THE ALPE-ADRIA AS A MULTINATIONAL REGION

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Introduction

The creation of the Alpe-Adria Working Community almost exactly ten years ago confirmed the revitalization of European regionalism. The first forms of regional co-operation in the area were developed by three territories: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Slovenia, and Carinthia. All three had been the most enthusiastic supporters of the founding of this Community, but the treaty for its foundation would have remained a dead letter if the desire for co-operation had not been rooted in the vital interests of the people of the whole of the present Alpe-Adria territory, which stretches from Lombardy to Gyor-Sopron, from Croatia to Bavaria. The creation of this regional entity was however also influenced by political interests: namely, for co-operation and ensuring peace and stability in this strategically sensitive region of Europe, transversed as it is by the ‘global border line’ that divides two world political-military systems, and which includes territorially neutral Austria and non-aligned Yugoslavia.¹

Culture and Civilization: the Area’s Greatest Treasure

A geographical location without people is not Life; and people without culture amount to no more than biological masses of contemporary consumer societies which have lost the humanity of their mission.² The Alpe-Adria area is one of the most diverse parts of Europe from a cultural and civilizational viewpoint.

Through the course of history there have developed a number of forces acting to promote both unity and disunity among the ethnic and cultural groups in this region: these forces, which are still active today, have served to mutually enrich the cultures and also to erect long-lasting fences between them. Moreover, culture must be defined in a wide sense, to include not just the arts and literature of a specific nation or national minority, but also its ways of thinking, traditions, ethical principles, ways of life, and so on.³ Seen in this light, a culture represents an internally ramified value-system which, by virtue of its difference from other cultures, is normally by its nature externally in a ‘defensive position’ as opposed to other value systems. The problem of overcoming these divisions is one of the global needs of today, given the strong tendencies not only for universality but also for uniformity. Unity in diversity is a maxim which demands a minute analysis of the social and cultural-political context.

In the Alpe-Adria area this problem opens up sensitive political questions, above all with respect to the position and human rights of national or ethnic minorities. The intrinsic dimensions of this problem are related to whether an individual country admits that it is a multi-national society, and—if it does admit this—how, within this kind of society, cultural and other policies are carried out that are supposed to guarantee the various ethnic and cultural subjects within it their basic freedoms, their rights, and their equality both as individuals and as groups. Most of the problems in this regard are embraced by the phrase: relations between the ‘majority’ and the ‘minority.’⁴ Externally, the relations between different value-systems (as depicted by the term culture) are revealed in the degree of mutual understanding, familiarity and civilizational cross-fertilization across state borders between individual cultures; here the relations between ethnic or national minorities and
the nations where they are in a majority (i.e., the countries that are usually termed ‘mother nations’) are especially sensitive.5

This interweaving of ‘external’ conditions has been portrayed, using Deutscher’s triad system, by Nakanishi;6 we can adapt the portrayal to the Alpe-Adria Working Community as on Diagram I. Here it may be seen that we meet with five ‘majority’ cultures and thirteen minority ethnic groups in the Alpe-Adria area. As noted, the relations between these ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ cultures (between A3 and B) demonstrate all the complexities of today’s multi-national societies in Europe.

The national/ethnic minorities live in ten of the fourteen regions which compose the Alpe-Adria Working Group. Some of these regions have extensive constitutional-juridical competence for dealing with minority questions (e.g., South Tyrol, Croatia, Slovenia); others share this competence with a central (federal) government (e.g., Friuli-Venezia Giulia); those in a third group have little juridical competence but considerable political scope (e.g., Carinthia, Styria); and the fourth group is composed of those regions which are more or less dependent on the decisions of a central government (e.g., the two Hungarian regions). There are also differences in the extent to which the minorities participate in decision-making processes with respect to their rights and obligations. In this regard, there exists a wide spectrum of combinations of minority (B) and territory in which the minorities live (A2).7

