

**SEARCH FOR PARITY:
ITALIAN AND YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE QUESTION OF TRIESTE**

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This article examines the attitudes of Italian and Yugoslav decision-makers towards the question of Trieste during the so-called "dynamic" phase of the conflict (1951-54). Foreign policy decision-makers, like other people, act on the basis of their own subjective perceptions of reality. Making a decision means choosing one course of action from a range of perceived alternatives. While the operational environment, both international and domestic, delimits the setting within which decision-makers must act, the psychological environment defines the field of choice and the ordering of alternatives in it from which they will select their preferred options. For analytic purposes, the psychological environment can be seen as comprising two inextricably linked elements: an attitudinal prism and specific images. The attitudinal prism can be defined as the lens through which decision-makers perceive the operational environment. The content of these perceptions can instead be defined as images. A dynamic relationship exists between psychological and operational environments insofar as the former generally orients decision-makers towards the latter and predisposes them to act in a particular way, while changes in the operational environment resulting from the actions of the decision-makers will, in turn, affect the psychological one. This relationship tends to be self-reinforcing rather than self-correcting. If one assumes, for instance, that Italian decision-makers have negative images of Yugoslav ones and vice versa, then, according to this model, they will tend to make decisions whose impact on the operational environment will result in changes that will lead them to form even more negative images of the adversary, and so on in a self-reinforcing spiral. This spiral can be reversed only when some event in the operational environment, brought about by a third actor, changes the psychological environment of both sets of decision-makers. Besides being based on social, cultural and individual factors, the attitudinal prism is also shaped by past experiences. A brief review of the major events in the Trieste saga between 1944 and 1951 will show the origins of the major components of the prism for both sets of decision-makers.¹

The perceptions of the operational environment of Italian and Yugoslav decision-makers in 1944 were radically different. Following the armistice of September 8, 1943, southern Italy passed under the rule of the Allied Military Government [AMG], while the rest of the country came under the effective control of German forces. The situation in the Julian region immediately became a matter of concern for the Italian government. The problem was not so much the presence of Nazi forces there as the fact that they might soon be driven out by Yugoslav partisans which could mean the loss of that region for Italy. Under existing conditions, however, the only way Italian decision-makers could react to the perceived Yugoslav threat was to pressure the Allies to act on their behalf. Two types of arguments were used in this endeavor. The first was strictly legalistic: the Allies were bound to establish AMG in the entire region by the terms of the armistice and the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which called for territorial questions to arrive unprejudiced at the peace conference. Italy had a right to the region based on the Rapallo border treaty, "freely negotiated" by the Italian and Yugoslav governments in 1920, and therefore expected to retain its 1939 borders. The possibility of border rectifications was not ruled out. Any

change, however, was to have the "Italian Royal Government's freely expressed assent." The second was exhortative and appealed to a supposed identity of interests between Italy and the Allies. Given the emotive significance the Julian region had for all Italians, failure to retain it could produce a pernicious resurgence of nationalist feelings and would result in a loss of prestige for the Allies. These, therefore, had an interest in defending the Julian cause given the strategic significance of Italy's position in the Mediterranean and in Europe.²

The Yugoslavs, for their part, followed a Realpolitik approach. They saw in the situation an opportunity to reverse the injustice suffered at the end of World War I. They considered that Italy was able to prevail at Versailles and impose a "Diktat" at Rapallo because its army controlled the area under dispute. Hence, they decided that the best way to insure their claim to the region was to occupy it militarily. As Vladimir Velebit (then Chief of the Yugoslav military mission in London) would later recall:

"We thought ... that whoever is in possession of a certain territory has a ninety-nine percent chance of keeping it. ... For this reason we made our preparations to concentrate our troops for the final quick advance against the Germans in a north-western direction, in order to be in Austria and Trieste before the British and American troops."³

Although the race for Trieste ended in a tie, the Yugoslav army won the race for Istria. With his troops in control of the region, Tito openly called into question the Allies' objective of setting up their own AMG. Although he was ready to cooperate militarily, he considered, as he told Field Marshal Alexander, that since "his troops had liberated [a] territory which [was] Slovenian ... they had a right to occupy it as an allied army on account of their services and sacrifices in the allied cause."⁴ The Allied military was reluctant to risk an armed confrontation with Tito for the attainment of an objective it did not consider essential for the continuation of war operations. The State Department, however, believed that Tito's advances had to be rebuffed in order to signal the Soviet government that the Allies would not tolerate its attempt to "operate through its satellite Yugoslavia in the Mediterranean theater to set up whatever states and boundaries look[ed] best for the future power of the U.S.S.R." This did not necessarily require, however, continued and complete adherence to the original policy of extending AMG to all Italian territory within its 1939 frontiers. Thus, in deference also to the views of the military, it was decided that the Allies would not seek the complete evacuation of the region by Yugoslav forces but would pursue instead the more limited objective of obtaining "complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and an area sufficiently to the east of this line to permit proper administrative control." Since Stalin had no intention of challenging the Anglo-Americans on a question of marginal interest to him, Tito reluctantly had to withdraw his forces beyond the demarcation line (later known as the "Morgan line") requested by the Anglo-Americans.⁵

This compromise did not satisfy either of the two contenders. The Yugoslavs, who thought that "as a belligerent [their country had] all the rights to hold the area till the final decision at the peace conference [was] taken," regarded the Allied request to evacuate Trieste as an "ultimatum". Yugoslavia, Tito complained, "was evidently [considered] a third class ally which did not enjoy the same rights as other classes of allies." He also resented the lack of Soviet support. The lesson he drew from this episode was succinctly presented in a speech in Ljubljana on May 27:

“We demand that everyone shall be master in his own house, we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.”⁶

The Italians, for their part, felt betrayed. The Yugoslav “armed conquest,” they later charged, had been possible only because of “the carelessness of the Western Allied military command, its unpardonable mistakes and suspicious blindness.” The demarcation line made a mockery of Allied promises to establish AMG in the whole region, especially since “with a bit more firmness, the Anglo-Americans could have obtained a more favorable line.”⁷

After June 1945 the politics of the Cold War provided the framework in which almost every problem came to be viewed and decided by the major powers. The United States and the Soviet Union backed the claims of Italy and Yugoslavia, respectively. For both, however, the Julian problem was, in the words of Alberico Casardi, one of the Italian delegates to the Council of Foreign Ministers, but “a completely secondary, and almost incidental, aspect of an infinitely greater political game.” Thus, when French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault suggested as a compromise solution that the city of Trieste and its adjacent area be turned into a Free Territory (later known as the FTT) under the auspices of the United Nations, the Anglo-Americans accepted the idea because they feared a Soviet-Yugoslav *coup de main* if the question was not solved soon. The Soviets, for their part, without consulting with the Yugoslavs, traded their acceptance of the proposal against Anglo-American agreement to their request for reparations from Italy.⁸

Both Italy and Yugoslavia resented this decision. The Italians felt that the attitude of the Allies, and the Americans in particular, although benevolent towards them, had not been pugnacious enough towards the others. As Ambassador Pietro Quaroni reported during the deliberations:

“American support is not worth a plugged nickel when faced with Russian opposition. ... Away from the conference ... they are lions ... at the conference table the end result of the negotiations is that they give up everything.”

