

MODERNIZATION AND ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN CARINTHIA

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At the end of the eighteenth century Europe was struck by a new type of conflict, the nationalistic struggle. Much has been written about this topic, often from an emotive point of view. The mechanisms which conditioned this type of ideological and social dynamic have not yet been rationally explained. It is however an important phenomenon which has been exported from Europe to almost all parts of the world; hence the value of scholarly works that try to better understand this kind of dynamic, in particular situations, as their results may be extended to a general model.

I suggest that nationalistic conflicts are closely bound to a wider phenomenon, termed more generally by many authors "modernization,"¹ which includes other aspects: social, economic, productive and so on. Nationalism in particular is a consequence of the new idea of social power emerging and becoming consolidated through the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment.

In the Middle Ages power was believed to be an attribute given by God to the ruler. Loyalty to the latter thus assumed a transcendental character. The specific character of the population ruled did not play a relevant role, and one ruler could very well govern different ethnic groups, as was the case with the Habsburgs. The modern idea denied this kind of relationship, considering social power as an emanation of the people. It was an innovative concept, posing several other problems, as for example the mechanisms by which power was to be expressed, how power was to be represented and delegated, and other problems of an organizational nature.

It poses the fundamental question: which segment of a total population is entitled to wield social power? To give an adequate answer, the idea of "nation" was conceived: a population homogeneous with respect to racial, cultural, linguistic, and historic characteristics. Thus a common base was created to express the right to build up the power structure, the national state in the modern sense of the word. Nation B would not like to be ruled by the power mechanisms of population A, but would claim its own mechanisms: i.e., every nation had the right to be governed by itself. In the old system this problem was not so

¹ See for example the works of Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality* 2nd. ed. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1975).

crucial: if power were given by God to a ruler, several populations might be ruled by them. The first obligation of social power was to transcendence, which is intangible. If the first obligation is to the people, who comprise something tangible, then the kind of population ruled becomes crucial, and as a consequence nationalism emerged.

Nationalism was a virulent phenomenon and its virulence derived from the fact that if we want to apply the concept just described, it is necessary to establish firmly the national domains which obtain in the given situation. The idea arose in the Western cultural environment, producing national states governed by democratic, popular structures in England, the United States of America, France and so on. After some delay, it arrived in Central and Southern Europe, and even later it reached the rest of the world. The application of the idea brought conflicts everywhere, as old social and economic organizations had to be destroyed and new ones built up.

In Central and Eastern Europe the application of the national idea met with a series of difficulties: (1) the boundaries between the different groups did not clearly coincide with geographic areas; (2) the territories of groups in the same region overlapped; and (3) in a given nation, the sense of membership matured earlier in some groups and later in others; thus at any given moment there were many people who could not decide to which nation they belonged. The real situation on the ground was less homogeneous than would have been theoretically desirable.

In such regions conflicts were inevitable, if the blurred situations were to be clarified. They were typical for many parts of Habsburg Austria, as they are today for areas like Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the well-known terrible consequences.

Andreas Moritsch recently published a very detailed analysis of the economic, social, ideological and psychological mechanisms operating in different areas of Carinthia and the Burgenland during the development of national conflicts, from the second half of the 19th century through the end of the 20th.² Both were regions where the conflict eventually resulted in partition between the successor states of the Habsburg empire. Of these two areas the one selected for consideration here is Carinthia,³ where the conflict developed more extensively.

² Andreas Moritsch, ed., *Vom Ethnos zur Nationalität* [= *Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*] (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik/München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991).

³ This emerges clearly in two of the chapters in Moritsch, *Vom Ethnos*: first, in Gerhard Baumgartner, "Der nationale Differenzierungsprozess in den Ländlichen Gemeinden des südlichen Burgenlandes," 93, 150; and second, and particularly, in Andreas Moritsch and Gerhard Baumgartner, "Vergleichende

Demographically, Carinthia changed relatively little in the period relevant to our considerations. This is shown in Diagram I. From these data we can easily see that in the span of 145 years the population of Carinthia grew from 318,577 to 547,798, i.e., by a factor of 1.7, that is a 0.375% yearly average.⁴ Diagram II shows the pattern of the total population growth balance (natural growth plus migration) for the whole of Carinthia in the same period. Interpolating the data by a polynomial curve, we see a minimal growth ratio in 1880, a maximum in 1950 and a recent negative trend. We may conclude that with some oscillations Carinthia was never a very dynamic demographic area. This is an advantageous fact if we wish to consider the impact of nationalism separately from demographic phenomena.

