all the illegal votes to have been cast for Whitfield, the pro-slavery candidate, their subtraction from his total vote still left him a plurality of more than 200 over his nearest competitor; and he was admitted without question to a seat in the House of Representatives.<sup>4</sup> In January and February, 1855, a census was taken which showed the presence in Kansas of 8,601 people, of whom 2,905 were voters. Governor Reeder ordered the election of a territorial Legislature for March 30, and once more "an unkempt, sun-dried, blatant, picturesque mob" equipped with guns, revolvers, bowie knives and whiskey crossed from Missouri to take part. A total of 6,307 votes

<sup>1</sup>Smith, "Parties and Slavery," p. 120 and Chap. VIII.

<sup>2</sup>Chicago Weekly Democratic Press, June 10, 1854; Rhodes, II., pp. 78-9.

<sup>3</sup>Thayer, "Kansas Crusade," Chap. II.

<sup>4</sup>"Howard Report," House Report, No. 200; 34 Cong., I. Sess., pp. 4-8. Rhodes, II., p. 80.

were cast of which the Howard committee found 4,908 to be illegal leaving 1,410 legal votes. The free State vote, legal and illegal, if any were illegal reached but 791.<sup>1</sup>

It is no part of our purpose here to go into a detailed examination of these returns. A superficial examination is enough to convince one that the early history of Kansas is worthy of further study than it has yet received. Few historians of the period seem to have gone farther than to accept the majority report of the committee. The minority member, Mr. Oliver, points out glaring inaccuracies in the majority report that seem not to have been considered. In the first place both reports were expected to and did have an effect upon the political campaign then pending. Again, the majority determined the number of illegal votes by comparing the census returns with the poll books **by districts.**<sup>2</sup> How many voters were recorded by the census in one district and had moved to another before election and were therefor counted as illegal voters, we may never know. In a territory in which conditions were as extremely unsettled as they were in Kansas then, the number might easily be large. Still further, it is probable that many settlers coming to Kansas late in the fall or during the winter may have been required through lack of shelter, provisions and the comforts of life to return to the settled districts of Missouri for the winter. Such persons returning after the census had been taken would be classed as illegal voters. The absence of definite information on these points makes the acceptance of either report hazardous in the extreme.

The invasion of the Missourians roused the North to the high-pitch of excitement; and arms were called for. The directors and officers of the Emigrant Aid Society busied themselves to raise Sharps rifles, and the Civil War began with Kansas as the outpost.<sup>3</sup> The Free State party repudiated the territorial Legislature, and in a constitutional convention which met at Topeka, October 23, 1855, drew up a constitution prohibiting slavery and asked admission as a State. The contest was opened in Congress by a report presented by Douglas from the Committee on Territories. The report said the committee had not been able to obtain definite and satisfactory information in regard to the alleged irregularities in conducting the election, the number of illegal votes, etc., but from what they had received they reported in favor of a bill authorizing the Legislature of the Territory to provide for an election of delegates to a constitutional convention as soon as the

<sup>1</sup>"Howard Report," pp. 9, 30.

<sup>2</sup>"Howard Report," p. 75. (Minority Report.)

<sup>3</sup>Smith, "Parties and Slavery," Chap. IX. and pp. 143-8; *Am. Hist. Review*, XII., 546.

Territory had the requisite population; and also reported in favor of an appropriation for executing the laws and maintaining public order in the Territory.<sup>1</sup>

This plan would leave the Territorial Legislature as it was. Douglas condemned the "unnatural and false system of emigration" carried on with the view to controlling elections, and charged the Kansas trouble to the actions of the Emigrant Aid Society. Collamer, the minority member, saw the cause of the trouble in slavery, popular sovereignty, and the Missouri Invasions. He therefore advocated the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska law, or a plan of action which would render the acts of the Kansas Legislature "utterly inoperative and void, and direct a re-organization, providing a proper safeguard for legal voting and against foreign force," or the admission of Kansas under its free state constitution.<sup>2</sup> Douglas advocated his bills in a powerful speech. He attacked Reeder mercilessly, declaring that he had recognized the Territorial Legislature as a legal body till he quarreled with it and was removed by the President; he charged and attempted to prove by quotations from utterances of the more hot headed leaders of the free state movement that their movement was "a case of open and undisguised rebellion;" he insisted that the Missouri invasion was an imitation of the Emigrant Aid movement, based on self-defense. But he held fast to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and reiterated the argument of his report that "justice, the genius of our institutions, the whole theory of our representative system, imperatively demand that the voice of the people shall be fairly expressed and their will embodied in the fundamental law, without fraud or violence, or intimidation, or any other improper or unlawful influence, and subject to no other restrictions than those imposed by the Constitution of the United States."<sup>3</sup> He refused to support the admission of Kansas under the Topeka constitution on the ground that it was the constitution of a political party—a faction—and not the act and will of the people. He supported the Toombs' bill which provided for a fair vote, but the bill was not considered in the House, because it was to the interest of the Republican party to keep the Kansas question open during the presidential campaign.<sup>4</sup>

The election over, "Kansas, under Geary's rule, ceased to bleed;" and the country quieted down to await developments.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Senate Com. Reports, 34 Cong., I Sess., p. 12. (Report of March 12, 1856.)

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Report No. 34.

<sup>3</sup>Senate Reports, 34 Cong., I Sess. (Report of June 30.) Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., I Sess., p. 285. (Appendix.)