The Yugoslavs, for their part, took notice that the Soviet Union had again let them down, using the question of Trieste, as Edvard Kardelj would later recall, “as a bargaining point in the mutual transactions between the Great Powers, thus inflicting serious blows to [Yugoslav] interests in a most difficult moment.”⁹

The UN Security Council was unable to reach agreement on the appointment of a governor for the FTT which, consequently, was never set up. The city of Trieste and the north-western part of the FTT (known as Zone A) continued to be administered by the Anglo-American military government, while its south-eastern part, beyond the Morgan line (Zone B), remained under the control of a Yugoslav military administration.

The period between 1947 and 1951 has been referred to as the “static phase” of the Trieste problem. Two significant events, however, occurred in this period: the so-called “tripartite declaration” and the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. Upon Italian solicitations, on March 20, 1948, the French, British and American governments released a proposal which suggested that since the FTT could not be set up, the entire territory should be returned to Italy. Although apparently requested only for electoral purposes, once it was issued, Italian decision-makers chose to look at the declaration as a promissory note in its own right. They were aware that, since it could not be forced upon Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the proposal had, at best, “only a symbolic value.” Yet, to keep Allied attention focused on the problem, they insisted on having it periodically reconfirmed.¹⁰

To the Yugoslavs the tripartite declaration came as a blow to their national pride. A proposal for a revision of the peace treaty with Italy should have been officially communicated also to the other treaty signatories—especially to Yugoslavia, which as administrator of Zone B had a primary and direct interest in the question. The Allies, instead, sent an official note in this sense only to the Soviet Union and Italy. Yugoslav officials complained not about the substance of the proposal, which they dismissed as a propagandistic electoral ploy, but about the procedure followed by the Allies, which they regarded as “needlessly offensive to Yugoslavia.”¹¹

Three months after the declaration, Yugoslavia’s rift with the Soviet Union changed the operational environment of all actors involved. After an initial period of caution, the Americans decided to provide economic assistance to Tito’s régime in the hope of keeping it permanently alienated from the Soviet camp. As a consequence, while still publicly supporting the tripartite proposal, their objective became that of reaching “a lasting political settlement ... by mutual agreement among the parties directly concerned.” At about the same time, the Yugoslavs expressed their readiness to negotiate some form of partition with Italy. They requested, however, that the Allies first make it clear that they no longer supported the tripartite declaration, otherwise the Italians would not “budge from claiming return of the entire Free Territory to Italy.” At first the Americans were hesitant to take such a step lest it fan anti-Western sentiments in Italy. This attitude, however, changed in mid-1951, when they decided to extend military assistance to Tito, their ultimate objective being to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western defence system. One could not expect, in fact, the Italians and the Yugoslavs to cooperate militarily as long as the FTT problem continued to stand in between them.¹²

By this time the attitudes of all major actors towards the FTT problem were well established. Hence, they can now be examined in more detail. As concerns Italian decision-makers, two components of their attitudinal prism are of particular relevance. The first, which could be defined as the “domestic magnifier,” relates to their tendency to regard foreign policy choices as geared to, and shaped by, domestic political considerations. This does not refer to the constraints that domestic politics inevitably impose upon foreign policy but describes a rather extreme situation where the main functions of foreign policy are domestic, that is where foreign policy issues are essentially symbolic and always approached with the aim of consolidating the hegemony of the dominant political forces. The Italian decision to seek admission to NATO, for instance, was not so much prompted by considerations of external military security as by the desire to relegate the Communist opposition to a permanent marginal position within the domestic political system (or, as Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi put it, “to make the efforts of the internal revolutionaries vain”), and thus insure the ruling coalition against any radical shift in power.¹³

The second element of the prism was the “leverage syndrome.” This describes the propensity of Italian decision-makers to regard membership in international organizations primarily as a means for Italy to regain its “proper status” in the international community, extract some concessions from its partners and be backed up by them in questions of national interest. Quaroni, for instance, advised Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza to seek admission to the Western European Union [WEU] because he thought it would be “the fastest and most effective way for Italy to regain parity in the international community.” Sforza saw entrance into NATO as assuring the end of “any political and moral difference” between Italy and other Western countries. The Ambassador in Washington Alberto Tarchiani regarded it as a means for Italy “to reach the first and fundamental objective of its postwar foreign policy: to become an equal and dignified partner in the Western political

system.” During the negotiations for both the WEU and NATO, De Gasperi hinted that the Italian government would find it easier to join a military pact if membership brought with it revision of the peace treaty—particularly those clauses concerning the colonies and Trieste—which kept Italy in a position of inferiority relative to the other members. Although admission to NATO and various other international organizations did not automatically produce the desired revisions, De Gasperi was confident that these would not be too late in coming. Thus, at the beginning of 1949, on the occasion of Italy’s joining the Council of Europe, he could affirm:

“Finally ... we emerge from the peculiar situation in which we have been since the war and like others, reenter the European family of nations in which ... we will be able to say a word on those postwar questions which have not yet been solved.”

Trieste obviously figured most prominently among these unsolved questions.¹⁴

Italian decision-makers, moreover, presented as a fact the view that “by entering into the Atlantic pact [they] had reinforced the ties of solidarity and cooperation with the Western democratic nations, thus further committing them to help Italy with the FTT.” They felt, therefore, that failure on the part of the Allies to act decisively in Italy’s favour betrayed the expectations of Italian public opinion and risked turning it against the West. The two components of the prism thus converged to form a single strong conviction: Italy was not simply entitled to the support of the Allies but it was also of paramount importance for the Allies to provide it. De Gasperi expressed this very well when, commenting on the prospects of the European Defence Community (EDC) during an official visit to Washington in September 1951, he tirelessly repeated that “without a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste question no democratic government in Italy could get parliamentary support for a joint defense effort.” If the Italians should think that “their allies could not save Trieste for Italy, the result would be a dangerous trend toward neutralism” and “his coalition would lose votes to the left and right.”¹⁵

These two components of the attitudinal prism define the outer parameters of Italian action toward the FTT problem. The “leverage syndrome” points to pressure on the Allies as the most preferred means for Italian decision-makers to seek a solution. The “domestic magnifier,” on the other hand, suggests that they would evaluate different solutions in terms of their impact on domestic politics and that variations in the intensity and scope of their pressures on the Allies would be related to changes in the domestic political scene.