YEAR	POPULATION	PERIOD	NATURAL BALANCE (b)	MIGRATION BALANCE (c)	TOTAL BALANCE	YEARS	ANNUAL VARIATION
1846	318,577						
1869	315,397						
1880	324,857	1869-1880	10,800	-1,3009	+9,500	11	+2.66%
1890	337,013	1880-1890	17,700	-5,500	+12,200	10	+3.62%
1900	343,531	1890-1900	20,600	-14,100	+6,500	10	+1.89%
1910	371,372	1900-1910	28,900	-1,00	+27,900	10	+7.51%
1923	371,227	1910-1923	1,400	-1,600	-200	13	-0.04%
1934	405,129	1923-1934	41,400	-7,500	+33,900	11	+7.61%
1939	416,268						
1951	474,764	1934-1951	53,300	+16,400	+69,700	17	+8.64%
1961	495,226	1951-1961	49,600	-29,200	+20,400	10	+4.12%
1971	526,759	1961-1971	45,700	-14,200	+31,500	10	+5.98%
1976 ^a	533,674						
1981	536,179	1971-1981	14,600	-5,200	+9,400	10	+1.75%
1991	547,798	1981-1991	9,600	+2,000	+11,600	10	+2.12%

^a Data from projection; all other years: data from censuses
^b Balance from births and deaths
^c Balance from immigration and emigration

**DIAGRAM I:
POPULATION GROWTH IN CARINTHIA, 1846-1991**

Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse der Dorfuntersuchungen in Kärnten und im Burgenland," 156.

⁴ $i = \left(\frac{P_n}{P_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - 1 = \left(\frac{547798}{318577}\right)^{\frac{1}{145}} - 1 = 0.00375$ or 0.375%




DIAGRAM II: TOTAL POPULATION, CARINTHIA

If we consider particular sub-areas of the region, we may see that some of them were more and others less dynamic than the average. For example, Tom Priestly recently published a set of data regarding two Carinthian localities, Borovlje/Ferlach and Sele/Zell.⁵ These may be summarily presented as in Diagram III.


YEAR	BOROVLJE/ FERLACH			SELE/ ZELL		
	TOTAL	SLOVENES		TOTAL	SLOVENES	
1846	1549	1549	100%	988	988	100%
1880	1894	1155	61%	1027	1027	100%
1890	2307	1384	60%	1070	1070	100%
1900	2543	1093	43%	1007	996	99%
1910	3194	319	10%	1027	1016	99%
1923	4714	1414	30%	971	961	99%
1934	4786	1052	22%	1025	953	92%
1971	7552	830	11%	835	768	92%
1976	8483				868	

DIAGRAM III: POPULATION OF BOROVLJE & SELE

From these data one may derive several graphs to demonstrate key demographic and ethnic phenomena. Let us, e.g., take Diagram IV, which shows a population growth comparison for these two localities during the period of observation, from the 1850s to the 1970s. The data show a very strong divaricating pattern. Clearly, in this period Borovlje multiplied the number of its inhabitants by more than four, whereas Sele did not grow at all. Whereas the whole of Carinthia grew by a factor of 1.7 in 145

⁵ Tom M.S. Priestly, "Surrender to symbolic domination, or resistance: patterns of language-use among Slovene-speakers in two Carinthian communities," *Slovene Studies* 12/2 (1990) 183-203.

years, Borovlje grew by 4.5 in 130 years,⁶ i.e., had an average growth of 1.317% a year, showing a demographic behaviour 3.512 times more dynamic than that in Carinthia as a whole and 132 times more dynamic than that of Sele.⁷



**DIAGRAM IV
POPULATION GROWTH, BOROVLJE & SELE**

From Moritsch's book we can see that the comparison between Borovlje and Sele is not isolated, and that there are other similar comparisons which can be made. For example, places such as Železna Kapla/Eisenkappel, Bela/Vellach⁸, and Bilčovs/Ludmannsdorf⁹ demonstrated a demographic behavior similar to that of Sele.

The above data clearly demonstrate that something different from the average happened in Borovlje. The question is, exactly what? It is easy to see that the Borovlje data can be conveniently fitted on an exponential growth curve (Diagram V).