<sup>4</sup>Smith, "Parties and Slavery," pp. 166-68.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

Buchanan's administration opened under favorable conditions in spite of the Dred Scott Decision, and the Republican party in the local elections lost ground nearly everywhere. Had Buchanan selected an impartial course, he might have ended "the whole territorial controversy" and have left "the Republicans with no grievance and no excuse for existence."<sup>1</sup> In his inaugural address he definitely promised to leave the whole slavery question to the resident settlers of Kansas, and Governor Walker stopped at Chicago on his way to Kansas to inform Douglas that the President was fully committed to this policy.<sup>2</sup> Before Governor Walker arrived in Kansas, however, the pro-slavery party, aided in part by the refusal of the free-state men to take any part in the elections, had elected a constitutional convention which drew up the famous Lecompton Constitution which declared: "The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction, and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever." This constitution with a special article on slavery was to be submitted in such a way that the voter could only vote "for the constitution with slavery," or "for the constitution without slavery."<sup>3</sup> Here was Buchanan's chance to redeem his promises, but he wilted in face of the opposition of Cobb, Thompson, Davis, and other Southerners, and turned all the power of the administration to the support of the Lecompton Constitution.<sup>4</sup>

Douglas bolted and arraigned the Lecompton Constitution and the method that produced it in the severest terms; his speeches against Lecompton are among the best he ever made. "Sir," said he, "call it faction; call it what you please; I intend to stand by the Nebraska bill, by the Cincinnati platform, by the organization and the principles of my party; and I defy opposition from whatever quarter it comes. \* \* \* We are told we must force the Lecompton Constitution down the throats of the people for the sake of peace; for the sake of localizing the quarrel. \* \* \* The moment you impose a constitution on that people against their remonstrance and protest you have nationalized this difficulty, and pledged yourself to maintain that government at the point of the bayonet, and with all the powers at your command; you have legalized civil war instead of local-

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 209-10.

<sup>2</sup>Richardson, "Messages and Papers," V., p. 431; Cutts, p. 111; Rhodes, II., p. 273.

<sup>3</sup>McDonald, "Select Documents," p. 436.

<sup>4</sup>Smith, "Parties and Slavery," pp. 217-9. Senate Exec. Doc., 35 Cong., I. Sess., No. 8, p. 130.



izing the Kansas quarrel. \* \* \* God forbid that I should ever surrender my right to differ from a President of the United States of my own choice. I have not become the mere servile tool of any President, so that I am bound to take every recommendation he makes, without examining and ascertaining whether it meets with the approval of my judgment or not. \* \* \* It is intimated, not charged, that there is something fearful, something terrible, in this thing of a man daring to be true and faithful to his principles, when other men do not desire that he should be."<sup>1</sup> Referring later in the debate to the desperate attempt of the administration to crush him by removing his supporters from the federal offices, he said: "I prefer private life, preserving my own self respect and manhood, to abject and servile submission to executive will. \* \* \* Official position has no charm for me when deprived of that freedom of thought and action which becomes a gentleman and a Senator. \* \* \* What depotism on earth would be equal to this, if you establish the doctrine that the executive has a right to command the votes, the conscience, the judgments of the Senators, and of the Representatives, instead of their constituents?" In old England "where they have a Queen by Divine right and lords by the Grace of God" no such despotism was practiced or would be tolerated. "I intend to perform my duty in accordance with my own convictions, neither the frowns of power nor the influence of patronage will change my actions, or drive me from my principles. I stand firmly, immovably upon these great principles of self-government and State sovereignty upon which the campaign was fought and won."<sup>2</sup>

Horace Greely wrote of the struggle: "Mr. Douglas never exerted himself so powerfully, and never exhibited more of that vigorous grasp and close treatment of his subject which characterize all of his efforts, nor ever displayed more resources, both in assault and defense, than on the various occasions in which the discussions brought him to his feet."<sup>3</sup>

The Lecompton measure easily passed the Senate, for Douglas was supported by only three Democrats, two Southern Americans and the Republicans, making a total of but twenty-five. In the House an amendment was carried re-submitting the constitution to the people.<sup>4</sup> A conference committee brought forward the English bill which was looked upon as a compromise by which re-submission was granted, but on the condition that if Kansas

<sup>1</sup>Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I. Sess., p. 140.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 201 (appendix).

<sup>3</sup>New York Tribune, April 9, 1858.

<sup>4</sup>Dem. Review, June 1858, p. 439; Smith, "Parties and Slavery," p. 225.

rejected the Lecompton Constitution its admission was to be postponed till it had gained population enough to entitle it to one representative.<sup>1</sup> Douglas looked upon the land grant as a direct bribe to induce Kansas to accept a constitution it did not want. He objected to the requirement in regard to population. He believed it wise to keep all territories out till they had the population requisite for a representative in Congress, but if concessions were to be made to Kansas as a slave State, they should be the same for Kansas as a free State. He did not believe the people of Kansas could be fooled so easily, and retorted that the attitude of the South would be very different if the land bribe had been offered Kansas to make it a free State. When asked to make some concession on his side because the other side had done so much, he replied: "No matter how many and how great their concessions are, if they have not conceded the principle for which I contend, I cannot take what they propose."<sup>2</sup> His opposition to the English bill continued to the end, but it was passed, and overwhelmingly defeated by the people of Kansas at the polls.<sup>3</sup>

When the English bill was passed and submitted to the people of Kansas the administration had gone as far as it could go toward making Kansas a slave state. It was generally conceded at the time, however, that the people of Kansas would reject the proposition; and if they did so, all hope of making Kansas a slave state was at an end.

In the summer and fall of 1857 it looked as if the mission of the Republican party had ended.<sup>4</sup> Seward and his organ, *The Times*, accepted popular sovereignty.<sup>5</sup> Greeley despaired of electing a President on a straight Republican issue and the Eastern Republican leaders began to feel that some combination with Douglas and against the administration was necessary to win in 1860.<sup>6</sup> *The New York Herald* predicted, "Senator Douglas will be the Black Republican of the Northwest in less than two months;" and in California the Republicans and Douglas Democrats combined to put up a fusion ticket.<sup>7</sup> Even the *Chicago Press* was inclined to be lenient with the Douglas Democrats. It said editorially: "Upon the whole, therefore, we think it best neither to be too lavish in promises on the one hand, nor yet hold up in advance, a period of probation to dampen the ardor of prospective recruits \* \* \* the results of course would be deter-

<sup>1</sup>American Hist. Rev., XII., pp. 500-1; Rhodes, II., pp. 299-300.

<sup>2</sup>Cong. Globe, 35 Cong. I. Sess., p. 1870.

<sup>3</sup>Smith, "Parties and Slavery," pp. 225-6.

<sup>4</sup>Rhodes, II., pp. 302-3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., II., p. 305; Bancroft, Seward I.