The minority question is an important integral element in bilateral relations between states in which the minorities live (A1) and the states in which the nations with the same ethnic origin (‘mother nations’) live as a majority (C1). Some of the states with component regions participating in Alpe-Adria have made inter-state treaties of a political character to govern these questions, thus Austria-Italy8 and Yugoslavia-Italy;9 in the case of relations between other countries, these questions are governed by other political agreements, thus Yugoslavia-Hungary.10 Further, agreements on cultural and technical cooperation have an important function in developing contacts for the benefit of minorities;11 and the openness of the borders (a necessary condition for the general development of minorities) is beneficially affected by contracts concerning the cross-frontier traffic of people and goods.12 Mutual reconciliation and understanding may also increase contacts between countries or republics in which minorities live (A2) and the equivalent administrative units of the ‘mother nationality’ (C2).13

The all-round cooperation of the national/ethnic minority with the nationality of the same ethnic origin (in the ‘mother state’) is an important precondition for its unhindered cultural and linguistic development. (At the same time, this is a sensitive political question if it develops within insufficiently democratic states, or if the minority attempts, by these means, to identify more with the ‘mother state’ than with the state in which it lives and to which it belongs politically.)14 Although this kind of cooperation is being developed, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the countries which compose Alpe-Adria, there are completely different situations with regard to the constitutional-juridical bases for this cooperation. Whereas both of the minorities in Slovenia (the Italian and the Hungarian ones) have constitutional rights to develop cooperation with the ‘mother nationality’, and whereas Italian law has (so to speak) brought the rights of the German minority in South Tyrol into line with their citizens’ rights, especially in the cultural field, the institutionalized cooperation of the other Italian minorities, and those of the Austrian minorities with their ‘mother nations’ is in many ways dependent on the competent administrative organs, e.g., in the field of education; and the institutionalized cooperation of minorities in Hungary with their ‘mother states’ depends on the political will of the government. An
Diagram I: The Triad of 'External' Conditions

A1. State in which minorities live:
- Austria
- Italy
- Yugoslavia
- Hungary

A2. Territory in which minorities live:
- Burgenland, Carinthia, Styria
- Friuli-Venezia Giulia, South Tyrol, Veneto
- Slovenia, Croatia
- Győr-Sopron, Vas

A3. Cultural majority
- Austrian-German
- Italian
- Slovene, Croatian
- Hungarian

B: National / Ethnic Minority

B1. Cimbri (Veneto)
B2. Czechs (Croatia)
B3. Friulians (FVG)
B4. Croats (Vas; Burgenland)
B5. Italians (Slovenia, Croatia)
B6. Lads (S. Tyrol, FVG)
B7. Hungarians
  (Slovenia, Croatia, Burgenland)
B8. Germans (S. Tyrol, FVG)
B9. Gypsies
  (Slovenia, Croatia, Vas, GS)
B10. Rusyns (Croatia)
B11. Sapadini (Veneto)
B12. Slovaks (Croatia)
B13. Slovenes
  (FVG, Carinthia, Styria, Vas)

C: State of 'Mother' Nationality

C1. Austria
- Italy
- Yugoslavia
- Hungary

C2. Croatia
- Slovenia

C3. Cultural Nationality
- Austro-German
- Italian
- Croatian
- Slovene
- Hungarian

C4. Other Factors
- NATO, Warsaw Pact
- Council of Europe
- EEC, EFTA, COMECON
- Non-aligned Movement
- Non-governmental Organizations (FUEN, AIDS, &c.)
- Other Political States

FVG = Friulia-Venezia Giulia; GS = Győr-Sopron
objective analysis of this cooperation would demonstrate that a specific political mistrust of the contact between minorities and their ‘mother states’ exists in all of the countries concerned, and is expressed in the greater or lesser complications that occur in the development of concrete forms of cooperation. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties, extensive cooperation in these respects has been developed, in all the countries concerned, in educational and cultural fields: exchanges of textbooks and other school accessories, seminars for students and for teachers, school excursions, contacts between schools, language courses, the reciprocative recognition (at least in principle) of diplomas, complementary scholarships for students, and so on. A unique example of association between a ‘mother state’ and ethnic minorities abroad is the so-called united Slovene cultural space, a concept developed in the seventies: its essence lies in the development of mutual cooperation between the Slovene nation and the Slovene minorities in Austria, Hungary and Italy, through ‘open borders;’ this is a constitutional obligation of the Slovene Republic and of the educational, cultural and other organizations of Slovenia.

