

These two books discuss the activities of the Slovene non-Communist autonomous political parties and movements from 1952 to 1956 and are the continuations of two previous works, namely *Trieste 1945-1949: nascita del movimento politico autonomo sloveno* (1980) by Nadja Maganja, and *I gruppi politici autonomi sloveni a Trieste 1949-1952* (1983) by Aleš Breccelj, both also published by Krožek za družbena vprašanja Virgil Šček. All four were presented as theses for diplomas at the University of Trieste, in 1979, 1982, 1987 and 1988.

In his book Pahor covers the period from the municipal elections in May 1952 until the division of the Free Territory of Trieste [FTT] between Italy and Yugoslavia in October 1954. In his first chapter he recapitulates the major international and local events after World War Two, with special consideration of the autonomous political parties and of the status of the Slovene community. The Peace Treaty signed in 1947 established the FTT, which was divided into two zones: Zone A, with the city of Trieste, was administered by the British-United States Allied Military Government [AMG]; and Zone B, by the Yugoslavs. Because of the Cold War the Western Powers and the Soviet Union could not agree on a common Governor and the FTT remained divided. To help the pro-Western political parties in Italy to victory against a Communist-Socialist alliance in the election, the Western Powers (the U.S.A., Great Britain and France) proposed to the USSR that the whole of the FTT be returned to Italy; this is known as the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, 1948. But soon the position of the Western Powers changed, following the Cominform resolution which in June 1948 expelled Tito and Yugoslavia from the Communist fold. When the Western Powers became convinced that Yugoslavia had ceased being an avant-garde of Soviet Communism and imperialism, they established friendlier relations with Yugoslavia, and in 1951 accepted a new solution for the FTT: that it should be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia.
On the local level, the Italian-Slovene Communists formed the *Communist Party of the Free Territory of Trieste* [CPFFT], and their mass organization, the *Italo-Slovene Liberation Front*, became the *Slovensko-italijanska antifašistična unija/Unione antifascista Italo-Slovena* [SIAU-UAIS]. The non-Communist Slovenes organized the *Slovenska demokratska zveza* [SDZ] and the smaller *Slovenska krščansko-socialna zveza* [SKSZ]. Some Slovene intellectuals, former members of the Italo-Slovene Liberation Front who resented Communist totalitarian methods, formed their own group, the *Skupina neodvisnih Slovencev* [SNS]. Following this, the Cominform Resolution led to a split in the CPFFT. Almost all of the Italian and also most of the Slovene Communists and their sympathizers agreed with the Cominform Resolution, as did the Communist Party in Italy. They called themselves the CPFFT (Vidali), after Vittorio Vidali, their new leader. The small minority of mostly Slovene Communists who remained faithful to the Yugoslav brand of Communism called themselves, in turn, CPFFT (Babič) after Branko Babič, their leader. The former were also referred to as ‘Cominformists,’ the latter as ‘Titoists.’

The split of the Communist bloc weakened the opposition, and in 1949 the AMG decided to call the first administrative elections. In 1952, on March 20 — the fourth anniversary of the Tripartite Declaration — the Italian nationalists in Trieste organized a meeting to demand the return of the entire FTT to Italy. This meeting was soon transformed into street riots. To calm the Italian nationalists the U.S.A. and Great Britain (administrators in Zone A) signed a bipartite agreement in London on May 9, according to which the Italian government would participate in the civil administration of that Zone. Italian electoral laws were introduced and municipal elections were held at the end of the month; the results, however, remained basically the same as those of 1949.

In the following chapters Pahor presents the results of his own research. The second chapter describes the political and diplomatic activities, and their impact on local events, from the elections of 1952 through the October 1954 division of the FTT. Italian diplomatic pressures and the rioting in Trieste led to the declaration of October 8, 1953, according to which the U.S. and British troops would leave and Italy would assume the administration of Zone A. A violent reaction from Yugoslavia, and a protest from the USSR,
resulted in the Zone A administration being left unchanged; this infuriated the Italian nationalists and led to an extremely violent and bloody uprising in Trieste during November 1953. Lengthy negotiations followed, which ended with the Memorandum of Understanding signed in London October 5, 1954, according to which Zone A would come under Italian and Zone B under Yugoslav administration, with some minor changes in the border between Zones A and B in favor of Yugoslavia.