<sup>6</sup>Chicago Press, March 9, 1858.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., March 6, 1858; New York Tribune, Sept. 13, 1858.

mined by the established usages of the party—by the will of the majority.”<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of the Eastern Republican leaders (Wilson, Burlingame, Colfax, Bowles, and others,) toward Douglas was well expressed in the *New York Tribune*, when Greeley wrote: “It seemed to us, therefore, the true policy of the Republican party \* \* \* to rally around him and uphold him on his new platform of practical resistance to the behests of the slave power. \* \* \* Had this been done, Mr. Douglas could never more have been signally useful to nor trusted by the slave power. His hopes of future advancement must have rested perforce on the growing free labor sentiment of the country.”<sup>2</sup>

Douglas’ term was soon to expire and the Legislature elected in 1858 was to fill the place. The Republicans of Illinois were not willing to take Eastern advice, and nominated Abraham Lincoln as the Republican candidate to succeed Douglas. Douglas seems to have been willing to welcome the Republican party into his camp, but openly and persistently refused “to be drummed out of the Democratic camp either as a deserter or coward.”<sup>3</sup> The Illinois Republicans had given up the idea of uniting with the Douglas Democrats, if indeed they ever seriously thought of doing so. “Once for all,” said the *Chicago Press*, “let the *Tribune* (N. Y.) understand that the Republicans of Illinois so far from intending to return Mr. Douglas to the United States Senate, intend to defeat him, and they feel abundantly competent to manage their own affairs, and that they do not recognize the right of *The Tribune* to instruct them on the subject, nor do they give any heed to its suggestions. The *Tribune* will do well to address itself to a close observance to the eleventh commandment—mind its own business.”<sup>4</sup> During the campaign *The Tribune* supported Lincoln, though still believing his nomination a mistake. When the campaign was over it seemingly justified in part Douglas’ position. “That Mr. Douglas \* \* \* was impelled to take positions in which the Republicans could not support him is very clear; but it by no means follows that he would have taken these positions had the Republicans of Illinois stood at his back instead of being desperately intent on his overthrow, and virtually leagued with the Buchananites to achieve that end \* \* \* He could not afford to alienate, nor allow Mr. Buchanan to alienate,

<sup>1</sup>*Chicago Press*, March 16, 1858.

<sup>2</sup>*New York Tribune*, Nov. 12, 1858; Rhodes, II., p. 306.

<sup>3</sup>*Chicago Press and Tribune*, July 7, 1858.

<sup>4</sup>*Chicago Press*, May 14, 1858; Hollister, “Life of Colfax,” pp. 119-22; “Greeley to Medill,” in Nicolay and Hay, II., pp. 140-1; Coleman, Crittenden II., pp. 162-164; Rhodes, II., pp. 305-7.



any portion of the Democratic party from his standard, if he were obliged to meet the entire Republican party marshaled in deadly array against him.<sup>1</sup>

### The Lincoln and Douglas Debates.

The attempt to crush Douglas was not confined within the halls of Congress. His term as Senator was nearing its end, and the administration determined if possible to prevent his re-election. The South repudiated him; the Kentucky state convention expressed undiminished confidence in Buchanan; and Indiana, under the leadership of his two old friends, Bright and Pettit, carried the state convention to the Buchanan standard.<sup>2</sup>

In Illinois scarcely a week passed that did not see newspapers, postmasters and other Federal officers announce their change from Douglas to Buchanan. Those who remained friendly to Douglas were removed and their places given to administration supporters.<sup>3</sup> "There are unmistakable indications," writes the editor of the Chicago Press, "of extensive rebellion against Mr. Douglas in the ranks of the Democracy of Illinois \* \* \* very different are the circumstances under which Mr. Douglas calls upon the Democracy of Illinois to sustain him now. He is openly arrayed against the policy of the administration which they helped to place in power. If they sustain him, they must fight the administration, which course takes them directly out of the Democratic party. \* \* \* A very large number of the rank and file of the Democracy of the State will doubtless stand by the administration \* \* \* there is no disguising the fact that Mr. Douglas will not be able to carry the party with him in the State \* \* \* not only the old conservative masses \* \* \* but even the local leaders of the party who have worked in the Douglas harness for the last dozen years are withdrawing their allegiance from the **man**, that they may cling to the **party**."<sup>4</sup> The next day the same paper said, "We shall not be surprised if more than half of the Democratic papers of the State were compelled by outside pressure to follow the example of the Peoria Union within the next fortnight."<sup>5</sup>

But the masses of the Democrats were too much attached to Douglas and "too honest and the prominent leaders too shrewd" to accept the Leocompton swindle. In nearly every county Doug-

<sup>1</sup>New York Tribune, Nov. 12, 1858. Macy, "Political Parties in the United States," pp. 258-9.

<sup>2</sup>Chicago Press, Jan. 13, 1858.

<sup>3</sup>Sheahan, Douglas, XVI.; Rhodes, II., p. 322.

<sup>4</sup>Chicago Press, Feb. 11, 1858.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., Feb. 12, 1858.

las could count on the rank and file of the party.<sup>1</sup> The first skirmish came in the Chicago city election (March 2), in which the Republican ticket won by a majority of 1,100 votes; and it was charged by the Douglas organ that this was made possible by desertions in the Democratic wards.<sup>2</sup> In March the "National Democrat," Douglas' German organ, in Chicago, went over to the administration, and from its presses was issued in addition the "National Union," a new anti-Douglas daily. "Let the present ordeal be maintained for six months longer, and it would be an easy matter to take the census of such officeholders and Democratic papers as stand out against the administration," observed the Press.<sup>3</sup>

The Democratic state convention was called to meet at Springfield, April 21, and as the regular machinery of the party was largely in the hands of the Douglas Democrats, the administration Democrats issued separate calls by petition for county conventions to elect delegates to the state convention. That for Cook County was signed by 101 prominent Democrats.<sup>4</sup> When the delegates arrived at Springfield the Douglas Democrats were found to be in a majority, so the administration Democrats decided not to enter the regular convention, but to hold a separate one.<sup>5</sup> The Douglas Democratic convention contained 520 delegates—representing all but fifteen counties (Sheahan, page 392, says all but two counties), while the administration Democratic convention contained representatives from only twenty-eight counties, and some of these were visitors rather than authorized representatives.<sup>6</sup>