The central component of the attitudinal prism of Yugoslav decision-makers can be described as the “equality imperative.” The Yugoslav attitude had been deeply influenced by the Great Powers’ practice of unilaterally deciding matters of concern to smaller countries. As long as they were aligned with one side, they had to swallow such a pill. Having defected from the Soviet camp, primarily because of their unwillingness to sacrifice national interests to Soviet ones, they were no longer prepared to put up with such practices. Since the FTT was an Italian-Yugoslav border dispute, they thought that a solution should emerge out of direct negotiations between the two countries most directly concerned. This attitude was best captured by American Chargé in Belgrade Woodruff Wallner, in a report in which he warned the State Department against the temptation of implementing the tripartite declaration with respect to Zone A without consultation with the Yugoslavs:

“The Yugoslavs cannot or will not accept concessions on [a] national problem like Trieste imposed from abroad at a time when they are drawing closer to [the]

West. This would be contrary [to the] ultranationalistic tendencies [of] this young nation as a whole and within [the] regime would be resented by doctrinaire commies as paying too great [a] national price to enter [the] bourgeois club. Consequently, they require that the Yugo[slav]-Ital[ian] settlement appear as [a] freely negotiated understanding between two sovereign nations with concessions being freely consented [to] in [the] interests [of] collective security against [the] Soviet threat and not imposed on them by [the] West."

The "equality imperative" suggests that the Yugoslavs, although prepared to make concessions to attain a solution, would resist any decision affecting the future of the FTT, made without their participation. And indeed they never tired of repeating that Yugoslavia would "never agree to have the Trieste question settled without its participation" and that Italy would do better to "pay more heed to geography" and look for an "Adriatic" solution rather than for an "Atlantic" one because "pressure on Yugoslavia [would] elicit only one reply: unwavering resistance."¹⁶

Given the instrumental view Italian decision-makers had of the Atlantic Alliance, they did not attach as much strategic importance as the Americans did to a Western opening to Yugoslavia. De Gasperi, in particular, regarded it primarily as a threat to Italy's claims to the FTT. Whereas the Americans now looked at this question as an irritant between two countries which shared a common interest in defence and should therefore make an effort to compromise, the Italians looked at it exclusively as a territorial dispute having potentially explosive repercussions on domestic politics, and hence as a zero sum game. If Yugoslavia became a member of the Western club, the solution could only be a compromise and Italy "would not succeed in obtaining Zone B, or part of it, and could even be obliged to discuss questions concerning Zone A." Italian decision-makers measured the benefits of belonging to the club in terms of the advantages individual members could derive from it. The club, as they saw it, was supposed to protect and advance the welfare of its members and be of assistance in their disputes with nonmembers. As the Ambassador in London Manlio Brosio later put it:

"We were NATO allies ... we believed we were entitled to preferential considerations over Yugoslavia... We felt that we deserved the support of the U.S. and the U.K. because of a community of ideology, of systems, and of the alliance."

If a non-member locked in a dispute with a member was seeking help from the club, what would be more natural than asking for something in return? Tito, they thought, should very simply be told that if he wanted aid he would have to show "a sincere willingness to cooperate with the Western world and Italy in particular." This obviously meant yielding to Italian requests on the question of the FTT. As long as Tito failed to provide this "decisive proof," it was also legitimate to doubt his solidarity with the Western democracies. Rather than pressing Italy to negotiate, the U.S. should try to extract from Tito a solution favorable to Italy because "only Washington [had] the means of persuasion," i.e., was in the unique position of being able to force Tito to make concessions on the FTT as a condition for granting him aid. Consequently, Italian decision-makers refused to enter into direct negotiations with Yugoslavia and preferred to remain anchored to the empty, but politically valuable, promise of the tripartite declaration. The Allies were to be "nailed," as De Gasperi put it, "to their moral engagement" and not to be allowed to give it a posthumous interpretation in the sense that they "would simply have adhered to a compromise solution to be agreed upon with the Slavs."¹⁷

The American decision to explore the possibility of integrating Yugoslavia into the Western defence system led, however, some Italian diplomats to question this dilatory policy. In July 1951, the ambassadors in the Allied capitals began to argue insistently in their reports to Rome that it was illusory for Italy to continue to look to the U.S. for a solution. Yugoslavia could offer more divisions than Italy, which was the only thing of interest to the Americans. They thought that "any postponement of a courageous decision for reasons of domestic politics" would, in the long run, work against Italy. Hence, the time had come to abandon "the game of requesting a confirmation of the tripartite declaration every three or four months," and fall back "on a less intransigent position." The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Vittorio Zoppi, presented De Gasperi with two possible courses of actions. The first was to negotiate with the Yugoslavs a definitive solution which would give Italy full sovereignty over Zone A and "as much of Zone B as could be torn away from Tito." The second was to convince the Allies to turn over to Italy the administration of Zone A. The "provisional solution," as this option came to be called, was perceived as an intermediate step capable of achieving two objectives: first, it would put Italy on a level of "parity" with Yugoslavia, and thus increase its bargaining position, in case a definitive solution would indeed have to be reached through direct negotiations; second, it would deprive the Allies of an instrument of pressure. Zoppi feared, in fact, that while reluctant to exert any pressure on Tito to obtain an acceptable compromise in Zone B, the Allies would not hesitate, if need be, "to force our hand." De Gasperi rejected both alternatives. Direct negotiations, he thought, would not yield acceptable results as long as the Allies continued to curry favour with Tito. As for the "provisional solution," he feared it could be interpreted as a relinquishment of the Italian claims to Zone B and hurt the center parties electorally.¹⁸