In his third chapter Pahor describes the activities of the autonomous Slovene political parties: the SDZ (the strongest) and its relationship to the others, especially the SKSZ, and the SNS, which did not then play any significant role. Because of the tensions inside the SKSZ regarding its policies toward Yugoslavia, a group split off and formed a new Catholic party, the Slovenska katoliška skupnost [SKS], which closely co-operated with the SDZ. Together with the Triestino Fronte dell’ Indipendenza and the Blocco Triestino, the SDZ, the SKS and the SNS formed the Committee for the Defence of the FTT (Comitato per la difesa del TLT). The autonomous Slovene political parties fought until the end for an independent FTT, because they were convinced that the FTT was the best guarantee for the respect of Slovene national rights, for the peaceful co-existence of the Italian and Slovene ethnic groups, and for the economic future of Trieste. In their struggle for the maintenance of the FTT the autonomous Slovene political parties were the only ones to preserve their independence, and were able to freely present their own opinions ‘without strings attached.’ This was not the case for the two Communist parties in Trieste, the CPFTT (Babič) and the CPFTT (Vidali), the first of which was tied to the changing politics of Belgrade and the second, to the special interests of the Italian Communist Party [CPI].

In his last chapter Pahor enumerates the violations of Slovene minority rights by the AMG during the period under discussion.

Bruna Ciani begins her book with an analysis of the Memorandum of Understanding of October 1954. She pays specific attention to the Special Statute, Annex II of the Memorandum, where Slovene minority rights are enumerated. After the signing of the Memorandum, over 17,000 refugees — among them 3,000 Slovenes — left the Yugoslav Zone B and tried to settle in Trieste. Very soon it became evident that there was not
enough employment for the residents, let alone for the refugees. Trieste had entered a sharp economic decline and many young people began to leave the city and emigrate overseas; most of them went to Australia, where 5,203 immigrants — including 1,560 Slovenes — were registered as coming from Trieste. This was the first time in the history of Trieste that people were leaving instead of coming to live there; hitherto, it had attracted many people, especially the working and business classes.

The Memorandum of Understanding and the subsequent establishment of Italian authority in the former Zone A had a profound impact upon Slovene life. As did authors of previous works before hers, Ciani pays special attention to the two autonomous Slovene political parties, the SDZ and the SKS. Both defended the existence of the FTT and had to adapt themselves to the new situation. Their main efforts were directed toward the implementation of the minority rights enumerated in the Special Statute. To achieve this end, the SDZ and the SKS tried to establish new contacts with the SKSZ and the SNS. Also, the two Communist parties had to adapt to the new situation. Following directions from Yugoslavia the Titoists — the CPFTT (Babič) — joined the Italian Unione Socialista Indipendente [USI], which had split from the Italian Communist Party in 1951. However, the Titoists retained their Slovene economic and cultural organizations and united them in one, the Slovenska gospodarsko-kulturna zveza [SGKZ]. The CPFTT (Vidali) — the Comin-formists — became part of the Italian Communist Party, but they too retained local Italo-Slovene cultural organizations and labor unions.

Next, Ciani discusses the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the condemnation of Stalin at the XX Party Congress, and the disbandment of the Cominform. All these events had a significant impact upon the Slovene minority in Trieste. The Slovene Titoists and the Cominformists began to cooperate, first in cultural activities, then in labor organizations, and finally in politics. In the administrative elections that were held in late May 1956, the Slovene Communists voted separately, namely for the CPI or the USI, in the city of Trieste, whereas in the rural municipalities they presented a united list and in this way prevented the SDZ and the SKS, who had together formed the Slovenska lista, from winning in any municipality. The former independentist parties, the Fronte dell'Indipendenza and the Blocco
Triestino (which together presented the list Trieste ai Triestini), were not permitted to participate in the elections by the new Italian authorities on the grounds of a minor technical deficiency.

The recent (1994) Italian objections to Slovenia's becoming an associate member of the European Community, which were expressed by twice using its veto power, justifies a more detailed demonstration of the Italian disregard for the minority rights of the Slovenes in Italy, and this disregard is well documented by Pahor and especially by Ciani. First, the Italian assertion that Slovenia has not adequately resolved the problem of its Italian minority is erroneous: Slovenia passed ethnic minority laws which protect its small Italian and Hungarian minorities and guarantee their representation in local administration and in Parliament. The same does not hold true for the much larger Slovene minority in Italy.