The administration Democratic convention endorsed the Cincinnati platform and adjourned to meet again June 9, in order "to give the Democracy time to turn out."<sup>7</sup> At the adjourned meeting, 263 delegates, representing forty-eight counties, met and adopted a platform and nominated candidates. Eighty counties were formally or informally represented before the convention adjourned, and some of the participants were men who "always ranked among the ablest leaders of the party in this State."<sup>8</sup> The Washington correspondents reaffirmed the continued determination of the President and the administration to continue "a war to the knife on the Douglas faction of the Democracy," and pre-

<sup>1</sup>Chicago Press, March 5, 1858.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., March 4, 1858; Chicago Times, March 3, 1858.

<sup>3</sup>Chicago Press, March 17, 1858.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., March 29, 1858.

<sup>5</sup>Sheahan, Douglass, pp. 390-94.

<sup>6</sup>Chicago Press, April 22, 23, 1858; Sheahan, Douglas, p. 392.

<sup>7</sup>Sheahan, Douglas, p. 393.

<sup>8</sup>Chicago Press, June 8, 9, 10, 11, 1858.

dictions were common that the administration Democrats would continue to gain strength as the contest continued.<sup>1</sup> These predictions, however, did not come true. With the entrance of Douglas into the campaign after his return from Washington, and the overwhelming vote against the English bill in Kansas, the administration Democratic party became an unimportant factor in the contest, at least as a third party, though it is impossible to know how many of them cast Republican votes.

The Douglas Democratic platform reaffirmed allegiance to the Cincinnati platform of 1856; reaffirmed its faith in popular sovereignty—the right of the people of a Territory by a majority vote at a fair election to decide the character of their fundamental laws; demanded the submission of the Lecompton constitution to a fair vote of the people of Kansas; and endorsed Douglas and the Democratic members of Congress from Illinois.<sup>2</sup>

The Republican state convention, which met at Springfield, June 16, 1858, unanimously nominated Abraham Lincoln as the senatorial candidate of that party to succeed Douglas, and it was then that Lincoln delivered his famous speech, in which he said: "A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."<sup>3</sup>

On the ninth of July, Douglas arrived in Chicago and was accorded a rousing welcome.<sup>4</sup> He responded in a speech answering that of Lincoln. He justified his opposition to the English bill because it discriminated between free and slave States by allowing Kansas to come in as a slave State with a population of 35,000, "but if she demanded another constitution, more consistent with the sentiments of her people and their feelings, that it should not be received into the Union until it had 93,420 inhabitants." This attempt to influence votes for slavery was unfair. He believed the people would reject the bribe, but in any case the right of the people to decide for themselves had been secured, and he thanked those, Republicans and Whigs, who had fought with him for this principle. He had defended popular sovereignty against a united North in 1854, and in 1858 against a United South and still believed it a sound doctrine. Turning then to Lincoln's speech he found in it two distinct propositions.

<sup>1</sup>Chicago Press and Tribune, July 22, 1858.

<sup>2</sup>Sheahan, Douglas, p. 394.

<sup>3</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 52. (Edited by A. T. Jones, Battle Creek, Mich., 1895.)

<sup>4</sup>Sheahan, Douglas, p. 398.

First, Mr. Lincoln "advocates boldly and clearly a war of sections \* \* \* to be continued relentlessly until the one or the other shall be subdued, and all the States shall become free or become slave." Second, Mr. Lincoln goes for a warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States because of their judicial decision in the Dred Scott case. On both of these points he was opposed to Lincoln. In answer to the first he vindicated the right of the people to regulate their own domestic institutions, and to the second, he declared that however he might differ with the court it was his duty as a citizen to bow to the will of the highest constitutional authority.<sup>1</sup>

Lincoln replied the next night in a much weaker effort than his convention speech, and Douglas made answer at Bloomington, July 16. Lincoln rejoined at Springfield next day, where he declared, "I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and his friends are not willing to stand by it, let them come up here and amend it. Let them make it read that all men are created equal except negroes."<sup>2</sup>

Thinking Douglas could be answered better from the same platform, Lincoln challenged him to a joint debate, and seven meetings were arranged—one in each Congressional district, except those containing Chicago and Springfield, where both had already spoken.<sup>3</sup> The joint debates attracted wide attention throughout the whole country, and brought Lincoln prominently forward as a Republican leader. Douglas had found no equal in running debate either in the Senate or House; and Lincoln certainly had the courage of his convictions and a confidence in the justness of his cause when he challenged him.

In the first debate Douglas asked seven questions which he called upon Lincoln to answer. He wanted to know if Lincoln:

1. Favored the unconditional repeal of the fugitive slave law.
2. Was opposed to the admission of any more slave States.
3. Was opposed to the admission of a State with a constitution satisfactory to its people.
4. Favored the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
5. Favored the prohibition of the slave trade between the States.
6. Favored the prohibition of slavery in all the Territories of the United States.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 406-15, and *Lincoln and Douglas Debates*, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup>*Lincoln and Douglas Debates*, pp. 159, 180.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 161; *Rhodes II.*, p. 321.

7. Was opposed to the acquisition of more territory unless slavery was prohibited therein.<sup>1</sup>

Douglas' object was to identify Lincoln with the radical wing of the Republican party in Illinois; but Lincoln would not so identify himself. Lincoln declared that while he did not endorse all the details of the existing law he did not favor the unconditional repeal of the fugitive slave law because such a law was guaranteed by the constitution. He would be glad to know that there would never be another slave State admitted, but that if slavery be kept out of the Territories until they were ready to be admitted he would admit them. He did not favor the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia except upon three conditions: First, abolition should be gradual; second, decided upon by a majority vote of the qualified voters of the District; third, compensation to be made to unwilling owners. He had not carefully studied the question of slave trade between the States and did not care to state his position on it. He was pledged to the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories. And, finally, he was not in favor of acquiring more slave territory.<sup>2</sup>

Douglas did not consider Lincoln's answer to the third and fourth questions satisfactory, but could get no more definite answer during the debates.