I shall not present here an analysis of the influence of global international political interests on inter-ethnic relations in the Alpe-Adria area, although they are undoubtedly a factor in this region: note that only the territories of Croatia, Slovenia and Styria come between the front ranks of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. With respect to factor C4, mention should also be made of the fact that the four great powers formally guarantee the implementation of the Austrian State Treaty, i.e., including Article 7 which specifies the rights of the Croatian and Slovene minorities in Austria. Also, Austria raised the question of the Austrian minority in South Tyrol at the United Nations General Assembly. Complaints from members of minorities in Alpe-Adria countries have already been dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights, cooperation between the appropriate organs of the Council of Europe (C4) and the interested countries of Alpe-Adria (A1, A2) or representatives of national or ethnic minorities (B) have also been manifested in recent years, in the preparation of documents on minority and regional languages. In the struggle for the affirmation of their rights under the Austrian State Treaty, the Slovene minority in Austria has developed contacts with the embassies of the great powers in Vienna, and with international organizations of a non-governmental character, e.g., AIDLCM and FUEN.

Sensitive Issues

A simple enumeration of the various forms of association between subjects in the Alpe-Adria area, as illustrated above, demonstrates the complicated conditions for the development of cooperation and for the increase of understanding and friendship in this part of Europe.

In other words, there are many differences among the nations and nationalities in the Alpe-Adria countries, differences which their common Christian-civilizational heritage has in no way eradicated. The existing gulf between cultural value-systems were further widened by political conflicts caused by German, Italian and Hungarian imperialist and irredentist aspirations against the Slovene world. The collective life in these countries under the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not essentially strengthen links between the cultures, and thus does not represent a continuity on the basis of which we could today build our future.

The systematic prejudices which are still part of ethnic relations reflect the deep chasms which still divide the nationalities. Prejudices are also an essential part of the differentiation mechanism created by ethnic nationalism, which finds particular expression in attitudes to nationalities or ethnic minorities. Ethnic nationalism tries to represent itself as
a ‘defense’ for individual cultural value-systems and for the social and economic interests of nationalities. 24 Ethnic nationalism among minorities, in our opinion, is ‘internally’ reinforced by their cultural and other links with the national collectivity. As an entirely natural reaction to assimilation and other pressures, ethnic nationalism is an essential precondition for the preservation of the identity of the minority (the Slovene minorities in Italy, Austria and Hungary being typical cases). Although, according to this view, it acts as a kind of ethnic glue, ethnic nationalism becomes a hindrance to the general development of the minority unless it finds a means of bridging the chasm created by the ethnic identification of us and them. This can only be achieved by opening the minority outwards, especially towards the ‘national mother nation’ and the culture of the ‘national majority.’

In Yugoslavia, social relations are based on the concept of multicultural or multinational societies with a federal political system, 25 while in the concept of a ‘national state’ (which is the general system elsewhere in the Alpe-Adria region) there is little room for the actual equality of nationalities or ethnic minorities, in the sense of developing their status as a political cultural subject. Whereas the nation state, which originated as a result of the demand for ‘one nation, one state’ in the nineteenth century, was then a progressive means for uniting nationalities, it is today becoming an ever greater obstruction to the liberal association of cultures, nations and national/ethnic minorities. 26 But, as throughout the world generally, in the Alpe-Adria region too the nation state is showing no signs of dying out; and, sooner or later, it becomes a ‘reality’ beyond which the development of cooperation is impossible. In the present circumstances there are various inhibiting measures in place at state frontiers which may act as a serious obstruction to contacts between peoples and cultures. 27 Different ideas influence the disunity of political collectivities, and detract from their effective power and their capacity for revitalization, especially that of cultural movements. In the pluralistic societies of the Alpe-Adria countries this disunity appears as a party-political classification of minority members; in single-party systems the disunity is hidden beneath a veneer of apparent ‘unity of ideas and politics.’