Allied pressures, however, eventually obliged him to agree to negotiations with the Yugoslavs. These (the Guidotti-Bebler talks of November 1951-March 1952) only exposed the profound differences in the working assumptions of the two contenders. The Yugoslavs worked under a *Realpolitik* assumption: they controlled Zone B while the Italians were, for all practical purposes, in control of Zone A through the Allies. Any solution, they felt, would have to take this reality into account. Hence, all their proposals were based, in one way or another, on the idea that concessions by the two countries in their respective zones would have to be more or less equal in importance. The Italians worked, instead, under what could be called the *transcendental assumption*: they felt, in the words of Tarchiani, that Italian "rights in Trieste had to triumph *independently* [emphasis added] of the circumstances which had caused the loss of that territory and population and of the objective conditions which had prevented regaining them." The peace treaty had already obliged Italy to leave Italian-populated cities to Yugoslavia. Hence a solution, to be acceptable, had at least to "redeem" those parts of Zone B that were predominantly Italian. They suggested a division of the FTT along what they termed "the continuous ethnic line." They regarded this solution as an acceptable compromise, since it made territorial concession to Yugoslavia in Zone B, in areas predominantly inhabited by Slovenes. To the Yugoslavs, however, these were not concessions at all, since these areas were already under Yugoslav control. Not surprisingly, the talks ended among reciprocal accusations of intransigence.¹⁹

In the spring of 1952, following riots in Trieste, the Italians requested the British and American governments to convene a conference in London "to examine jointly measures designed to foster a closer collaboration in Zone A among the three governments and with the local authorities there." De Gasperi's objective was to regain effective administrative

control of the zone while final authority would continue to be formally vested in the Allied Zone Commander. This solution, he thought, would allow him to put an end to what he regarded as the deterioration of Italian interests there, without incurring the domestic risks involved in the "provisional solution." Although unable to convince the Allies to empty AMG of all powers, De Gasperi nevertheless succeeded in wresting from them substantial concessions. He then publicly presented the outcome of the conference as "a primary application of the tripartite declaration."²⁰

The Yugoslavs were not officially informed of the London conference but learned about it from the press. To them, this was proof that the Allies still did not treat them on a par with Italy. The Allies tried to justify their behavior by pointing out that the objective of the conference was to associate the Italians with the administration of Zone A, not to make a final disposition of it. The Yugoslavs, however, felt that as legal co-administrators of the FTT they had a right to be at least consulted. Thus, they denounced the outcome of the conference as a "unilateral and illegal violation of the international status of Zone A and a serious blow to the[ir] rights and interests."²¹

All subsequent Allied attempts to convince the Italians to resume negotiations proved futile. Thus, in the fall of 1952, the British, anxious to withdraw from Trieste, suggested to the Americans that perhaps the only solution lay in imposing partition along the zonal boundary. Since a definitive partition was even worse than a "provisional" one, De Gasperi turned to the Americans. He argued that to help the center parties in the upcoming elections they should "act on Belgrade with sufficient energy to obtain for [Italy], and in the general interest, an acceptable compromise in Zone B." Between December 1952 and March 1953, the Americans came up with two different plans. If acceptable to Italy they would have then endeavored to obtain Yugoslav agreement. De Gasperi, however, rejected both of them. Since the divisions suggested did not come close to the "continuous ethnic line," he felt that acceptance would hurt him electorally and insisted on a more favorable line. When the plan was finally presented to the Yugoslavs, these turned it down without comment to its substance but lamenting that the Italians still continued to "expect a solution to come from the Great Powers ... by means of pressure on Yugoslavia." De Gasperi then convinced the Americans to make another attempt, making it clear this time that "if, for political reasons, Tito desired that the agreement result from direct negotiations" he would agree to them on condition, however, that "the fundamental terms of the agreement be established and accepted by both parties beforehand through the good offices of the United States." The Yugoslavs this time replied that it would be "preferable" to conduct any "serious negotiations" after the Italian elections.²²

The poor performance of the center parties in the June 1953 elections (they lost 12.7% of the votes and 42 seats with respect to 1948) convinced De Gasperi that time had come to seek the "provisional solution." He was, however, unable to reconstitute a centrist coalition and on August 24 he ceded his place to Giuseppe Pella who formed a center-right government. For the new Prime Minister the pursuit of the "provisional solution" became a high priority. On the one hand, the continued support of the right-wing parties depended in no small measure on his "determination to defend national interests." On the other, he felt that the reacquisition of Zone A, and of Trieste in particular, would be a political success capable of prolonging the life of its government, which was regarded as merely transitional. The Americans, however, were reluctant to turn Zone A over to Italy lest such a move increase, rather than decrease, friction between Italy and Yugoslavia, and all Italian verbal efforts to change their mind proved ineffective.²³

The situation took a dramatic turn only a few days after Pella's arrival at the helm of the government. The August 29, 1953 Italian decision to move some troops toward the Yugoslav frontier was presented as a response to an alleged Yugopress story, released the previous day, which speculated on the possibility that Yugoslavia might annex Zone B. A closer look at available evidence reveals, however, that the decision to move troops was a calculated, risky initiative undertaken because of a perceived opportunity to sensitize the Allies to the necessity of implementing the "provisional solution." The threat perceived by Italian decision-makers was not that Yugoslavia might annex Zone B—a final outcome to which they had already resigned themselves when deciding to pursue the "provisional solution"—but that Italy might not recover Zone A in time. The American decision, announced in July, to hold talks on joint military planning with Yugoslavia, had led Italian decision-makers to conclude that time was now running out for Trieste. They feared that the progressive inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Western defence system, in conjunction with De Gasperi's political demise and the advent of Pella's transitional government, had increased Tito's self-assurance and that he would now press for Trieste and its surroundings to be turned into an international neutral area on the model of Tangiers. Since repeated light nudges had produced no results in Washington, the idea slowly gained ground at the Foreign Ministry that recourse to other, more adequate, means to convince the Americans to hand over Zone A might be necessary. One had to show them, as Zoppi put it, that they worried too much about Yugoslav reactions if the "provisional solution" was implemented and too little about those in Italy if it were not. The decision to move troops, as Defence Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani concisely put it in his diary, had one simple objective: "to prove to Tito and *above all to the Allies* that we [did] not intend, on any account, to give up Trieste" [emphasis added]. A small concentration of troops along the frontier could not deter Tito from annexing Zone B, had this really been his intention, but would be effective in signalling Italian restlessness about the future of Zone A to the Americans and, hopefully, pushing them along a path they had been reluctant to follow until then. As Tarchiani put it in retrospect: "From that unfortunate series of incidents the Allies were almost forced to convince themselves that the problem of Trieste could take a tragic turn at any moment; hence, it was both necessary and urgent to solve it."²⁴