If the growth pattern were exponential in a strict mathematical sense, it would have a trend toward infinity, which is impossible in the real world. The only realistic hypothesis is that the curve is only a portion of the logistic growth curve that is typical for inno-

⁶ $i = \left(\frac{P_n}{P_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - 1 = \left(\frac{8483}{1549}\right)^{\frac{1}{130}} - 1 = 0.01317$ or 1.317%

⁷ $i = \left(\frac{P_n}{P_0}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}} - 1 = \left(\frac{868}{1549988}\right)^{\frac{1}{130}} - 1 = 0.0000996$ or 0.00996%

⁸ Moritsch, 191.

⁹ Moritsch, 83.




DIAGRAM V
POPULATION GROWTH CURVE, BOROVLJE

vative phenomena. This model, described in almost all business manuals, is the so called *life-cycle curve*,¹⁰ the first part of which refers to the growth of a new product, as also, more generally, the growth of an innovative business. The complete life-cycle curve is illustrated in Diagram VI.




DIAGRAM VI: LIFE-CYCLE CURVE (FIRST PART)

The Borovlje curve would, perhaps, correspond to the dotted part of the curve represented in Diagram VI. Let us begin our considerations with the formal resemblance between the Borovlje curve and the business life-cycle curve. Is this resemblance only formal, or is there something more profound behind the apparent similarity?

¹⁰ Philip Kotler and Gary Armstrong, *Marketing. An Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987) 274, 282.

In order to answer this question, it should be said that product life-cycle curves simply describe the quantitative variation in time of the sales of new products which have some success in the market, or of the sales or profits of successful companies. My hypothesis is that the formal resemblance is not accidental, i.e., that there are connections between the two phenomena which are worth investigating in more detail. In the case of business, the explanation is a simple one, as we are considering a new product which is replacing old ones. The success of the new product depends on it's being more suitable to the needs and wants of consumers, causing a rise in "demand" and hence an increase in sales. The portion of exponential growth is due to a stage of more than proportional diffusion speed in the market: at successive equal intervals of time, corresponding rising intervals of sales occur.

The exponential growth of a community may be more complex in nature, but only to a certain extent, as in this case, too, a demand model may be proposed: the population growth of a settlement in a short period is certainly due to immigration in the area; and movement into the area must have origin in a demand for it, as in the case of the life-cycle. There must be an "attraction" exhibited: in the case of the life-cycle this is exhibited by a product or a company, in the case of a locality it must be present in the place or area. In the first case there is no need for people to move, as (for the most part) products move along distribution channels closer to consumers, whereas in the case of a locality, people are obliged to migrate if they want to satisfy their needs. Thus in the first case we have a growth curve for products, whereas in the second case the same kind of curve is exhibited by geographical locations.

What may be causing the attraction? In the case of a product, there certainly are advantages provided by it for the buyer. In the case of a place there must be advantages too, provided by it for the people that is being attracted to it. The advantages may be certainly accepted as a difference when compared to traditional products or places. Such differences are termed "innovations," as they were not present previously in the case of traditional products, and for similar reasons are termed "modernization" or "technological and cultural change" for locations and areas. A modernizing area provides its advantages in the form of new and better work opportunities, new and more productive methods of organization, better possibilities of survival, or even possibilities of becoming richer and reaching a higher level of life. But in order to obtain these advantages a new culture is needed, i.e., new knowledge must be absorbed by the individuals in order to be able to master the new situation.

We cannot go into detail with this argument, as it is treated in a vast literature;¹¹ here it suffices to say that its essence is afforded by a deep change having effects in all sectors of life. One of the most visible effects is connected with language: new words for new objects and methods are created and spread. Hence it is no wonder that it is an occasion for the affirmation of new idioms: the populations which are more eager to adopt the new methods, adapting to the new situations in a creative way, may start to use new words, and spread them to the populations which are lagging behind.¹²

The concept of the life-cycle is discussed in the social science literature: it is proposed by Robertson, Miller, Snow and Benford in their works.¹³

In order to analyze the situation in the other location to be compared, Sele, let us consider Diagram VII which is the "pendent" of Diagram V. Fitting the Sele data onto a curve, as we did for Borovlje, we obtain a picture which is entirely different: here no portion of a growth curve can be seen, only a parabola with a peak (maximum) around the turn of the century. In the case of Sele, no modernization growth is apparent: the population data slowly increase during the 1800s, reach a peak at the turn of the century and then decrease slowly toward the year 2000. The phenomena here are indeed entirely different. The hypothesis may be proposed that in the case of Sele modernization processes did not obtain at all, or at least did not obtain to the same extent as in Borovlje. We may suppose that the basic phenomenon here was a slow evolution of the rural settlement, negatively affected by the quick growth of nearby locations like Borovlje, which in turn was fostered by emigration from places like Sele. (As is pointed out above, there are other places in Carinthia that show demographic patterns similar to that of Sele).