**Conclusion and Outlook**

The work of the organizations within the Alpe-Adria can only gradually and to a limited extent contribute to the elimination of historic and contemporary stereotypic representations of ‘others’—which, as noted above, are most frequently based on prejudices. The representatives of regional or republican administrations cooperate in the Alpe-Adria Committee for Culture (one of its seven working bodies) and, under this committee’s sponsorship, direct contacts are developing among interested cultural, scientific, research and other organizations; and collective cultural, educational and similar arrangements are also made. One of the important linking arrangements are the so-called ‘cultural identity cards,’ which allow their owners entrance to the majority of cultural establishments and performances in the Alpe-Adria countries. 28

A special Alpe-Adria working group will prepare a publication in which will be issued reports from the relevant governments on the situation and the rights of the national and ethnic minorities which live in their area. 29 It is already known that these reports will not be able to satisfy the minority members: it would be expecting too much for a joint publication to bridge the misunderstandings and conflicts which genuinely exist in the individual Alpe-Adria countries. But we must also not underestimate the fact that this is the first attempt in history to contribute collaboratively to a better understanding of minority problems. The working group has proposed that the Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja in Ljubljana should organize a scientific Alpe-Adria conference, to coincide with
the publication of the above-mentioned reports; this could then develop into a forum for the regular discussion of these problems. The Institut and the Gorki State Library in Budapest have contributed to joint research aimed at the increase of knowledge about minority problems; the results were recently published.  

The complicated situations described above that occur in the mutual relationships between nations and cultures in the Alpe-Adria area can now only be bridged effectively with new incentives: the sponsors of these incentives will be not only the administrative structures, but above all the various groups that manifest the individual cultures, in this geographic area. Cooperation should not be limited to occasional contacts only; it should entail the ever increasing fruitful development of, and mutual interchange between, the cultures and nationalities which live in the Alpe-Adria countries. Only in this way will it be possible to create the embryonic form of a collective set of the cultural values that exist in this region of Europe. 

Campaigns waged hitherto for increasing reciprocal understanding of the cultures through translations and other means have only produced minor results.  We could count on the fingers of one hand, for example, the individuals who might be considered links between Slovene culture and the cultures of neighbouring nations.  In the Alpe-Adria countries we hear of cultural events in New York or Paris more often than those of our neighbors. An important connecting role is played by members of minorities, but their scope is limited. 'Education for Mutual Coexistence' would have to begin with the basics: the inclusion in school programmes of appropriate course content to increase knowledge of neighboring states, and also, in schools or by some other way, of courses in the 'minority' neighboring languages. The list of possible suggestions is very long and would have to be continually supplemented. 

In the future it will also be necessary to direct cultural activities toward linking the countries of Alpe-Adria as a group, externally, in particular with Eastern Europe and with the Balkan cultural space, so that this regional collectivity may achieve a wider European cultural mission by linking the civilizational values of Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam; and by making a link between Socialism and Capitalism. 

In conclusion let me emphasize that it would be completely unrealistic to expect that the unity of the countries of the Alpe-Adria could develop on the basis of a negation of existing political, ideological and cultural structures. It is also true that we must not allow ourselves to be satisfied with the current state of affairs, and that it is necessary to continually search for new ways of resolving conflicts and establishing new approaches for cooperation between nations and national minorities; it is in this cooperation that culture has an incalculable role.

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NOTES

1. The relief of political tension and the improvement of East-West relations in Europe are also reflected in the Final Act of the ECSC of 1975.