Following the military measures of August 29, Italian decision-makers moved on two fronts. In a speech in Rome on September 13, Pella called for a plebiscite as a solution to the FTT problem. This, however, was merely a tactical move for public consumption. In the words of Tarchiani: "We did not believe the proposal of the plebiscite would go through but we hoped through a forceful action on our part to reach a solution; that is, that we could at least obtain the administration of Zone A." Behind the scene, in fact, Italian decision-makers confronted the Allies (and the Americans in particular) with a barrage of requests for the implementation of the "provisional solution." Their arguments relied on a combination of suasion and pressure: the Allies should put an end to "their so-called impartiality" since "impartiality shown towards a communist dictatorship and a democratic, full-participating member of NATO [could] only be interpreted ... as partiality for Tito and support for Yugoslavia;" turning the administration of Zone A over to Italy was by now the only possible way to reach a settlement; once on an equal footing with Yugoslavia, in fact, Italy could look more confidently to the prospect of direct negotiations; the implementation of the "provisional solution" would satisfy Italian public opinion, strengthen Pella's government, enable him to pursue a strong pro-Western course and thus allow him to solve all outstanding foreign policy issues (the ratification of the EDC treaty and the signing of an agreement for the concession of military facilities); continuation of the policy of

“impartiality,” on the other hand, would embolden Tito’s ambitions, solidify anti-Allied sentiments in Italy, strengthen extremist political forces, lead to the fall of Pella and even call into question Italy’s membership in the Western alliance.²⁵

Thanks primarily to the efforts of the ambassador in Rome Clare Boothe Luce, the State Department made, in early September, a dramatic U-turn in its policy towards the FTT. All of a sudden, the option of turning Zone A over to Italy, which until then had been regarded as more likely to complicate rather than solving the situation, came to be seen as capable of “reliev[ing the Allies] of their ... embarrassing responsibilities and commitments” and even “pav[ing] the way ... for collaboration” between Italy and Yugoslavia. A plan to this effect was immediately drafted and presented to the British Foreign Office for concurrence.²⁶

The Italians were immediately informed that a plan “to accomplish for Italy the ‘equality’ which Pella desir[ed] so strongly” was under study and would be unveiled soon. Being concerned that such a plan might involve more than the pure and simple “provisional” transfer of Zone A, Italian decision-makers proceeded to express their desiderata. This culminated on October 5, in the submission of a detailed outline. All Italian requests were forcefully backed up by Luce.²⁷ The Yugoslavs were not officially informed of the plan but got an inkling of what was happening from press speculations. Mostly through public speeches and newspapers interviews, they signalled that the plan rumored to be in the making at the State Department was yet another example of the unilateral approach which had characterized Allied policy toward the FTT ever since the war and that, as such, it would be “unacceptable.” As Tito put it in a speech in Split on September 12, Yugoslavia would not take lightly to another *fait accompli* and would “consider Italy’s entry into Zone A as an act of aggression against which it would be compelled to take steps.” At the same time, they continued to reiterate that a solution had to come out of direct negotiations or an international conference.²⁸

Not surprisingly the Yugoslav reaction to the October 8 Allied decision to withdraw from Zone A and transfer its administration to Italy, was very strong. In a speech at Leskovac on October 10, Tito announced that military units had been sent to reinforce the troops already located in Zone B and that the moment an Italian soldier entered Zone A, the Yugoslavs would do the same. The Allied decision, the Yugoslavs argued, could not be accepted because it had been made in blatant disregard of Yugoslavia’s special interest in the FTT as recognized also in the peace treaty with Italy. The entry of Italian troops in Zone A could also be considered—given Italy’s traditional expansionist tendencies in the Balkans, the military measures of August 29 and recent revanchist statements by various Italian politicians—as the beginning of a policy of open aggression. Yugoslavia would therefore be justified, on the basis of art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, in resorting to force to protect its rights and national interests.²⁹

Yugoslav decision-makers perceived that they needed, for domestic political reasons, to stand up to Western overbearing behavior as they had to that of the East. Their reaction, however, put them in a delicate situation. The Allied decision already risked fuelling Cominformist sympathies within the country especially since the Soviet Union cast itself in the role of unsolicited defender of Yugoslav interests by protesting Anglo-American behavior and bringing the FTT question to the U.N. Security Council. Even worse, were the Allies to decide to ignore the Yugoslav reaction and let the Italians into Zone A under the cover of their own troops, the domestic political consequences would be even more disastrous. Such a decision, as Kardelj told Eden and Tito repeated to the Allied diplomatic representatives in Belgrade, would be regarded by all Yugoslavs as yet another instance

of unfair pressure, if not outright imperialism, against their country, "cast a dark shadow" on the role of NATO and seriously jeopardize Yugoslavia's continued cooperation with the West. To avoid a dangerous confrontation Yugoslav decision-makers signalled to the Allies that they were not opposed to Zone A being returned to Italy, "provided it [was] done in a face-saving way." The method they suggested was the convening of a four-power conference (U.S., U.K., Italy and Yugoslavia).³⁰

Italian decision-makers, for their part, reacted to these developments with consternation. They warned the Allies that to yield to the Yugoslav threat would be "a new form of appeasement" and have serious repercussions in Italy. If the U.S. would not confront "a small bandit" such as Tito, its willingness to respond to a Soviet threat to Europe would also be questioned, NATO's credibility would be eroded, and Italy's continued participation in it endangered. They were willing to participate in a conference for the purpose of reaching a definitive agreement but only after the transfer of the administration of Zone A had been completed.³¹

The Allies now found themselves in an impasse. To proceed with the implementation of their plan was out of the question since it meant nullifying five years of efforts to cultivate relations with Yugoslavia and wrecking all defence plans for southeastern Europe. To renege on the October 8 decision was tantamount to admitting to a major policy mistake. A conference was not easy to organize since it was clear that neither country would agree to attend on the terms of the other. During the next couple of months, they tried, through ambiguous semantic gimmicks, to devise a conference proposal acceptable to both countries. All efforts proved vain. Although both countries softened their positions and came up with different suggestions, neither was prepared to give in on the central question of when the transfer of the administration was to begin.³²

Finally, in early December the Allies decided to tackle the problem from a different angle. The new plan provided for the Allies to hold secret talks with the Yugoslavs to explore with them, as co-administrators of the FTT, the terms of a definitive settlement which would take into consideration all aspects of the problem, including minority rights and the question of a free port in Trieste. Once an agreement had been reached, it would be submitted to the Italians. The Allies would then help mediate whichever differences might remain. This proposal was accepted by both countries.³³