¹¹ Philip K. Bock, *Modern Cultural Anthropology* (New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1974).

¹² See, e.g., Alessio L. Lokar, "Culture e lingue in contatto nell'ambito dell'Alpe Adria," *Sveučilište "V.Bakarič" u Rijeci- Università degli Studi "V. Bakarič" di Fiume; Pedagoški fakultet u Rijeci-Facoltà di pedagogia di Fiume. Jezici i kulture u doticajima-Lingue e culture in contatto, Zbornik I. Medjunarodnog skupa-Atti del 1° Convegno Internazionale; Pula-Pola, 14-15.IV 1988. Pula-Pola 1989, 52, 63.*

¹³ I. Robertson, *Sociologia* (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1988) 620-21; D. Miller, *Introduction to Collective Behavior*, (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 1985) 287-88; D. Snow & D. Benford, "Schemi interpretativi dominanti e cicli di protesta," *Polis*, (Bologna: Il Mulino) 3/1, 1989, 5.




DIAGRAM VII: POPULATION GROWTH CURVE, SELE

Local Slovenedom was deeply and negatively affected by the phenomena described. That can be seen in the quantitative pattern of the number of Slovenes in both places, as in Diagrams VIII and IX:




DIAGRAM VIII: SLOVENE INHABITANTS, BOROVLJE




DIAGRAM IX: SLOVENE INHABITANTS, SELE

Despite the exponential growth of Borovlje, its Slovene population decreased in the period under discussion, which demonstrates that Slovenedom diminished under the influence of the modernization effect; and this is confirmed by the analogous figure for Sele. Diagram IX, showing the variation of the Slovene population of Sele, is almost identical to Diagram VII, as the population of Sele remained almost 100% Slovene.

From the data illustrated here, I propose the following more general consideration: that Slovenedom in Carinthia simply suffered from a delay in modernization.

We cannot say that Slovenedom did not modernize at all. The simple fact that Slovenes elaborated their modern standard language, and after a certain period have recently attained an independent national state, is a proof to the contrary. But we must consider that Carinthia was on one hand peripheral to the center of modernization of the Slovene nation, and on the other was at the forefront of the Slovene world in the direction of the "push" towards modernization which came from north-western Europe. The timing of the phenomenon should be considered too. The German-speakers in Austria were much closer to the heart of modernization phenomena in Europe, and were hence able to become experienced in them, exploiting them earlier, whereas the Slovenes were affected by them later. The German-speakers obtained their national states by the middle of the 19th century; the Slovenes did not obtain theirs until the end of the 20th. In places like Borovlje and Sele, which may be paradigmatic for Carinthia, the development described resulted in an increase in the difference in modernization between locations where it took root and developed during an earlier historical period, and locations

where it developed later and in different ways. In Borovlje we have for instance the development of industry, whereas in Sele we can probably speak only about later rural modernization.

These considerations are confirmed also by other historical data. Let us begin with the original situation which stayed unchanged for centuries:

●1. Ethnically different populations lived together in the same area, with in some places German-speakers in the quantitative majority of the population, in others Slovenes. But everywhere in Austria that Slovenes lived, German-speakers were the feudal lords, representing the essence of the old system. The language of the subjects was of little interest and the same feudal lord could rule different populations.

We can cite examples for this particular, and for our days strange, situation. In 1836 a nobleman from Vienna made an expedition to Mount Triglav, the highest mountain of Carniola, the land bordering Carinthia to the south. In Ljubljana, the Carniolan capital, he spoke German everywhere, but in the villages beneath the mountain he had to take an interpreter, because *nobody knew German*.¹⁴ This was in an area which had been more than 1,000 years under Habsburg, that is, German feudal rule! Another example: two English tourists, Gilbert and Churchill, who were traveling in Carniola and Carinthia area in 1860, had to learn Slovene phrases in some areas to obtain the services they needed.¹⁵

●2. The situation was disrupted by the modernizing, democratic ideas. At first a cultural and later a political program was elaborated. Slovenes started the *Tabori* movement which encourage mass meetings of country people¹⁶ to express their claim for their own power structure. This movement was the first step towards change, i.e., modernization was initiated by Slovenes. But the *Tabori* movement had the disadvantage of being a long term program, as the ideas that were promised were very far from realization: the destruction of the old situation and the construction of a new one could be attained only in a long time-period. In fact, it took more than 100 years for the Slovenes to reach their national state.