Although with the signing of the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding Italy obtained Zone A of the FTT, including the city of Trieste, it never ratified it and never published it in its official publications, including the Trieste Bollettino Ufficiale. According to the Italian authorities in Rome, as well as in Trieste, therefore, the Memorandum (including the Special Statute) never became part of Italian law. Consequently, Slovene minority rights, which were so precisely enumerated in the Special Statute, never became legally binding upon the Italian authorities. This was a welcome factor for Commissario Generale del Governo, Giovanni Palamara, who was appointed by and responsible only to the Italian President. Palamara was given all legislative and executive powers, and in addition all the powers that had been exercised by the AMG. Besides, both Palamara and the mayor of Trieste, Gianni Bartoli, were ardent Italian nationalists. Hence, it is easy to understand the Slovene concern for the precarious position of their minority in Trieste.

The most important concern was with respect to the slow but steady expropriation of land lying between the city of Trieste and the Italian ethnic border to the West of Devin/Duino. The expropriations already began during the AMG administration, but were accelerated after Italy took over power. Along the sea shore the authorities set up fishing villages for Italian refugees from Istria. Land was also forcibly expropriated for new apartment houses for Italian refugees from Istria and Dalmatia in Nabrežina/ Aursina, Prosek/Prosecco, and Kontovel/Contovello. Hitherto the Slovenes
had constituted a two-thirds majority in the municipality of Devin-Nabrežina/Duino-Aurisina, but after the new settlements of Italians they became a minority in their own land. This was a direct violation of Articles 4 and 7 of the Special Statute, which provided for the safeguarding of the ethnic character of the land. Moreover, land was forcibly confiscated for industrial extension, and new industrial plants were built not close to the old ones, but further away, on now empty, rural, formerly-Slovene land. On the same land, in addition, were built 2,200 new apartments for workers. In connection with the expropriation of Slovene-held land by the Italian authorities, it is important to note that the Yugoslav government agreed in 1954 to pay the Italian government for all the real estate vacated by Italian refugees from what had been Zone B of the FTT.

There were other violations of Slovene minority rights, such as the disregard for the use of the Slovene language in public offices, the removal of bilingual signs from Slovene schools and other public buildings, and also the removal of bilingual signs for geographic localities and of bilingual street names in places where the Slovenes constituted more than one-quarter of the total population. While Slovene schools continued to function, their existence was not guaranteed by Italian law, and they did not have their own administration. Moreover, the discriminatory laws which had been implemented by the Fascist régime were not abolished and the injustices deriving therefrom were not corrected. This applies to the confiscation of individual private property and also of property intended for public use such as Slovene banks, savings institutions, libraries, cultural homes and others; it also applies to the forcible Italianization of Slovene surnames and of Slovene geographic names. During the first period of Italian rule (1954-56), the police behaved illegally in many instances. For example, Slovene restaurants were closed and their licences were revoked under the pretext that they were places for illegal gatherings; and, to intimidate the Slovene population, police entered and searched their homes without reason.

With the passing of time, the relationship of the Italian authorities toward the Slovene minority improved. In November 1975 the final agreement regarding the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was signed in Osimo, near Ancona. In Article 8 of this agreement Italy gave an assurance that it would pass new laws to
legalize Slovene minority rights, as enumerated in the 1954 Special Statute. Although the Osimo treaty was ratified by Italy, special Italian laws regarding its Slovene minority have to date not been passed by the Italian legislature. Although the Italian attitude toward the Slovene minority did improve, the lands confiscated from Slovenes remain in the hands of former Italian refugees and their descendants. As a consequence the land between Trieste and the ethnic border, which had once constituted a Slovene coastland, is no longer Slovene and has changed its ethnic character.

Both Pahor and Ciani are to be congratulated for work well done. Pahor includes in an appendix the pertinent parts of the Peace Treaty with Italy, signed in 1947, and the entire text of the Memorandum of Understanding of 1954, including the Special Statute. The Memorandum and the Special Statute are provided in an appendix by Ciani, too. Each book has an index of personal names and a bibliography. Also very helpful are lists of abbreviations, which are at the end of both books, just before the index.

One hopes that the future generation of young scholars in Trieste will continue with this line of research and will offer an account of events from 1956 until the present.

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Since 1990 the Institute for Slovene Emigration Research of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts has published *Dve domovini/Two Homelands*. A primary objective of the volumes is to advance the study of Slovene emigration, emigrants, and immigrant communities. Despite an emphasis on Slovenes, the *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* series is limited neither in vision nor scope. The volumes are designed to encourage interdisciplinary approaches to migration studies and help further world-