Lincoln then retaliated by asking Douglas four questions, and later asked a fifth one:

1. Would Douglas favor the admission of Kansas before it had 93,000 people?
2. Can the people of a Territory lawfully exclude slavery before a State constitution is formed?
3. If the Supreme Court should decide that a State cannot exclude slavery, would Douglas acquiesce in the decision?
4. Did he favor the acquisition of territory irrespective of its bearing on the slavery question?
5. If the slaveholders in a territory needed Congressional protection would Douglas as a member of Congress vote for this legislation?<sup>3</sup>

To the first Douglas answered that as a general principle he did not favor admitting a Territory till it had population enough to entitle it to one Representative, but as the English bill made an exception favorable to slavery, he would vote to admit it as a free State with the population it had. In answer

<sup>1</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 168.

<sup>2</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 201-4.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 204, 270.



to the second question Douglas replied that the people could exclude slavery from a Territory by unfriendly legislation. This doctrine became known as the Freeport doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

A great many biographers of Lincoln have laid emphasis upon his cleverness when in Freeport he asked Douglas the question that resulted in his Freeport doctrine of unfriendly legislation. Nicolay and Hay (II., p. 160) state that there is a tradition that Lincoln submitted the questions to a number of friends. The second one was objected to on the ground that Douglas would answer it yes, by unfriendly legislation. "Then," Lincoln is reported to have answered, "Gentlemen, I am killing larger game; if Douglas answers he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this." It is hard to disprove a tradition; but the facts in this connection are worth consideration.

On June 12, 1857, Douglas delivered an address before the Grand Jury at Springfield in which he said: "While the right (to hold slaves in the Territories) continues in full force under the guarantee of the constitution, and cannot be divested or alienated by an act of Congress, it necessarily remains a barren and worthless right unless sustained, protected and enforced by appropriate police regulation and local legislation presenting adequate remedies for its violation. These regulations and remedies must necessarily depend entirely upon the will and wishes of the people of the territory, as they can only be prescribed by the local Legislature."<sup>2</sup>

In Bloomington, July 16, 1858, Lincoln being present in the audience, Douglas devoted more time to a discussion of this question than he did at Freeport, saying, "Slavery will never exist one day or one hour in any Territory against the unfriendly legislation of an unfriendly people."<sup>3</sup> Again at Springfield the next day he expressed the same idea in regard to unfriendly legislation, and Lincoln criticised his designation of the Dred Scott decision as a mere abstraction in his answer the same day at Springfield.<sup>4</sup>

All this occurred before the Lincoln-Douglas debates were commenced, and any advantage Lincoln could possibly gain was in getting Douglas to answer in the joint debate because "of the greater interest incited by a joint debate."<sup>5</sup>

In answer to the third question, Douglas said that such a

<sup>1</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup>Nicolay and Hay, II., pp. 83-4, 159; Sheahan, Douglas, p. 423.

<sup>3</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 109-110; Sheahan, Douglas, p. 423.

<sup>4</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 157, 136; Flint, Douglas, pp. 196-206; Chicago Press and Tribune, July 20, 1858.

<sup>5</sup>Rhodes, II., p. 328.

decision was impossible; it would be moral treason and no man on the bench would stoop to it. Answering the fourth question, he said he felt free to annex territory and leave the people to decide whether the State should be free or slave. And finally, he would not vote protection to slave property in the Territories because he believed in non-intervention by Congress, and held that all domestic institutions should be left to the people themselves.<sup>1</sup> From previous speeches the "house divided against itself" issue and that of the Dred Scott decision were brought in. The points at issue between them may be summed up as follows: Lincoln planted himself upon the Declaration of Independence and declared that the negro was entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Douglas tried to push him to admitting equality between the negroes and whites; Lincoln denied that he believed this, "but in the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hands earns, he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."<sup>2</sup> But this equality did not hold in States having slavery, for Lincoln repeatedly denied that he was in favor of interfering with slavery in the States. He believed he had no right to do so and he had no disposition to do so. Even in the District of Columbia he was not in favor of freeing the slaves except by a vote of the people—an interesting recognition of the popular sovereignty which Douglas was advocating.

They both agreed to the inferiority of the negro, that the white race was superior. They further agreed that the negro need not necessarily be a slave because an inferior; that he had certain rights and privileges which he should be allowed to enjoy as far as consistent with the good of society. Meeting the question of what was for the good of society, Douglas would let the people decide for themselves; Illinois forbade slavery, Missouri did not; Maine allowed negroes to vote, New York did the same if they owned property worth \$250. Douglas would not question the correctness of these provisions; he would allow each state and territory to decide for itself. Lincoln demanded that the territory be made free; he would not make the negroes the equals of the whites; he would not even make them citizens. The states, but not the territories could regulate slavery to suit themselves and he would not interfere with them in this matter, but in spite of all this he would not let go of the doctrines laid down in the Declaration, and the equal right to eat the bread they had earned by their toil. Douglas pointed out the inconsistencies he saw in

<sup>1</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 212-17, 280.