Yugoslav acceptance was not a surprise since the plan indirectly admitted the Allies' past errors and finally acknowledged Yugoslavia's "parity" of rights and interests in the FTT. Italian acceptance, on the other hand, was the result of some propitious circumstances. On December 23, while rejecting yet another Allied proposal for the convening of a conference, Pella had suggested an alternative plan which was rather similar to the one the Allies had already devised but not yet submitted to either country. They were thus able to submit their own plan to Pella as if it was his own, with some alterations.³⁴ Even more important, when the plan was submitted to Pella, he had already resigned as a result of factional squabbles within his own party. He could thus afford to disregard the domestic repercussions of his choices on Trieste and accept the recommendation of his diplomatic advisors. These had also looked favorably to the idea of a conference. They were convinced, in fact, that the Yugoslavs had no interest in seeking a solution because as long as the Trieste question remained unsolved they could continue to benefit from American aid without having to engage themselves fully in the Western camp. A conference would make this clear also to the Americans and thus finally oblige them, as Tarchiani put it, "to confront a problem which for too long they had tried to elude with all kinds of expedients" namely, to choose between Italy and Yugoslavia. While his political future was still at stake,

however, Pella did not feel he could make any compromise.³⁵

The rest of the story is well known. The secret negotiations which took place in London between February and October 1954 yielded an agreement which, at least as far as its territorial aspect was concerned, was little different from the one suggested in the October 8 plan. This time, however, it had been reached with the participation of all actors involved. In commenting on this outcome, John C. Campbell has noted that the lesson to retain is that "the technique ... [of] the two-stage negotiation by the third party with first one side, then the other ... seem[s] especially suited to disputes between states that [are] unable or unwilling to negotiate directly with each other." What he forgets to add, however, is that the third party must be able to act as an impartial mediator and treat both contenders on a level of true "parity." Only then will it be able to catalyze a solution. This, in turn, might reverse, as it did in the case of Italy and Yugoslavia, the negative spiral of images and behavior and start the two contenders on a new path of cooperation.³⁶

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NOTES

1. For the distinction between operational and psychological environments and the development of a model of foreign policy analysis based on it, see Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, 1 (March 1969) 75-101. The following analysis is based on the perceptions and images expressed by decision-makers in three different types of circumstances: (a) public speeches, statements, press conferences, interviews and memoirs, (b) confidential meetings with American diplomatic officials reported by the latter in their correspondence with Washington and, limitedly to Italy, (c) secret deliberations of the decision-making or consultative units revealed by Italian Foreign Ministry documents and quoted in Diego De Castro, *La Questione di Trieste: L'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954* (Trieste: Lint, 1981, 2 vols). Not all sets of documents provide the same type of information. Perceptions expressed in the third category are more reliable than those articulated in the first or second, where advocative (or, if one prefers, manipulative) intentions also come into play.
2. See Raoul Pupo, *La rifondazione della politica estera italiana: la questione giuliana (1944-46). Linee interpretative* (Udine: Del Bianco, 1979) 42- 69.
3. Quoted in John Campbell, ed., *Successful Negotiations: Trieste 1954* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976) 84. The Rapallo treaty is described as a *Diktat* in V. Sedmak and J. Mejak, *Trieste, the Problem which Agitates the World* (Belgrade: Edition Jugoslavija, 1953) 15-16.
4. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, United States Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Special Studies, 1964) 598. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*) IV (1945) 1144-1145, 1149.
5. *FRUS* IV (1945) 1155; Roberto G. Rabel, "Prologue to Containment: The Truman Administration's Response to the Trieste Crisis of May 1945," *Diplomatic History* 10, 2 (Spring 1986) 141-160.
6. *FRUS* 1945, IV: 1163-1164, 1165- 1167, 1170-1171; Bojan Cvietic, "The Trieste Crises in 1945 and 1953," *Review of International Affairs* (Dec. 1, 1953); *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948) 35-36. This episode can be regarded as a very important milestone on the road that would lead Yugoslavia first to the 1948 split with the Soviet Union and later to the formulation of its nonalignment policy. Yugoslav resentment was expressed even more explicitly once the break was consummated. As put by Tito in another speech: "I can say today ... that while we were fighting within ourselves over the terrible decision whether or not to evacuate Trieste, we did not receive any moral support, no sign of it, on the part of the Soviet Union. Night after night, I sat by the telephone waiting for at least a word, a counsel. But we heard nothing, because their interest was not directly touched." Tito, *Govori i Članci* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959) VII: 36.

