

The results of statistical tests are not cited in the typical way; e.g., “chi-square .000” (80), instead of reporting this as a p-value (presumably, $p < .001$). Not all forms are glossed, and the combinations of characters and diacritic marks used in the transcription of dialect forms are also not always clearly explained; it would have been helpful to supply a complete table or list somewhere with IPA equivalents. I mention these things here because this is a work that should be of interest to a broader audience, beyond the narrow circle of scholars specializing in Slovene dialects, and minor changes such as these would make it more accessible and appealing to non-specialists, particularly sociolinguists. However, none of these quibbles seriously detracts from the merits of the work as a whole.

Dialect Leveling in Haloze, Slovenia is an interesting and valuable contribution to the study of South Slavic language varieties. It provides important information about an understudied group of dialects and their historical development, but goes beyond the traditional goals of dialect description by investigating variation in contemporary dialect usage and attitudes about different language varieties from the perspective of perceptual dialectology. The application of sociolinguistic research methods for the study of language variation is still relatively rare within the field of South Slavic linguistics, and it is to be hoped that more researchers will follow in Lundberg’s footsteps.

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Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi. *The Italian Army in Slovenia: Strategies of Antipartisan Repression, 1941-1943*. Translated by Elizabeth Burke and Anthony Majanlahti. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. XIV + 196 pp., \$95 (hardcover). ISBN: 9781137281197.

Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi’s monograph, fluidly translated from Italian by Elizabeth Burke and Anthony Majanlahti, is a welcome addition to the rather sparse English-language scholarship on the behavior of the Italian military in occupied Slovenia. Guerrazzi’s work was preceded by a few

recent strong surveys, such as James H. Burgwyn's 2005 study *Empire on the Adriatic* and Davide Rodogno's 2006 translated work *Fascism's European Empire*, yet none of them focused specifically on occupied Slovenia. The distinction is critical, for in comparison to occupied Croatia, for example, where "the Italian soldiers were able to recall their defense of the ethnic minorities with pride" (121), they remained largely mum on the atrocious war crimes that were committed in Slovenia. Indeed, this is a central theme in Guerrazzi's work—how to explain the massive chasm separating the reputation (and myth) of the "*bono taliano*" (good Italian) during the Second World War from the cold-blooded killings perpetrated against civilians as an official antipartisan strategy in Slovenia. That this subject is not merely the preserve of isolated scholarly exchange is evident in Guerrazzi's final chapter ("Memory and Oblivion"), where he traces the reluctance of both Italian officials and the public to come to terms with the shameful conduct of their army and especially its commanders in Slovenia, clinging instead to the outdated "good Italian" caricature, or even worse, seeing themselves solely as the war's victims.

It wasn't meant to be this way, as Guerrazzi reveals in his opening chapter "The Annexion." "Italian conduct, in this early phase," Guerrazzi reminds us, "was marked by a certain moderation" (22). Under the guidance of civilian administrators, the Italians offered their newly annexed so-called Province of Ljubljana "cultural and linguistic autonomy" (22), which although intended to Italianize the population in the long-run was still far less harsh than the brutal behavior of the occupying Germans, who were attempting in the summer of 1941 to deport a third of their Slovene population. Yet Guerrazzi devotes only a few pages to this "honeymoon stage" in Italy's illegal occupation and annexation of Slovene territory, as it had already been largely derailed by the autumn of 1941 with the emergence of armed Slovene resistance in the form of the Liberation Front (OF – Osvobodilna fronta). In fact, Mario Robotti, the commander of the Italian Eleventh Army Corps, which was assigned occupation duties in Slovenia, insisted that the hostile Slovene population *was taking advantage* of the "slackness and tolerance that has produced the phrase *bono taliano*" (27). By September 1941 the death penalty had been declared for "those responsible for attacks and those who had taken part in subversive meetings or assemblies or were in possession of anti-Italian propaganda material" (28) and the military had taken over from civilian authorities exclusive control of all antipartisan operations.

With this passing of the torch (or rifle), Guerrazzi's work enters the meaty and most rewarding phase—the attempt (and failure) by the Italian Second Army and its Eleventh Army Corps to stamp out Partisan activity by relying almost exclusively on draconian military measures. Through the close examination of Italian archival sources, Guerrazzi chronicles the spiraling violence in the three following chapters beginning in the autumn

of 1941 and ending with the orgy of violence that was the Italian summer offensive (June–September 1942). Somewhat confusingly, Guerrazzi decided to entitle some of his chapters after the leaders of the Italian Second Army; Chapters 2 and 3 are named after Vittorio Ambrosio and Mario Roatta respectively, while chapter 5 is entitled Gambara, after Gastone Gambara, who takes over the command of the Eleventh Army Corps in December 1942. The tenure of these commanders, with the possible exception of Gambara's return to a relatively passive antipartisan strategy, were not that distinctive and the book could have been better subdivided using actual events and chronologies specific to the antipartisan struggle in Slovenia, such as chapter 4's ("Summer 1942") coverage of the Italian summer offensive. Moreover, awarding Ambrosio, Roatta, and Gambara with chapters begs the question of why Robotti, who had his fingers more deeply imbedded (and for longer) in the antipartisan fight than any other Italian military official, did not deserve his own chapter.