¹⁴ Information from: Julius Kugy, *Fünf Jahrhunderte Triglav* (Graz: Leykam Verlag, 1938) 118, 139; [Chapter 8 = "Eine Neuerliche Ersteigung des Triglav", von Franz von Hermannstahl (1831), from *Wiener Zeitschrift für Kunst, Literatur, Theater und Mode* 128-132 (1831)].

¹⁵ Josiah Gilbert, and G.C. Churchill F.G.S., *The Dolomite Mountains excursions through Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola, & Friuli in 1861, 1862, & 1863. With a Geological Chapter, and Pictorial Illustrations from Original Drawings on the Spot*. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1864).

¹⁶ See, e.g., Moritsch, 223.

●3. German-speakers acted at first only in reaction to these events. It is clear why this was so: by virtue of the feudal structure, they already enjoyed social power. The passing of power from German-speaking lords to the German-speaking middle class was much easier than that from German-speaking lords to Slovene peasants. The former group was only social, whereas the latter, being social and national, was much more revolutionary. It is interesting now to consider the strategies of the two groups. The Slovenes were striving for national recognition, but did not know exactly how to achieve it: they had to discover the correct path. Moreover, they did not clearly understand what they were striving for, as they had almost no experience in politics; at that stage they tended to confuse cultural emancipation with political emancipation. The German-speakers, with their greater historical experience, developed more effective strategies with greater speed.

●4. These strategies were oriented toward the objective of acquiring as much land and Germanizing as many people as possible. Since warfare was not a realistic option at this stage of development, given the co-existence of the two groups within a peaceful and well-functioning state and society, the groups tended to develop strategies of a more peaceful character. In Carinthia, war and guerrilla actions played only a marginal role.

We may describe the situation using a model representing a force field emanating from a pole. The pole represents the center of modernization, whereas the field represents an area around it, with a gradient the intensity of which varies inversely with the square of the distance from the pole. Persons caught within the field were induced to change; and the change is complex. This complexity is due to the fact that people are not simple electrical charges but organisms endowed to a certain extent with rationality and liberty of choice. For a charged particle caught in a field of forces, we may predict its behavior, but the same is much less true for persons and social groups. Hence, several responses to the situation were possible: for many of them it took the form of migration toward the center and settlement in it. But geographical migration is not the only result even if it may be the most visible. What is always present is cultural change, an alternative response which was induced in persons and groups caught in the field. One of the aspects of this kind of cultural change is the introduction of new concepts, models, methods, words and finally language.

The "modernization field" caused an impetus to mobilization for individuals, who reacted to this effect in various ways: many of them gradually shifted to Germanness, the modernization pole of which was more effective and realistic. The advantage offered by the "German pole" was a readier and easier path to a modern conformation. Its disadvantage consisted in a certain disconnection from the natural sense of belonging of people, and hence

some degree of loss of connection with ethnic roots, a process having a traumatic effect on personality. A person is always the product of a given history. The personality suffers when there is a lack of consciousness about one's roots and of a harmonic connection with them. If we look at the very essence of things, we know to-day from biology and anthropology that a person is nothing other than an amount of information¹⁷ summed up in time in the biological realm (genes) and in the cultural one (memory). Hence, in a certain sense, historical data are essential to personality in both the cultural and the biological field.

But, as is stated above, given the modernization field, Slovenes tried to build up their own particular modernization pole; and some people were attracted in that direction, adopting Slovene nationality, a strategy which had the advantage of harmony with the past, even if it had the disadvantage of a later and less efficient form of modernization with fewer advantages to those who took this option.

The choice of the "Slovene pole" was more natural, but less effective; the choice of the "German pole" went to some extent against nature, but had better short term results. People behaved individually and in consideration of their local environments. People from more static environments like Sele tended to remain Slovene, people from more dynamic environments like Borovlje tended to be Germanized.

There is another curve which is interesting to consider: that of the distribution of people considering their readiness to innovate (Diagram X). Innovators are mostly younger people with a better economic and cultural position, better educated (the intelligentsia), originating from urban environments, whereas people tend to be poorer, older, less educated and more rural if we shift to the right on the x axis.

There is another explanation of the phenomenon of interest here: more dynamic places like Borovlje contained probably a larger number of younger and richer people, with less opposition to change.