7. For a detailed account of Italian inquiries as to the continued standing of the Allies' policy toward the Julian region and the reassurances received, see De Castro, I: 303-323, 329-350, 399. For Italian complaints see *FRUS* 1945, IV: 1179-1180 and "Washington e i rapporti Italo-Jugoslavi," *Esteri* (semi-official publication of the Italian Foreign Ministry), May 5, 1950.
8. Casardi is quoted in De Castro, I: 392; *FRUS* 1946, II: 689. On the fears of the American delegates about a Yugoslav coup in Trieste, see Patricia Dawson Ward, *The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946* (Kent OH: Ohio State UP, 1979) 104-105.
9. De Castro, I: 399 and 466. Edvard Kardelj, *Trieste and Yugoslav-Italian Relations*, (New York: Yugoslav Information Center, 1953) 30-31.
10. Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza argued, when making the request to American Ambassador in Rome James Dunn, that he viewed the declaration "purely from the tactical point of view in relation to the electoral campaign." He could not fail to see, however, that, besides its immediate electoral function, such a commitment would provide ammunition for Italy's continuing struggle for Trieste. Indeed in his memoirs, he vehemently denied that he solicited the declaration for electoral purposes, his "supreme objective" being that of "dismantling and destroying all that was unjust and cruel in the peace treaty." See Dunn to Dept. 883 (March 1, 1948), Record Group 84, Records of the U.S. Political Advisor to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the FTT, General Records, Washington Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland (henceforth USPolAd), Box 17, File 322; Carlo Sforza, *Cinque Anni a Palazzo Chigi: la politica estera italiana dal 1947 al 1951* (Roma: Atlante, 1952) 321-322, 375, 400. For the rationale behind the request for confirmations see De Castro, I: 734-735, 746.
11. Cannon (American Ambassador in Belgrade) to Dept. 332 and 336 (March 22 and 23, 1948), USPolAd, Box 17, File 322.
12. Memorandum, "Policy Statement: Trieste" Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files, National Archives, Diplomatic Branch, Washington, D.C. [CDF] 611.50G/11-1450; *FRUS* 1949, IV: 522-524; 1950, III: 1311-1314 and 1951, IV: 228-231, 240-242. On American policies toward Yugoslavia following the rift with the Soviet Union see Lorraine M. Lees, "The American decision to Assist Tito 1948-1949," *Diplomatic History* 2 (Autumn 1978): 407-422 and Henry W. Brands, Jr., "Redefining the Cold War: American Policy toward Yugoslavia 1948-60," *Diplomatic History* 11, 1 (Winter 1983) 41-53.
13. The quotation is taken from De Gasperi's speech during the final debate in the Senate on March 27, 1949 (*Atti Parlamentari*, Senato della Repubblica, 1st Legislature, vol. 1948-49: 6534-6544). See also Brunello Vigezzi, "De Gasperi, Sforza, la diplomazia italiana fra patto di Bruxelles e patto atlantico (1948-49)," *Storia Contemporanea* 18, 1 (1987): 5-43 and, for a more general view, Primo Vannicelli, *Italy, NATO and the European Community: The Interplay of Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 31, 1974.)
14. Pietro Quaroni is quoted in Brunello Vigezzi, "De Gasperi, Sforza, la diplomazia italiana e la percezione della politica di potenza dal trattato di pace al patto atlantico (1947-1950)," *Storia Contemporanea* 16, 4, (1985): 661-685 at 673; Carlo Sforza, 189, 234. Tarchiani's report is in Alfonso Sterpellone, "Vent'anni di politica estera" in Massimo Bonanni, ed., *La politica estera della Repubblica italiana* (Milano: Edizioni di Comunità, 1967) II: 159-345 at 243. De Gasperi's comment is in Maria Romana Catti De Gasperi, *La nostra patria Europa: il pensiero europeistico di Alcide De Gasperi* (Milano: Mondadori, 1969) 17.
15. Sforza, 361. De Gasperi is quoted in Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1962) 572.
16. Wallner to Dept. 1098 (February 3, 1953), RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Belgrade Legation and Embassy, Top Secret General Records, 1945-1953, Washington Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, Box 5, File January-March 1953. See also the following articles in the unofficial review of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, *Review of International Affairs*: "What is obstructing good relations between Yugoslavia and Italy" (May 9, 1951); "No solution of the Trieste problem without Yugoslavia" (April 9, 1952); "Italian action of straining relations with Yugoslavia" (June 1, 1952); "Latest edition of Rome's 'sacro egoismo'" (Aug. 1, 1952) and "Blackmail" (Jan. 16, 1953).
17. Quotations in De Castro, I: 617, 796-797, 814; Brosio is quoted in Campbell, 119. See also the following articles in *Esteri*: "Washington e i rapporti Italo- Jugoslavi" (May, 5, 1950); "Politica e strategia nel Mediterraneo" (Feb. 28, 1951); "Il sistema Italo-Greco-Turco e l'incognita Jugoslava" (March 15, 1952); "L'Italia e la difesa del mondo occidentale" (Sept. 15, 1952); "L'Italia e il riarmo jugoslavo" (Dec. 15, 1952).

18. Quotations in De Castro, I: 869-871 and II, 89-92.
19. Alberto Tarchiani, *Dieci Anni fra Roma e Washington* (Verona: Mondadori, 1955) 309. The Guidotti-Bebler talks are discussed in detail in De Castro, II: 107- 131.
20. De Castro, II: 183, 211-215. MC Tarchiani, Perkins (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), CDF, 750G.00/4-2352; Tarchiani to Acheson, CDF, 750G.022/4- 2052.
21. "No Dictation on Trieste," *The Yugoslav Review* (April 1952); De Castro, I: 183- 188.
22. Tarchiani, 216; Acheson to Rome 2392, CDF, 750G/12-652; Dulles to Rome 3353, CDF, 750G.00/2-1653; Bunker (Ambassador in Rome) to Dept. 3699, CDF, 750G.00/2-2253 and 3886 (March 6, 1953), RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of The Department of State, Trieste-Italy 1948-54, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland [FSP-Trieste], Box 2, File Jan. 30-April 29, 1953; Wallner to Dept. 1562 (May 14, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste and 1574, CDF, 750G.00/5/1853; Memorandum of Conversation [MC] Sensi (First Secretary, Italian embassy in Washington), Byington (Director Office of Western European Affairs), CDF, 750G.00/5-1853; Luce (American Ambassador in Rome) to Dept. 4821, CDF, 750G.00/5-2053; "Discussions between Ambassador Luce, Prime Minister De Gasperi and Secretary General Zoppi on Trieste," CDF, 750G.00/5-2053; Wallner to Dept. 1593, CDF, 750G.00/5-2053. See also De Castro, II: 348-352, 376, 411-412, 428-441, 451.
23. See Pella's policy speech to Parliament in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Aug. 29, 1953): 822-825; MC Tarchiani, Merchant (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), Byington, June 19, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Trieste and MC Lucioli (Italian Chargé in Washington), R.B. Knight (Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs), W.E. Knight (Office of Western European Affairs), CDF, 750G.00/8-2453.
24. Paolo Emilio Taviani, Unpublished Journal, entries of August 29, 1953. Taviani's private journal which covers the period Aug. 15, 1953, Nov. 4, 1954 is to be published *post mortem*. I wish to express my gratitude to him for having kindly allowed me to read and quote from it. Tarchiani, 322.
25. *Documenti di Vita Italiana*, Nov. 1953: 1871-1881; Tarchiani, 55; Luce to Dept. 718, CDF, 750G.00/8-3153; 765, 777, 781 and 782, CDF, 750G.00/9-453; 796, CDF, 750G.00/9-753 and D-599, CDF, 750G.00/9-753; Williamson (Councillor of Embassy) to Dept. D-598, CDF, 750G.00/9-753; Taviani, Unpublished journal, entries of Sept. 3 and 4 and Oct. 7, 1953.
26. Dulles to London 1337, CDF, 750G.00/9-1153. I have examined this dramatic policy U-turn and the role of Luce in detail in O. Croci, "The United States, Yugoslavia and the Question of Trieste: The American Policy Reversal of October 1953" in John D. Morison, ed., *East Europe and the West*, London: MacMillan (forthcoming).
27. Dulles to Rome 884, CDF, 750G.00/9-1053; MC Lucioli, Byington, W.E. Knight, Sept. 23, 1953 and MC Lucioli, Byington, Oct. 2, 1953, both in FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File Manuscripts and Letters [ML]; Tarchiani to Dulles, CDF, 750G.00/10-553.
28. Tito's speech is reported and commented in Wallner to Dept. 329, CDF, 750G.00/9-1353, 333 and 335, CDF, 750G.00/9-1453; see also the editorial "Message to the Western Powers," *Borba* (Sept. 17, 1953), reported in Wallner to Dept. 355, CDF, 750G.00/9-1753; an interview of Vice-President Kardelj to the French weekly *L'Express* and a speech in Kočevje on October 4, reported in *Relazioni Internazionali* (Oct. 3, 1953) 943-944 and (Oct. 10, 1953) 972-973; and an editorial in *Borba* (October 6), reported in Wallner to Dept. 414 (Oct. 7, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 3.
29. The text of the October 8 declaration is in *Department of State Bulletin* (Oct. 19, 1953): 529. For Yugoslav reactions see Wallner to Dept. 428, 437 (both Oct. 9, 1953), 445, 446 and 447, (Oct. 10), 451, 453 (Oct. 11), 463 (Oct. 12), all in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4 and 438, CDF, 750G.00/10- 953; USUN to Dept. 243, "Text of Cablegram from Yugoslavia to the SYG-UN Concerning Trieste," CDF, 750G.00/10-1453. See also Kardelj. "Trieste".
30. For the Soviet note of protest and initiative in the U.N. see [Charles] Bohlen (Ambassador to Moscow) to Dept. 461 (Oct. 12, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2 File 4; Lodge (Representative to the U.N.) to Dept. 204, CDF, 750G.00/10-1353. Kardelj's message to Eden is mentioned in MC Salt (First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington), [Walworth] Barbour (Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs), Freund (Office of Western European Affairs), W.E. Knight, Nes (Office of Western European Affairs), Oct. 12, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Tito's conversation with the Allied diplomats in Belgrade is reported in Wallner to Dept. 512 (Oct. 18, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 5. See also an article by Vice-President Moše Pijade in *Politika* (Oct. 15) in which he tried to minimize anti-Western feelings by explaining that the Allied decision was not to be viewed as disregard or indifference for Yugoslavia but as the result