7. In the South Tyrol the German minority is administered as a majority group in the area of Bolzano/Bozen which, together with the Trento region, comprises the area. In Slovenia the Italian and Hungarian nationalities, in the communes where they live, have joint decisive powers on matters in which they have an interest; on the republican level, they must be consulted when the assembly makes this kind of decision. In the Hungarian districts the nationalities are represented on council committees concerned with these questions (cf. S. Devetak, “Aspects of linguistic equality in Slovenia,” *Slovene Studies* 8/2 (1986) 53-63). In the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region the Slovene party has its own representative in the regional parliament; Slovenes are also elected thereto on the lists of the majority parties, mainly the communist party. The representatives of the minority in Carinthia have largely independent representation on commune councils, but are only represented to a small degree on the lists of the major parties; they have no representative in the regional parliament.


13. For example, the cooperation of SR Slovenija with the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, with Carinthia, with Styria (which does not admit the existence of an ethnic minority), and with Vas District.

14. S. Devetak, “Pitanje ‘lojalnosti’ i separatizma nacionalnih manjina u savremenom svetu,” *Savremenost* (Novi Sad) 7-8 (July-August 1986) 165-71; see also note 7.

15. For instance: the accusations of nationalist circles in Austria about the contacts that the Slovene minority has ‘with Ljubljana’ are well-known; the Yugoslav regulation that forbids the import of ‘printed matter in the languages of the nations and nationalities’ limits the circulation of printed materials in Slovene, e.g., *Celovski zvon*.


17. See *Skupni slovenski prostor* (Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1985).


21. AIDLCM = Association Internationale pour la Défense des langues et Cultures Menacées; FUEN = Federal Union of European Nationalities. Re these contacts, see Slovenski vestnik (Celovec) 31 October 1986, p.7, and 24 October 1986, p. 1; also Das Menschenrecht (Vienna) 1.


23. Prejudice is best defined as the ascription to individuals of characteristics which are alleged to be true of a whole ethnic group. These prejudices are expressed, among other ways, by the reciprocal use of ethnic slurs, e.g., Žvabi, Lahi, Makaronarji, Ogri, Čuši; Schiavi, Vendì; &c.; cf. also Scarpellini, "Origine psicologica."


27. One such measure was the 'deposit' introduced for crossing the Yugoslav frontier in 1982, cf. S. Devetak, "Povezovanje znotraj skupnega narodnega in kulturnega prostora—pogoj za nemoten razvoj slovenskega naroda ter italijanske in madžarske narodnosti v SR Sloveniji," 475-91 in Križni pojavi (Ljubljana: Knjižnica FSPN, 1983).


29. In the working groups the following are represented: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Alto Adige, Croatia, Carinthia, Slovenia, Veneto. Cooperation was declined by Styria and the Vas and Győr-Soprony regions. Slovenia is represented by two workers from the Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, S. Devetak and S. Novak-Lukanovič.


31. An encouraging example in recent times is the literary supplement to the Wiener Zeitung, Leserzirkel of March 1987, entitled "Literarische Staaterese," in which were presented literary works from four neighbouring regions: Styria, Slovenia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Carinthia.

32. With respect to the message in their works, the most notable are P. Handke and F. Tomizza, both of whom have received the Vilenica award of the Society of Slovene Authors.


POVZETEK

ALPE-JADRAN KOT VEČETNIČNO OBMOCJE


Avtor analizira najprej različne zvrsti odnosov, ki obstajajo med političnimi, etničnimi in mednarodnimi dejavniki v tem geografskem območju. Posebno pozornost v razpravi posveča medetičnim
odnosom v tem prostoru. Ustavlja se tudi ob ugotovitvi, da obstajajo med narodi in narodnimi manjšinami, ki živijo v deželah Alpe-Jadran, mnoge razlike, ki jih tudi skupna krščanska civilizacijska dediščina ni opravila. Potem ko obravnava rezultate dejavnosti delovnih teles skupnosti Alpe-Jadran, zaključuje, da je najno nenehoma iskati novih poti za reševanje konfliktov in za razvijanje novih pristopov k sodelovanju med narodi in narodnimi manjšinami, pri čemer bo ravno kultura imela pomembno vlogo.