The process lasted a certain period of time and is possibly not yet finished; in other words, many people started to change but they still did not reach the goal: they are still lagging half-way. In order to attract these people different "polar" strategies were applied.

¹⁷ See, for example, the recent very interesting article by Allan C. Wilson and Rebecca L. Cann, "The Recent African Genesis of Humans," *Scientific American*, April 1992, 22, 27 where it is stated: "A ... full set of genes, is complete because it holds all the inherited biological information of an individual."




DIAGRAM X: ADOPTION OF INNOVATIONS

The German-speakers, who had the advantage of time and quality in building their modernization poles, introduced a new ethno-social form named the “Windische;” this tried to reduce the trauma of cutting the roots, whose importance is demonstrated above, and which is especially significant in a restricted area like Carinthia, where the home village is often mostly not more than ten or twenty kilometers from the modernization pole.¹⁸ But, clearly, in the use of the “Windisch” strategy the direction of the change vector, oriented primarily toward the German-speaking end result, was important.

For strategic reasons it was also important to build up a Carinthian version of Germanism, with a peculiar loudly-stated regional connotation and militant approach. There were two reasons for this: first, to attract those who would be Germanized; and second, to construct a barrier against the potential reversion of those people who would wish to be Slovenized again. Cutting one’s roots is always traumatic to the personality and even if individuals do accept it at a given moment because it is temporarily convenient, they may regret it later when things settle. There are examples of this kind, especially among the intelligentsia,¹⁹ members of which are known to be more mobile and more ready to change. Somebody who is ready to change once may be ready to change again; or, members of the following generation may evince this readiness.

¹⁸ For people who migrate a considerable distance, for instance across the ocean, this cutting of one’s roots may be more natural: they are not daily confronted with the places and memories where the roots were present in the past.

¹⁹ A very interesting case may be that of the famous writer Peter Handke, 50% Slovene on his mother’s side, who lived as a child in Carinthia and in all his books expresses a kind of nostalgia for the cutting of his roots with his heritage. Another example would be that of Andreas Moritsch who (personal communication) found that he could more easily reconnect himself with his heritage when he lived in Vienna, where Germanism was not so fiercely militant.

Diagram XI schematically depicts the paradigm described here: a typical inhabitant of Carinthia is attracted toward two different modernization poles, the German-speaking and the Slovene one. They are also bound to their present situation by their roots. The three attractions have different strengths: the end result depends on the individuals' attitudes and mobility. Statistically and summarily, in the last century we may note a growth of German-speakers and a decrease of Slovenes. Hence, we may conclude that the attraction toward the German-speaking pole was stronger.




DIAGRAM XI: THE MODERNIZATION EFFECT

The whole situation however evolved over time: the apex of the conflict was reached at the end of World War I, when partition of the region between Austria and Yugoslavia took place, and the plebiscite followed. At that time the majority of the population opted for the German-speaking pole, thus betraying their roots.

Another critical period followed between World War I and II, especially during the Nazi period, when fanatic German nationalists tried by force to erase the Slovene presence, partly by Germanization and partly by forced evictions. After World War II, the process was concluded: the greater part of the areas previously inhabited by Slovenes became German-speaking, while the Slovenes remained a minority, forming islands in the German-speaking sea. Their presence corresponds to places where the modernization processes were slower, giving people time to adjust to the modernization rhythm, without cutting the connection with their roots.

POVZETEK**MODERNIZACIJA IN NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA
NA KOROŠKEM**

Nacionalizem je pravzaprav posledica sodobnega koncepta, da je oblast emanacija ljudstva; potemtakem si mora vsako ljudstvo postaviti lastno oblast in v zadnji konsekvenci tudi lastno državo. Ta model pa je posebno težko uporabiti v Srednji in Vzhodni Evropi, kjer so se narodi prekrivali in mešali in se še prekrivajo in mešajo in kjer se mnogi ljudje le počasi odločajo kateri naciji bi pripadali. Takšno področje je Koroška, kjer se je v preteklosti razplamtel narodnostni boj med Nemci in Slovenci. Če analiziramo koroški razvoj v zadnjih desetletjih in strategije, ki so jih postavljali na oder zgodovine posamezni igralci in če uporabljamo v ta namen določene modele in koncepte iz podjetniških strok kaže, da so bili rezultati tega boja ozko povezani z modernizacijskimi spremembami. Nastala sta dva modernizacijska pola: nemški in slovenski, vendar se je slovenski izkazal za kratkoročno manj učinkovitega zaradi zamude s katero se je loteval modernizacijskih prijemov.