<sup>2</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 180.

these views but Lincoln insisted that there were no inconsistencies in them. The doctrines of the Declaration were held by Lincoln as abstract principles to be applied to new territory, but apparently not applicable to older states having slavery.<sup>1</sup> Douglas wanted to know what Lincoln would do with the states to be made out of Texas but Lincoln would not meet that question. He insisted that Lincoln's preliminary proposition that the territory must be free did not meet the situation, Texas was not now free, would he admit the states made from Texas? As to the Dred Scott decision Lincoln was opposed to it, he considered it as part and parcel of a plot to extend slavery, he predicted that the court would later deny the right to the states to prohibit slavery and wanted to know if Douglas would support the courts then. As already indicated Douglas did not meet this question by a definite answer, he argued it out of court as moral treason—an impossibility. Support of the Dred Scott decision forced Douglas to emphasize the doctrine of unfriendly legislation. Lincoln repudiated the Dred Scott decision and Douglas repeatedly scored him for not upholding the highest constitutional court. How could he take the oath to support the Constitution when he did not intend to do it? Lincoln argued that he was compelled to accept it as a principle of law but not as a principle of political action; he proposed to have it reversed if possible and to favor no measure that concurred with the principle there laid down. He pointed out how the court in Illinois had been reversed, and how Douglas got the title Judge by being made one of the new Judges which reversed the former decision.<sup>2</sup> Lincoln retaliated by showing that while Douglas claimed to uphold the court he was in practice advocating the overthrow of the decision by his unfriendly legislation. Douglas argued that the decision required additional legislation to make slavery possible in a territory. This the people need not give. As a matter of fact the two men were not far apart on this principle. Each was going to obey the decision as a rule of law but not of political action.<sup>3</sup> One of the most important differences between the debaters grew out of the policy of the "Fathers." Lincoln contended that the Nation could not exist half free and half slave. Douglas held that it could so exist; that it had so existed; and if the abolitionists would mind their own business, confine themselves to their own domestic institutions the country would continue to exist as it came from the "Fathers."

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 384, 431, 442.

<sup>2</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 408; Flint, Douglas, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 449, 455.

Lincoln claimed the "Fathers" did not leave a divided country; they restricted slavery, and the public mind was at rest so long as the policy of the "Fathers" continued.

Douglas pressed home with vigor the charge that Lincoln favored a war on the South in order that the country might "become all one thing"—free territory. Lincoln was repeatedly put on the defensive because of this "house divided" sentiment, though he absolutely denied any intention to interfere with slavery in the states. He was inclined to go no farther than to say that all territory should be free and slavery would gradually die out, in a hundred years or thereabout.<sup>1</sup>

"According to Lincoln's exposition the Republican party would act as if it were a church, a reform club, or an ethical society; it would simply exercise the right of saying that slavery was wrong."<sup>2</sup>

Douglas made a persistent attempt to show that Lincoln did not stand on the Republican platforms, that in the North he quoted the Declaration of Independence but in the South denied that he believed in equality. Lincoln positively refused to stand on any Republican platform other than that of 1856. Though Douglas repeatedly read Congressional platforms and caucus resolutions to show up Republican principles, Lincoln steered clear of them and explained that the radicals and conservatives met in convention, harmonized their differences, and upon that platform he stood.<sup>3</sup>

The Douglas solution for the slavery trouble was to allow the people to settle it for themselves. "Lincoln's objections \* \* \* were historic and theoretical rather than practical. \* \* \* It was in their moral attitude towards slavery that Lincoln and Douglas differed rather than in specific policies."<sup>4</sup> Under the Douglas method Kansas was becoming a free state, at least it was not coming in as a slave state.

Speaking of the campaign, after it had ended, the Chicago Tribune said it was one "in which the leader of the Democracy, a man of great courage, coolness and adroitness, approached so near Republican opinions on the vital questions of the campaign that we could not hit him without wounding our friends.

\* \* \*"<sup>5</sup> Isaac N. Arnold, a biographer of Lincoln, a Republi-

<sup>1</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, p. 321; Macy, "Political Parties in the U. S.," p. 271.

<sup>2</sup>Macy, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 167, 220, 225, 233, 343, 344; New York Tribune, Nov. 5, 11, 1858.

<sup>4</sup>Macy, "Political Parties in the U. S.," p. 265; Wise, "Life of H. A. Wise," p. 265.

<sup>5</sup>Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, quoted in New York Tribune, Nov. 12, 1858.

can, and an intimate friend of both debaters wrote, "this canvass of Douglas, and his personal and immediate triumph, in being returned to the Senate, over the combined opposition of the Republican party, led by Lincoln and Trumbull, and the Administration, with all its patronage, is, I think, the most brilliant personal triumph in American politics."<sup>1</sup>

### The Campaign of 1860.

Douglas aided by a favorable legislative apportionment won the Senatorship over Lincoln, but he did not get a majority of the votes.<sup>2</sup> In every Northern state, except Indiana which was won by a Douglas follower, the administration had lost support, and its failure to make Kansas a slave state discredited it in the South. Douglas was held responsible for this; it was his popular sovereignty that had made Kansas a free state, and he was removed from the position of chairman of the Committee on Territories by the Senate caucus of Democrats. Following his campaign with Lincoln he made a tour of the South in an attempt to win converts to his doctrines.<sup>3</sup> "Mr. Douglas during his canvass in Illinois and in his speech at New Orleans uttered sentiments eminently befitting a great statesman; and promulgated a platform which, with a **solitary exception**, includes as sound political creed as the most Southern man should desire. He vindicated the institution of slavery on moral grounds and advocated it, as a wise and necessary element in our agricultural system," wrote the editor of DeBow's Review.<sup>4</sup>

In the Senate Southern opposition to Western interests was further shown. Iverson explained his attitude against the Pacific Railroad by saying that he did not propose to help build a railroad which would be outside the South Confederacy when the Union was dissolved.<sup>5</sup> A homestead bill was shelved in the Senate after passing the House because it would help the settlement of the free states. The inevitable clash came between Douglas and Davis, and each side issued its ultimatum to the other. It was what DeBow's Review called the **solitary exception**, viz.: unfriendly legislation, that separated them.<sup>6</sup> Davis claimed that he was standing squarely on the doctrine of non-intervention as it was laid down by Calhoun in his Senate resolution of Febru-

<sup>1</sup>Fergus, *Historical Pub.*, II., p. 152; Macy, p. 271; Burgess, "Middle Period," pp. 62-3.

<sup>2</sup>Moses, *Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, II., pp. 1189, 1212.

<sup>3</sup>Flint, Douglas, pp. 181, 189; Nicolay and Hay, II., pp. 171-4; Rhodes II., p. 354.

<sup>4</sup>DeBow's Review, Vol. 26, p. 641.