- of "Italian blackmail." For the conference proposal and the indirect suggestion that Yugoslavia was ready to accept the return of Zone A to Italy see MC K. Popović (Foreign Minister), V. Popović (Ambassador in Washington), Bruner (First Secretary, Yugoslav embassy), the Secretary, Merchant, Barbour, CDF, 750G.00/10-1253 and 750G.00/10-1353; a UP despatch in FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4 and Wallner to Dept. 486, CDF, 750G.00/10-1453.
31. For Italian reactions see MC Sensi, R.B. Knight, W.E. Knight, Oct. 12, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Luce to Dept. 1257 (Oct. 14, 1953), 1270 (Oct. 15, 1953) and 1347 (Oct. 22, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 4; MC Lucioli, Byington, W.E. Knight, CDF, 750G.00/10-1653 and a telegram from Pella to Tarchiani and a statement given by the latter to Dulles, both in CDF, 750G.00/10-1453. See also Taviani, UJ, entry of Oct. 23, 1953.
 32. I have examined these efforts in detail in *The Trieste Crisis, 1953*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, Department of Political Science, 1991, chapters 5 and 6.
 33. Dulles to Belgrade 754 (Dec. 23, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9 and 755, CDF, 750G.00/12-2353; Durbrow (Chargé in Rome) to Dept. 2088 (Jan. 7, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9; Riddleberger (Ambassador in Belgrade) to Dept. 839 (Jan. 8, 1954) and 851 (Jan. 11, 1954), FSP-Trieste, Box 2, File 10.
 34. Luce to Dept. 1983 (Dec. 24, 1953), Durbrow to Dept. 2031 (Dec. 30, 1953), Dulles to Paris 2314 (Dec. 28, 1953), FSP-Trieste, Box 1, File 9; MC Beeley (Counsellor, British embassy), Holmes (Minister, American embassy in London), Barbour, Jones (Office of Western European Affairs), Nes, Dec. 28, 1953, FSP-Trieste, Box 3, File ML; Merchant to Secretary, "Recent Trieste Developments," 750G.00/12-3153. De Castro, who has not consulted the American documents, is a victim of the same game played by the Americans with Pella. He suggests, in fact, that the Americans got the idea "for this new type of diplomatic technique" from the Italians. He thus interprets a telegram sent by Tarchiani on February 2, 1954 in which the ambassador revealed that the idea of the secret negotiations did not derive from Pella's suggestion but was "a concept autonomously and independently developed" at the State Department, as an attempt by Tarchiani "to attribute that merit to his American friends" (II: 778).
 35. De Castro, II: 607, 729-730, 638-643, 748 and 771; see also an memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1953, Record Group 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Rome Embassy and Consulates, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, Box 1, File 250-350 and "Trieste, paravento della politica jugoslava?" in *Esteri* (Jan. 15, 1954).
 36. Campbell, 155. For the sudden improvement in Italian-Yugoslav relations following the London agreement see the series of articles in a special issue of *Il Ponte* entitled "Jugoslavia d'oggi," XI, 8-9 (Aug.-Sept. 1955).

POVZETEK

ISKANJE PARITETNIH POZICIJ: ITALIJANSKE IN JUGOSLOVANSKE DRŽE PRI REŠEVANJU TRAŽAŠKEGA VPRAŠANJA

Članek obravnava države in nagibe odločujočih predstavnikov italijanske in jugoslovanske vlade - diplomatov in predvsem politikov - v dolgotrajnih pogajanjih za rešitev tržaškega vprašanja. Avtorjeva analiza se dotika pet obdobjih teh pogajanj: začetne faze, 1944-45, v kateri so bile postavljene prve zahteve po tržaškem ozemlju; druge faze, 1945-49, ki je vodila do ustanovitve področij "A" in "B" Tržaškega ozemlja; tretje, tako imenovane "statične" faze, 1949-51, v kateri je prišlo do tripartitne deklaracije in do sovjetsko-jugoslovanskega preloma; in tako imenovane "dinamične" faze reševanja tržaškega vprašanja, 1951-54, v kateri so pogajanja dosegla svoj višek in končno razrešitev. Največ pozornosti avtor posveča tej poslednji fazi, zlasti motivom in pričakovanjem treh glavnih protagonistov tega obdobja: de Gasperija, Pelleja in Tita. Za vsako teh štirih obdobjih avtor analizira diplomatske in politične pozicije obeh strani v mejah mednarodne politike skozi "prizmo države in nagibov", odgovornih za formulacijo pozicij v mednarodnih pogajanjih jugoslovanske in italijanske strani pri reševanju tržaškega vprašanja.