

alism. The history of the Carinthian Slovenes in the 20th century is nevertheless the history of a small minority trying to confront a German nationalism that is all-powerful and aggressive. Hitherto, official Carinthian provincial historiography has come to grief in this respect, being quite unwilling to write an objective history of Carinthia in the 20th century in which the viewpoint of the Carinthian Slovenes might be sufficiently appreciated. The very presumptuousness of Ogris's criticism underscores the worth of the book under review; for it is the first description in which the minority has had its say. This informative and involved book deserves a wide reception in the international world of scholarship.

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NOTES

1. Valentin Inzko et al., eds., *Zgodovina koroških Slovencev od leta 1918 do danes z upoštevanjem vseslovenske zgodovine*. Celovec/Klagenfurt: Mohorjeva založba/St.-Hermagoras-Bruderschaft, 1985.
2. Alfred Ogris, "Die Kärntner Landesgeschichte ist unteilbar! Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem Lehrbuch über eine 'Geschichte der Kärntner Slowenen' von 1918 bis zur Gegenwart," *Carinthia I. Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Landeskunde von Kärnten* (Klagenfurt) 178 (1988) 353-63.

Jože Pirejvec, *Tito, Stalin in zahod*. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost, 1987. 251 pp..

"Tito, in comparison with the hero of Orwell's novel [1984]," writes Jože Pirejvec, "did not allow himself to be crushed by the destructive mechanism, but rather persevered staunchly in his resistance." With these words the author concludes this work on the Tito-Stalin rupture of 1948. His interesting and well-documented account is a survey of the first three years of post-war Yugoslav foreign policy.

Pirejvec, a Slovene living in Italy, has crafted the events of the period into a readable and colorful narrative. The translation of the work into Slovene from Italian is intended to fill a gap in the recent Slovene historiography on this theme. Certainly it succeeds in making available an expansive recounting of the Cominform split.

Pirejvec's fine book is praiseworthy on account of its scope, scholarliness, and readability. It covers quite a broad range of material on all facets of Yugoslav international relations. Included are descriptions of the disputes over Trst/Trieste and Carinthia, American military overflights, the Greek civil war, and the Truman doctrine. The now-familiar terrain of the growth of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute is covered in some detail: Soviet intelligence activity in Yugoslavia, the demise of plans for Balkan and Danubian federations, and the actions taken against the high government officials Jovanović, Hebrang, and Žujović.

Pirejvec pinpoints the spark that send the dispute into full flames as Soviet irritation at Yugoslavia's close cooperation with Albania. He then moves to a discussion of the two sets of inner tensions in Yugoslav policy: whether or not to distinguish between relations with foreign Communist parties and their governments, and whether to give precedence to Yugoslavia's continued diplomatic activity with the East or to its new, Western-oriented commercial policies. Implicit in this new priority given to economic matters is the future importance of relations with the developing countries. Perhaps one may date the birth of

Yugoslavia's "Südpolitik" (as this reviewer refers to the policy of non-alignment) with the conclusion of a major commercial agreement with India in late 1948.

Most interestingly, Pirjevec analyzes Yugoslav charges that Stalin was a liar. The use of this term would seem to serve several purposes. It underscores the fact that initially there was a close correspondence between Belgrade's and Moscow's aims. Then, on account of his being "infected" with "distrustfulness," Stalin is seen as marring this co-operation by abandoning the Yugoslavs in their efforts to secure irredenta and to aid neighboring Communist parties. This notion of Stalin short-changing his Communist partners illustrates an important facet of the time-honored thesis that Stalin's autocratic personality bore the primary responsibility for the Cominform rupture.

The author's erudition is apparent. He marshals enough sources, in many languages, to provide over six hundred footnotes. The work was in part carried out in the United States, where Pirjevec made use of the National Archives and the Truman Library. Due to its straightforward and engaging prose, the narrative is in general very accessible. It is also studded with a number of illustrative or entertaining details.

There is an abundance of historical sidelights, such as descriptions of Kardelj's breakfasts with Molotov in Paris, and of British ambassador Peakes' train ride to Trieste as he learned by telephone and newspaper of the Cominform session in Bucharest at which Yugoslavia was expelled. Pirjevec also includes such anecdotes as a description of Kidrič as an "enfant prodige;" the poem over which Georgi Dimitrov mused while in a German prison; a tea-time conversation between diplomats in Belgrade during which Anna Pauker compares Stalin to an experienced ice-skater; and a song of praise likening Tito to a white violet. Readers will thus find in this work a wealth of colorful particulars to flesh out their general understanding of the period's events.

Although in general this work is quite sound, one may nonetheless disagree with the author over his analysis of the motives of "Tito and company" for resisting Soviet power. Pirjevec does mention Tito's need to defend his own authority, but he gives much more weight to a depiction of Tito as a virtuous, valiant revolutionary, who by opposing Stalin remained true to the genuine—presumably, Leninist—radicalism of his youth. This devotion is accented by Tito's dogged, unceremonial practicality. "It's hard for us," he is quoted as saying after the rupture, "but then again, when have we had it easy?" Pirjevec's view of Tito's personality is widely shared, but would be well complemented by more commentary on the psychology of his preservation of power, as elaborated by Ulam, Djilas, and other observers.

An oft-neglected third set of factors in Tito's dissent was actually ideological. Pirjevec does not emphasize these motives, which center on differing Yugoslav and Soviet conceptions of the Party's role in the Popular Front, the rapidity of economic centralization, co-operation with "progressive bourgeoisie," the worker-peasant alliance, and the exportability of the early Yugoslav model. Interested readers may consult the work of A. Ross Johnson.

It is also important to note that, unfortunately, Pirjevec did not have full access to Yugoslav diplomatic archives. He is thus unable to shed new light on the motives behind certain of Tito's controversial actions. But the absence of this material is clearly stated in the introduction, and it in no way hinders the flow and breadth of the narrative. *Tito, Stalin in zahod* is highly recommended to diplomatic historians and to general students of the period.

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