<sup>5</sup>Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 242-4.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 1244, 1246, 1257.



ary 19, 1847, and, in fact, Davis' resolutions of February 7, 1860, are substantially a restatement of Calhoun's doctrine.<sup>1</sup> But Douglas and his Northern followers did not adhere to the Calhoun interpretation, and Alex. H. Stephens and his followers agreed with Douglas rather than with Davis.<sup>2</sup> Non-intervention, said Davis, "seems to have been more malleable than gold, to have been hammered out to an extent that covers boundless regions undiscovered by those who proclaimed the doctrine. It has a different meaning in every State, in every county, in every town."<sup>3</sup> Alex. H. Stephens writes: "Calhoun denied the power, [of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territory] yet he was for the Compromise Line; and the same position is taken by the whole fire-eating crowd."<sup>4</sup> When the compromise of 1850 was under discussion, Jefferson Davis signified his willingness to accept an extension of the Compromise Line—36° 30'—in lieu of Calhoun's non-intervention, and in 1854 he arranged an interview between Douglas and President Pierce, which resulted in Pierce's support of Douglas' bill with the whole power of the administration.<sup>5</sup> Later Davis used his power as Secretary of War to make Kansas a slave State. How a consistent supporter of Calhoun's interpretation of non-intervention could support a bill purporting to leave the whole question of slavery in the Territory to the decision of the people of the Territory, subject to the constitution, is hard to see unless the Kansas-Nebraska bill meant nothing. If the slave-holders had "an equal right to go into all Territories—all property being alike protected" what was to be decided by the people of the Territory?

The facts in the case seem to be: That Douglas and Stephens and their followers accepted the principles of the compromise of 1850 as superceding the Calhoun doctrines of 1847, but Davis did not.<sup>6</sup> In 1859, he spoke of 1850 as "that dark period for Southern rights;" later, in 1854, he was willing to accept the Kansas-Nebraska bill as a possible means of adding a slave State, but when it became known that Kansas would not enter the Union as a slave State, he retraced his steps and resumed his stand on the Calhoun doctrines.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Calhoun's Resolution in Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 455; Davis' Resolution in Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 658.

<sup>2</sup>Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 315 (appendix). Johnson and Browne, Alex. H. Stephens, pp. 302-4.

<sup>3</sup>Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1941. Davis' Rise and Fall of Confed. Govtmt., I., pp. 40-41.

<sup>4</sup>Johnson and Browne, Alex. H. Stephens, p. 288.

<sup>5</sup>Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 520; Davis' Rise and Fall, I., p. 28; Rhodes, I. 483, II., pp. 85, 122, 240, 277, 295.

<sup>6</sup>Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 315 (appendix); Globe, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 586 (appendix).

<sup>7</sup>Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1941.

In the opinion of Alex. H. Stephens it was this new position taken by the South that wrecked the Democratic party at Charleston.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, the position was not new; it was a position in harmony with the earlier Southern interpretation of the Calhoun doctrine that had, apparently, been thrown overboard in 1850 and 1854.

Douglas had repeatedly quoted Davis and Orr in his debates with Lincoln to show that the Freeport doctrine was good Democracy, but the South was in no mood to accept it.<sup>2</sup> The Southern Senators planted their guns on the Calhoun theory of 1847, which Douglas had repudiated. A great deal has been said in derision of Douglas' Freeport doctrine, but the Southern Senators clearly saw that the right to take slaves into a Territory was barren unless backed up by local protective legislation. They understood the slavery situation much better than the Northern scoffers who derided the Freeport doctrine as metaphysical. Douglas steadfastly maintained that slaves could be brought into the Territory just as dry goods, liquors, mules, or other property, but they must remain there subject to the local laws. Davis maintained that if the people of the Territory were opposed to slavery it could not exist in such a Territory. Douglas heartily agreed to this, but Davis and Brown wished to push him to support by Congressional legislation a slave code which would protect slave property in a territory. Answering Senator Brown in particular, Douglas said, "I am much obliged to him for taking it for granted, from my record, that I would never vote for a slave code in the Territory by Congress; and I have yet to learn that there is a man in a free State of this Union, of any party, who would."<sup>3</sup>

During the next session of Congress the two leaders of the Democratic factions again defined their positions. The Democratic convention was soon to meet at Charleston and these declarations were to define the issues to be fought out there. On January 12, 1860, Douglas said: "I am not seeking a nomination. I am willing to take one, provided I can assume it on principles I believe to be sound; but in the event of your making a platform that I could not conscientiously execute in good faith if I were elected I will not stand upon it and be a candidate. \* \* \* I have no grievances, but I have no concessions. I have no abandonment of position or principle; no recantation to make to any

<sup>1</sup>Johnson and Browne, Alex. H. Stephens, p. 358, 9, 62, 364; *Globe*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 315 (appendix).

<sup>2</sup>Lincoln and Douglas Debates, pp. 110, 425; Flint, Douglas, pp. 165, 195, 201-7.

<sup>3</sup>Cong. *Globe*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 1241-74.

man or body of men on earth."<sup>1</sup> On the second of the following month, Davis introduced a set of resolutions defining the Southern demands. The crucial one declared that neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature could directly or indirectly deprive a citizen of the right to take slaves into a Territory, and that it was the duty of the Federal Government to afford the necessary protection to maintain slavery there.<sup>2</sup>

When the convention met, the Southern delegates in caucus determined to stand by the Davis resolutions. Douglas as resolutely insisted that the platform should embody his principles and that the nominee, whether himself or not, should stand squarely upon that platform.<sup>3</sup> Here was his time, had he been the time-serving truckler to the slavocracy that he has been painted, to give way and unite the party and secure the nomination. On the 20th of June, during the adjourned session of the convention, Douglas wrote to Richardson, his lieutenant, "While I can never sacrifice the principle (of non-intervention) even to obtain the presidency, I will cheerfully and joyfully sacrifice myself to maintain the principle. If, therefore, you and my others friends \* \* \* shall be of the opinion that the principle can be preserved, and the unity and ascendancy of the Democratic party maintained \* \* \* by withdrawing my name and uniting with some other non-intervention, Union-loving Democrat, I beseech you to pursue that course. \* \* \* I conjure you to act with a single eye to the safety and welfare of the country, and without the slightest regard to my individual interest or aggrandizement."<sup>4</sup>

The final result was the nomination of two sets of candidates, Douglas and Johnson of Georgia, on the Douglas platform, and Breckenridge of Kentucky and Lane of Oregon on the Davis platform.<sup>5</sup>

In the campaign which followed, the number of meetings and oral addresses was beyond precedent. "We judge that the number of speeches made during the recent campaign has been quite equal to that of all that were made in the previous presidential canvasses from 1789 to 1856 inclusive."<sup>6</sup> Douglas plunged actively into the campaign, speaking in the North, South, East and West. At Chicago he said: "I believe that the country is in more danger now than at any other moment since I have known anything of public life."<sup>7</sup> The Republicans generally hooted at

<sup>1</sup>Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 424.