However, these reservations are mostly optical and do not detract from Guerrazzi's well-researched explanation for what he sardonically refers to as the "exceptional case" (xii) of Italian brutality in Slovenia. To debunk this presumed exceptionalness, Guerrazzi takes the long view of Italian experiences in counter-insurgency tactics. In his introduction, Guerrazzi surveys the horrific reprisals against civilians in Libya and Ethiopia prior to World War II, where the aim was to terrorize the population into rejecting resistance, resulting in some 100,000 and 500,000 victims respectively (3). Not only did some of the key military figures in occupied Slovenia cut their teeth in these African campaigns, but the Italian' overall antipartisan policy against "racially inferior" and hostile Slavs—favored themes in Fascist propaganda—was copied from Libya and Ethiopia, including "devastating villages, burning houses, and shooting and deporting civilians" (17). Guerrazzi also highlights the poor caliber of the Italian military and especially its higher officers. The latter were rigidly stratified and denied lower-ranking officers the operational flexibility to suppress insurgency that was adopted by the Wehrmacht. Poorly schooled in antiguerrilla campaigns, the Italian military command assumed until 1939 that the next war would be a "trench war" like the last (9). As for weaponry, the Italian army was also largely unprepared to fight a guerilla-style war, lacking vehicles for rapid deployment and armed primarily with rifles and hand grenades. When faced with an enemy that did not dig into trenches, but rather moved lightly across a land they knew well, struck Italian patrols and garrisons with deadly effect with the few submachine guns they possessed, and then blended into the civilian population, the Italians could only respond with clumsy brutality. Guerrazzi offers numerous documented cases of Partisans slipping out of poorly planned Italian dragnets. Often unable to catch, let alone neutralize, the OF insurgency, Italian soldiers took their frustrations out on civilians who frequently had only the faintest

connection to the resistance. In the numerous orders he provides as evidence, including Roatta's infamous March 1942 Circular 3C, which mandated a scorched earth policy, the taking of hostages, and the widespread arrest and internment of civilians (especially those capable of supporting the resistance) in concentration camps, Guerrazzi reveals that such behavior was in most cases officially sanctioned by Italian commanders. While Guerrazzi notes that such policies were also practiced by the Nazis, Russians, and other armies (49–50), he contends that the Italian military's particular inability to strike surgically against resisters helped contribute to their viciousness against those they could apprehend—that is, civilians. Guerrazzi's larger point, which he repeats several times throughout his work (for example on pages 54 and 87), is that the shooting and arrest of civilians and the burning of homes was not “hot” violence committed in the thick of battle against guerillas with civilians as unfortunate collateral damage. This was “cold” violence, often committed well after engagements with the guerillas or failed raids. As Guerrazzi notes, “This was simply planned violence, against all the rules of war, and ordered from above” (54).

While Guerrazzi provides a thorough and well-documented exploration of the brutality of the Italian military in occupied Slovenia, he telescopes his analysis largely to the most violent one-year span from September 1941 to September 1942. His study largely ignores the less violent “shoulder” periods from April to September 1941 and especially the last year of the Italian occupation from September 1942 to September 1943. Chapter 5 (“Gambara”), which covers Gambara's tenure as commander of the Eleventh Army Corps from December 1942 to the capitulation, is only five pages long, essentially a quick summary of the return to the tried-and-failed policy of fragmenting Italian forces among numerous garrisons and the abandonment of the more aggressive search-and-destroy missions that had characterized much of 1942. Just because there were “no large-scale actions to be remembered, no great victories or heavy defeats” in the final year of the occupation does not mean that the period does not deserve more attention (119). Indeed, Guerrazzi briefly notes that the Italian occupation was increasingly “Slovenicized” in this later period (115), as the Italians came to rely more heavily on the *Milizia volontaria anti comunista* (MVAC)—a Slovene antipartisan collaborating formation which had been established during the Italian summer offensive. Yet the MVAC, despite the important role they played in antipartisan repression and the overall development of what was already by 1943 a civil war between resisters and collaborators, is first mentioned only in the final twenty pages of the book (112). In addition to the MVAC, the Slovene Chetniks—which are not mentioned at all in the book—also established relations with the Italians which allowed them to pursue the Partisans unmolested by the Italians. The resistance is also treated too much as a monolithic organization. There is

little attempt to distinguish between the OF and the non-communist led, albeit weaker and unarmed, resistance groups in Slovenia, especially in the first-year of the occupation. The *varnostna obveščevalna služba* (VOS) is obscurely referred to as “a partisan organization” (66), rather than as the armed security and intelligence wing of the Communist party of Slovenia. The OF also suffered far more dramatically from Italian antipartisan policies than Guerrazzi is willing to admit, and the organization was largely incapacitated (temporarily) by the Italian summer offensive. Guerrazzi’s reluctance to better explain the complexity of the Slovene response to the Italian occupation by resisters, collaborators, and accommodators, leaves the Slovenes as somewhat faceless actors in the dynamic relationship that often develops between the occupied and the occupier. On a final editing note, while the book reads wonderfully in English, the two maps of the Province of Ljubljana on page 137 contains a confusing array of Slovene, Italian and a few undecipherable place names that would have been better represented had only one of the languages (preferably Slovene) been consistently applied.

These concerns, however, are largely sins of omission, and resistance and collaboration in Slovenia have admittedly been covered in many studies by Slovene and non-Slovene historians. As for his stated goal that is encapsulated in his title—explaining the Italian Army’s strategies of antipartisan repression in occupied Slovenia—Guerrazzi’s work succeeds admirably and should become its authoritative text. On a wider level, Guerrazzi’s study of Italian-occupied Slovenia is a must-read for anyone interested in memory studies and a critical addition to the growing literature that is reassessing the decades-old image of the “good Italian.” Confronted with Robotti’s 3 August 1942 statement that “we must begin to create a greater terror than that provoked by the rebels” (98), this antiquated one-sided perception must surely crumble.

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