<sup>2</sup>Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 658.

<sup>3</sup>Flint, Douglas, pp. 221-2.

<sup>4</sup>Flint, Douglas, p. 212; Rhodes, II., p. 474.

<sup>5</sup>Halsted, "National Political Conventions of 1860;" Rhodes, II., p. 440.

<sup>6</sup>New York Tribune, Nov. 8, 1860.

<sup>7</sup>Rhodes, II., p. 488.

attempts at "Union saving," as they were called. Seward said that the threats of secession might frighten old women, but the "stock market remains provokingly calm."

A characteristic editorial on this subject, though written during the Lincoln-Douglas debates, is worth quoting at length:

"TIME FOR UNION SAVING TO BEGIN. It must be approaching time for Union saving to begin. Here is a month of the campaign gone, the Union in the meantime going to everlasting smash, and the Giant has not stirred a muscle to save it. Where are the old apostrophes to that gal-o-ri-ous bird of freedom? Where are the denunciations of the traitors, parricides and fanatics that have been amusing themselves with pulling the tail feathers out? Where the Jeremiads that used to be said and sung on every stump, when the Union was the theme? There's but one way to account for the Senator's silence. He is in more danger than the Union. The Republicans have dropped the American Eagle and are making HIS feathers fly; and he is attending to what is nearest at hand. But the Union must be saved. If Douglas won't do it somebody else will. Who will take the contract to save the American Union? Douglas' hands are full (he's bringing Lincoln to his milk?) and he can't. Who'll save the Union?"<sup>1</sup>

At no time during the canvass had Douglas any hopes of election. His main effort was to save the Union. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, New York and New Jersey attempts at fusion against Lincoln were more or less completely carried out. Breckenridge and Bell gave Davis power to withdraw their names if Douglas would withdraw in favor of a candidate satisfactory to all. Douglas replied that if he withdrew his friends would support Lincoln. He was sure his friends would not accept the proposition.<sup>2</sup>

At Baltimore Douglas said that although every Breckenridge man was not a disunionist, every disunionist was a Breckenridge man.<sup>3</sup> At Norfolk, Va., in answer to a question whether the election of Lincoln would justify the South in seceding, he said: "To this I answer emphatically, no. The election of a man to the presidency by the American people, in conformity with the constitution of the United States, would not justify any attempt at dissolving this glorious confederacy."<sup>4</sup> Another question put was: "If they, the Southern States secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before he commits an overt act

<sup>1</sup>Chicago Press and Tribune, Aug. 25, 1858.

<sup>2</sup>Davis, "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," I., p. 52.

<sup>3</sup>Rhodes, II., p. 483.

<sup>4</sup>Rhodes, II., p. 491.

against their constitutional rights, will you advise or vindicate resistance by force to their secession?" Douglas replied: "I answer emphatically that it is the duty of the President of the United States, and all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States as passed by Congress, and as the court expound them. And I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the constitution, would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from what quarter it might. In other words, I think the President of the United States, whoever he may be, should treat all attempts to break up the Union by resistance to its laws as Old Hickory treated the nullifiers of 1832."<sup>1</sup> At Baltimore he expressed similar sentiments, going so far as to say that he was ready to hang the nullifiers.<sup>2</sup> On October 9th the Pennsylvania Republicans carried their State ticket by 32,000 majority, and in Indiana they won by nearly ten thousand. South as well as North now knew that Lincoln would certainly be elected in November. Of the popular vote, Lincoln had 1,857,610; Douglas, 1,291,574; Breckenridge, 850,082; Bell, 646,124. But it was the electoral vote that told the story. Lincoln received 180 electoral votes; Douglas, 12, Breckenridge, 72; and Bell 39. In neither House, however, did the Republicans have a majority. When Douglas heard the returns from Pennsylvania and Indiana in October, he cancelled all Western engagements and spoke in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Georgia and Alabama, everywhere denouncing disunion. He believed "the Union would be safe under Mr. Lincoln, if it could be held together long enough for the development of his policy," and it was for this he was striving. When Sumpter was fired on he immediately called on Lincoln to assure him of his support in the war, but in less than two months he was dead. Horace Greeley wrote, "Our country has often been called to mourn severe, untimely losses; yet I deem the death of Stephen A. Douglas, just at the outbreak of our great Civil War and when he had thrown his whole soul into the cause of the country, one of the most grievous and irreparable."<sup>3</sup> From across Mason and Dixon's line Alexander H. Stephens wrote, "His death, at the time, I regarded as one of the greatest calamities, under the dispensation of Providence, which befell this country in the beginning of these troubles."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Rhodes, II., p. 491.

<sup>2</sup>Wilson, "Slave Power," II., p. 700.

<sup>3</sup>Rhodes, III., p. 415; Greeley, "Recollections of a Busy Life," p. 359.

<sup>4</sup>Stephens, "The War Between the States," II., p. 421.



In his last speech, which was made at Chicago, May 1, 1860, before 10,000 people, Douglas said: "There are only two sides to the question. Every man must be for the United States or against it. There can be no neutrals in this war; **only patriots or traitors.**"  
\* \* \* It is a sad task to discuss questions so fearful as Civil War, but sad as it is, bloody and disastrous as I expect it will be, I express it as my conviction before God that it is the duty of every American citizen to rally around the flag of his country."<sup>1</sup>

—EDWARD McMAHON.

<sup>1</sup>Rhodes, III., p. 414.